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"You cannot teach a man anything; 
you can only help him to find it within himself, " 
Galileo Galilei. 
A B S T R A r T 
Towards the Development of a Model of Vision: 
An Investigation into the Architectures and Mechanisms of 
Visual Perception. 
by 
LUCY JANE TROUP 
A conceptual model of visual perception has been developed using a multi-
disciplinary approach which combines both top-down and bottom-up 
descriptions of vision. Top-down psychological theories of visual 
perception have been investigated resulting in the development of a theory 
of perception which combines the best of existing accounts. Perception is 
defined in terms of a combination of "data driven" and "concept driven" 
explanations. Bottom-up neurophysiological descriptions have also been 
investigated to provide possible descriptions of structure and function for 
the development of a conceptual model based upon the theory. An attempt is 
made to provide a "complete" account of visual perception through the 
development of both the theory and conceptual model. Further it is 
envisaged that the development of such a model wi l l provide new insight 
into the development of artificial vision systems and new algorithms for 
perceptual function in such systems. 
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C H A P T E R 1 
I N T R O D U C T I O N : 
AN O V E R V I E W OF T H E DEVELOPMENT OF A 
MODEL OF VISUAL PERCEPTION. 
This introductory chapter aims to provide an outline of the work that 
follows. An initial overview is provided, then the chapter has been divided 
into four sections. The first is an introduction to perception through an 
overview of previous attempts at explaining vision. The second is an 
overview of the theoretical framework in which the model is to be based, 
introducing the approach that has been taken to modelling vision. The third 
section is an introduction to the model itself in relation to the previous two 
sections. Finally there is a summary of the following five chapters. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N . 
AIMS OF THE THESIS. 
Before embarking on a description of the thesis it is important to explain 
the motivations behind the work that follows. The title of the thesis begins 
with the words; "Towards the development of a model of vision..." This is 
extremely important because as it suggests this work in no way constitutes a 
definitive account of a model of biological vision, neither does it describe a 
model implemented in software for use in the development of artificial 
vision applications. The aim then is quite simply twofold. 
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The first aim is to provide a better understanding of visual perception 
through the development of both a theory and conceptual model of 
perception. One of the key issues that w i l l be addressed in the thesis is that 
it is important to have a good conceptual model based on sound theory 
before you attempt any implementation. There is a danger that pressure to 
simulate any model developed distracts from the insight gained in 
understanding what is to be modelled. 
The second aim of the thesis, is to provide the foundations for a model of 
visual perception that could be easily implemented as an artificial vision 
system, by formulating new more efficient algorithms as a result of 
studying in detail real neuronal behaviours and architectures. 
It is reasonable to assume from attempts at developing artificial vision 
systems that the closer those systems are to the brain the more efficient they 
might be. An example of this can be seen in limitations experienced with 
expert systems approaches to the development of artificial vision systems. 
Early attempts at artificial vision systems such as "blocks world" (Roberts, 
1965; Waltz, 1975) were at best limited to the domain in which they were 
developed. The advent of artificial neural networks (ANN's) which had 
their foundations in a simplified understanding of how the brain was 
thought to function, as outlined in Rumelhart & Mc Clelland's 10 
characteristics of brain function (Rumelhart & Mc Clelland, 1986), were 
more successful in dealing with the problem of restricted domains. The key 
to ANN 'S was that they could learn, so could adapt to deal with new 
information, rather than depend on representations already stored in the 
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system. However the networks developed were inclined to be restricted to 
subsets of visual processing. For example successful neural network 
implementations tended to be built to deal with the problems of low level 
vision or high level vision, a distinction to levels of visual processing first 
popularised by Marr (Marr, 1982), separately. One of the reasons suggested 
for the inadequacies of ANN's in terms of explaining how the brain 
functioned was that the algorithms, for example "back-propagation" and 
architectures they ran on were not brain like at all (Massaro, 1988; Ratliff , 
1990). I f systems developed under these principles do not function like the 
brain, it would seem reasonable to suggest that in the development of a 
truly intelligent machine their performance could be bettered. Through the 
formulation of a conceptual model based closely on the brain it is hoped 
that systems can be developed that produce much more effective behaviours. 
DIFFERENT SORTS OF MODELS. 
It seems that to progress in the field of understanding any aspect of the 
brain involves a relationship with computers in some form. This 
relationship might just be to analyse data. However at the other end of the 
scale, the development of computer models of neuronal behaviour has 
proved to be extremely useful in developing the understanding that we have 
of the brain today. Implementing models of brain behaviour in software 
provides support for both reasons for modelling the brain. The sort of 
system that is developed determines how much detail is necessary in both 
the theory and conceptual model. For example, it is possible to define two 
broad categories of artificial system development with different aims and 
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objectives. These two sorts of system correspond with the two reasons for 
modelling perception that were previously outlined. Firstly there are those 
systems that w i l l eventually be marketed as being capable of performing 
some task that was otherwise performed by a human being. Such systems 
include fault detection devices, robots, chess playing games, etc. The 
development of such systems is not necessarily concerned with how the 
system works its concern is producing systems that can perform certain 
tasks that seem to be examples of "intelligent behaviour". These systems are 
concerned with the apparent behaviours they produce rather than the 
underlying mechanisms of those behaviours. However generalisations of the 
underlying mechanisms of the brain provide valuable artificial mechanisms 
that mean the performance of the artificial system is superior. Usually one 
has a task in mind and a system is developed that performs that task, this is 
referred to as a "top-down" approach to artificial intelligence. 
Secondly there are those systems that are developed to demonstrate 
behaviours but which also rely on architectures and mechanisms that have 
some kind of biological realism. These systems are built initially to work 
from a "bottom-up" approach. They start at the lowest level of function and 
build up on that in the hope that the eventual emergent behaviours wi l l be 
realistic. The underlying mechanisms are similar to those of the brain. At 
their purest level such systems are used by neurophysiologists to investigate 
how the brain actually works, through developing detailed models of 
neuronal behaviours. This approach also has bearing on the development of 
systems that are behaviour driven. Such models can provide information 
about new mechanisms that could be simplified and used in the development 
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of systems that are designed to perform a given task. However there is a 
certain amount of overlap between the two sorts of systems developed and it 
is not always the case that only one particular approach, either top-down or 
bottom-up, is applied in the development of one or other type of system. 
A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH. 
The idea of modelling the brain to understand its behaviour is not new. A 
distinguishing feature of this thesis is the aim to provide a multi-
disciplinary model of visual perception, that encompasses both 
psychological theory and an understanding of neuronal behaviours. To 
understand neuronal behaviours, mathematical analysis and computer 
simulation can provide invaluable tools. This means the involvement of at 
least four different disciplines, neurophysiology, psychology, computer 
science and mathematics in the modelling process. 
Such a model can take advantage of the understanding of vision that has 
been developed from each of these perspectives. There are however very 
few theories of vision that are not related specifically to one discipline. 
There are psychological, neurophysiological, and philosophical theories of 
how we see. It is a relatively simple task to develop models of vision from 
detailed neurophysiological research. It is when there is no specific 
physiological information that it becomes diff icul t to develop models, and 
psychological theories and behavioural information from psychological 
experiments become central to understanding (Bruce & Green, 1990). 
However reconciling neurophysiological data with psychological theory is 
not an easy task. The eventual outcome is that you have several theories 
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some derived f rom neurophysiology and others derived f rom psychology. In 
turn this means that most a r t i f i c i a l intelligence models have been developed 
through concentrating on one o f these particular theories. 
Links between what we know about vision and how we can create machines 
that can perform the same tasks have been dominated by theories o f vis ion 
or iginat ing f rom cognitive psychology. The implications o f this are that 
a r t i f i c i a l v is ion systems tend to be al l developed based on the same 
theories. Arguably it is only through major paradigm shif ts , or the advent of 
new theories generally l inked to the fai lure o f existing theories that changes 
in the models take place. Thus i f a theory is dominant for any length o f 
t ime, the models remain unchanged regardless o f developments f rom other 
disciplines. For example the expert systems approach was dominant for a 
long whi le in a r t i f i c i a l intelligence even though new approaches to 
intel l igent systems development were apparent. Neural network theory that 
eventually usurped the dominant expert systems approach had its 
foundations in 1940's neurophysiology, although i t was the early 1980's 
before a r t i f i c i a l neural network models began to be recognised in the 
development o f a r t i f i c i a l intelligence models. 
Through looking at the capabilities o f a r t i f i c i a l v is ion systems to date i t 
becomes obvious that there is a need to improve on their performance 
greatly. They are generally restricted to single tasks or "domains" and 
compared to the human visual system they are greatly infer ior . The insight 
a r t i f i c i a l systems applications have provided has been through their 
inab i l i ty to perform rather than through actually demonstrating real visual 
behaviours. A classic example being the previously mentioned "blocks 
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w o r l d " program. The blocks wor ld system was unable to process a r t i f i c i a l 
geometric scenes, being unable to generalise to object recognition in natural 
visual images (Roberts, 1965; Waltz, 1975). 
PROBLEMS OF M U L T I - D I S C I P L I N A R Y APPROACH. 
There are many problems associated wi th mult i -discipl inary approaches to 
the study o f any subject. One such problem is that by combining 
informat ion f rom different disciplines, in this case in research into vis ion, 
there is a danger that any discoveries about the nature of the problem may 
seem to be general rather than detailed. Detailed understanding evolves 
f rom looking extremely closely at a particular aspect o f perception. A 
specific problem, or area o f the brain is studied in depth, usually through 
research in a particular discipline such as neurophysiology or psychology. 
This often means that any insight gained is dependent on the research 
methods associated wi th that discipl ine. For example psychological 
interpretations o f vis ion often centre on behavioural experimentation to 
support a theory, whereas neurophysiological research provides detailed 
accounts o f how the brain actually functions in terms o f the mechanisms o f 
neuronal behaviour. To make things even more complex what is assumed to 
be a singular discipline comprises again o f a whole set o f sub-disciplines. 
Arguably neuroscience i t se l f is a mul t i -d isc ipl inary research area, invo lv ing 
the work o f anatomists, biochemists, and physiologists working either in 
c l in ica l neuroscience or experimental neuroscience (Bloom & Lazerson, 
1988), a l l using their own particular research methods, al l working on 
di f ferent aspects o f the same problem. The same applies to psychological 
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approaches to understanding vis ion. Wi th in the discipline of psychology 
there are developmental psychologists, cognitive psychologists, 
psychobiologists, etc., al l looking at vision f rom their own perspective. 
This leads to another very real problem, how informat ion is communicated 
wi th in and across disciplines. I t is not surprising that there is l i t t l e or no 
relationship between a model developed for example f rom psychological 
research and a model developed f rom neurophysiological research as they 
are both working at very different levels o f explanation. The descriptions 
they provide about vision could be seen as being wri t ten in different 
languages. This means that i f you understand one particular language, you 
w i l l be able to understand what the research in that discipline is saying. For 
example i f you are a neurophysiologist you w i l l explain vis ion in terms o f 
its underlying neuronal processes and relate this informat ion in a specific 
language used to describe these mechanisms. I f however you are a 
psychologist the informat ion w i l l not hold the same meaning, any 
understanding w i l l be l imi ted compared to that o f a neuroscientist. I f a clear 
understanding is d i f f i c u l t to communicate at the theoretical level there is 
l i t t l e chance o f that informat ion being o f any use in developing a r t i f i c i a l 
intelligence models. 
I f the development o f a better understanding o f vision or the development 
o f new a r t i f i c i a l systems capable o f perception is to become a reality there 
has to be inter-disciplinary communication. I t seems reasonable to suggest 
that an understanding o f vis ion in its ful lest sense is the f i r s t step to 
developing any sort o f model for whatever reason. Even i f your intention is 
to model a very small part o f v is ion, or even i f you are only concerned wi th 
19 
modell ing vision at its highest level , it is essential to have the most 
complete understanding possible. I t seems clear through looking at the 
development o f a r t i f i c i a l vis ion systems that the demands of being able to 
implement a model in software shape the kind o f model that is developed. 
This leads to things being added or lef t out purely because o f the need to 
code the model. Eventually you may lose important features o f the model 
just so you can produce the desired behaviours. I t is therefore my aim not to 
emphasise the development o f a simulation o f the model. I f a strong 
theoretically based conceptual model is developed f i r s t then maybe its 
eventual simulation w i l l retain more o f the delicate intricacies underlying 
vision in translation. Further, i f s ignif icant changes have to be made to 
enable simulation, there is always the conceptual model to refer to for a 
more detailed description. 
To be able to f u l l y understand informat ion f rom other disciplines you need 
to have some understanding o f those disciplines. One possible solution to 
the problem o f understanding the diversity o f relevant informat ion provided 
by several di f ferent disciplines is to translate everything into a single 
language that can be understood by everyone through a common factor. 
I n i t i a l l y this would seem to be a good idea, but there are problems w i t h this 
approach. One obvious problem is that informat ion is lost in translation. 
Some types o f informat ion have to be represented in certain ways and could 
not be translated, or else attempting to translate them becomes a central 
issue distracting f rom understanding the informat ion itself . A crucial aspect 
o f any attempt at mul t i -d isc ip l inary research is to overcome these problems. 
It is envisaged that by using a strong theoretical framework through 
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combining a top-down and bottom-up approach the problems o f m u l t i -
disciplinary research can be overcome. 
S U M M A R Y . 
Through the combination o f research into visual perception f r o m varying 
disciplines it is hoped that a conceptual model can be developed that w i l l 
provide a more complete understanding o f vis ion. The aims o f the 
conceptual model are both to form a more comprehensive understanding o f 
vis ion, and to aid the development o f more sophisticated a r t i f i c i a l v is ion 
systems. There are many diverse explanations o f various aspects o f visual 
perception, both neurophysiological and psychological. Through uni t ing 
such a plethora o f informat ion i t is hoped that progress in understanding the 
brain w i l l be made. In turn this progression w i l l influence the development 
o f a r t i f i c i a l systems. As noted previously this work does not aim to 
provided an account o f an implementation o f a model o f vision. I t aims to 
provide a strong theoretical frame work for a conceptual model that could 
ul t imately be developed in software. 
A T H E O R E T I C A L F R A M E W O R K F O R M O D E L L I N G 
V I S I O N . 
TOP-DOWN VERSUS BOTTOM-UP. 
Churchland addresses the issue o f "top-down" versus "bottom-up" 
processing as a theoretical framework w i t h which to study the structure and 
funct ion o f the brain. (Churchland, 1986). This dist inct ion between top-
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down and bottom-up in principle is much the same as discussed previously, 
although Churchland specif ical ly defines the terms in relation to the study 
o f the brain. Churchland refers to top-down and bottom-up as fo l lows . 
A top-down approach involves starting wi th a theory then explaining the 
underlying mechanisms o f that theory, for example taking a psychological 
approach to the study o f visual perception. This would involve having a 
theory o f visual perception and then going out to look for evidence that 
supports that theory. A bottom-up approach on the other hand starts by 
working up f rom the lowest level o f explanation to develop a theory, e.g. 
taking a neurophysiological approach to the study o f visual perception. This 
would involve t ry ing to understand how the brain works at its lowest level , 
for example at the neuronal level , then using that informat ion to develop a 
theory o f perception. However i f you only work at one level you miss out 
on important informat ion that would become evident i f you were working at 
the other. So in the case o f vision i f it was studied merely in terms o f low 
level neuronal behaviour we would not progress towards an understanding 
o f perception. The same is true i f we start w i th a theory o f higher cognitive 
funct ion and d id not look at possible underlying mechanisms for that 
theory. By disregarding the elements o f neuronal behaviour the theory o f 
perception might never be complete. I t may miss out on subtleties that an 
explanation at a lower level might provide. Churchland goes on to il lustrate 
the importance o f a uni f ica t ion o f top-down and bottom-up approach to 
understanding the brain. As previously discussed this theme provides the 
basis for the conceptual model o f vision that is developed here. The aim is 
to provide a theory o f visual perception that is easily reduced to its 
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neurophysiological basis, the rationale being that so called "higher level" 
cognitive functions must have underlying neuronal foundations. The aim is 
thus to explain and develop a conceptual model o f visual perception by 
looking at the underlying architecture and mechanisms o f vis ion, i.e. the 
brain, what i t is and how it works. 
Churchland goes on to explain that the major i ty o f our understanding o f the 
brain has been developed through adopting either o f these two approaches. 
For example there are neurophysiologists working on the lower levels based 
on a bottom-up approach. In contrast there are psychologists developing 
"grand theories" o f how the brain works f rom a top-down perspective. What 
is clearly evident according to Churchland is that there is a serious lack o f 
communication between the two approaches. Not only that, but there are 
also many disciplines using very di f ferent tools o f explanation that could be 
relevant to understanding the brain, an example being the discipline o f 
mathematics. Using the tools o f mathematical analysis could provide 
essential insight into the behaviour o f low level neuronal behaviour. 
Al though there are many reasons for this lack o f communication leading to 
a lack o f progression in our understanding o f the brain Churchland suggests 
that one important factor is the subject matter i tself . 
B R A I N EQUALS B R A M B L E S C A P E . 
Churchland describes the brain as "bramblescape", an unruly mass o f w i l d 
and tangled structures. This makes i t d i f f i c u l t to study as the fibres br inging 
informat ion into the cortex and fibres taking out are tangled together. I t 
leads on f r o m this that types o f in format ion , both incoming and outgoing 
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are therefore d i f f i c u l t to characterise. So relating a top-down theory o f the 
brain to a bottom-up theory becomes an almost impossible task. In the case 
o f developing a theory o f visual perception clearly the problem is making 
sense o f the tangled mass o f fibres in an attempt to try and develop an 
understanding o f what actually constitutes perception at its lowest level 
before any theory can be developed. We have to go beyond bramblescape, 
and the key to this and ult imately the key to developing a conceptual model 
o f visual perception is to make sense o f the brain through the emergence of 
structure f r o m mayhem. The problem o f understanding visual perception 
becomes the problem o f understanding the informat ion processing structures 
and functions o f the brain. By looking at visual processing structures and 
functions, the lowest level o f behaviour, a theory o f visual perception w i l l 
evolve. The two are reliant on each other, in that understanding processing 
provides informat ion about perception, and ul t imately how the brain works. 
Al though processing can be explained in isolation f r o m perception i t has no 
real value i n being able to explain anything about the brain as a whole 
unless i t is l inked to a theory o f perception. (Churchland, 1986). 
Through developing models o f the brain i t is possible to develop a 
uni f ica t ion o f both bottom-up and top-down approaches. The sorts o f 
models developed even at the neurophysiological level can be categorised 
into two types o f model, ' "s impl i fying brain models'", where the generalised 
neurophysiology is used (Sejnowski , Koch & Churchland, 1988). or finer 
more detailed models (Wehmeier, Dong, Koch & van Essen, 1989). They 
suggest that the essential differences between these two sorts o f models can 
be likened to the dis t inct ion that Chomsky makes between "competence" 
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and "performance" in models o f language understanding (Chomsky, 1965). 
Competence models are similar to s i m p l i f y i n g brain models whereas 
performance models are related to detailed models o f structure and funct ion 
o f the brain. You may get the same behaviours wi th the two but the latter is 
more realistic. The former, however, provide an excellent overall picture 
f rom which to bui ld more detailed models (Wehmeier, Dong, Koch & van 
Essen, 1989). 
I N T R O D U C T I O N T O A M O D E L O F V I S U A L P E R C E P T I O N . 
THE IMPORTANCE OF V I S I O N . 
Vis ion could be considered as being our most important sensory system, 
making up over for ty per cent o f al l sensory input (Dowl ing , 1992). 
Intelligence can be defined as having the abi l i ty to adapt to our constantly 
changing environment. Wi th in this f luctuat ing environment we encounter 
and have to solve many problems enabling us to act upon the wor ld in which 
we exist in order to maintain that existence (Beer, 1989; Gould, 1981). 
Informat ion about our environment arrives through our sensory receptors in 
d i f f e r i n g forms, e.g. l ight waves (eyes), chemicals (mouth and nose), sound 
waves (ears), etc. This informat ion is then directed to the relevant area in 
the brain to be processed to enable incoming informat ion to be interpreted 
and acted upon. Al though al l o f our senses are important to us i t could be 
argued that visual informat ion is the most crucial to our performance in our 
environment. Without hearing we can s t i l l funct ion wel l enough to survive, 
the same can be said about smell and taste. Visual impairment on the other 
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hand can have devastating effects on our survival . This then suggests that 
explaining how this system works is a key issue not just in developing 
a r t i f i c i a l l y intel l igent systems, but also in understanding real biological 
intelligence: 
"Our thinking is to a large extent visual imagery. All navigation and 
manipulation is guided directly by vision or by imagined geometry. Our 
intelligence is curiously restricted to things that can be formulated as 
scenes, which are largely visual in substance. Language only makes sense 
by continuous reference to visual imaginations. Understanding vision very 
likely will mean understanding the brain and mind. " 
von der Malsburg (1990), 
W H A T IS VISION? 
To attempt to define vis ion calls for an explanation o f a l l the component 
parts that go to make up an understanding o f what "seeing" involves. Vis ion 
is a general term which is used to describe both the mechanisms and 
apparatus that are involved in the processing o f visual informat ion, as wel l 
as the actual act ivi ty o f "seeing" in its global sense, i.e. vis ion as a 
cognitive func t ion , as an interpretation rather than purely a physical 
representation. There is a clear dist inct ion between explaining "seeing" in 
terms o f mechanisms and apparatus, and explaining "seeing" as cognit ion in 
the psychological sense. The dist inct ion is perhaps best described as the 
dis t inct ion between visual processing and visual perception. 
V I S U A L PERCEPTION OR V I S U A L PROCESSING? 
Visual perception is not the same as visual processing. There is a clear 
difference between the two, although the latter is the basis for the former. 
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Visual processing involves understanding seeing in terms of l ight f a l l i n g on 
the retina, reflected f rom objects in the visual scene, and the mechanisms 
and structures in the brain that process that informat ion . The level at which 
the informat ion about the visual image is described is purely neuronal. That 
is, it is understood in terms o f the electrochemical reactions that occur in 
relevant neurons in specific areas o f the brain dedicated to visual 
processing. The study o f visual processing might involve tracing the path o f 
informat ion through the brain, iden t i fy ing the various areas involved in 
processing visual informat ion . I t also might involve describing neuronal 
behaviour in those particular structures, and making some sense o f how 
visual informat ion is represented in the brain. Visual processing therefore, 
is about looking solely at how l ight f a l l i ng on the retina is processed and 
encoded by the component parts o f the brain that make up the visual system, 
and how the brain combines al l the relevant informat ion about the patterns 
o f l ight f a l l i ng on the retina to provide an overall representation o f the 
visual scene. Visual processing is thus best understood through 
neurophysiological theory. 
On the other hand, visual perception is not just about the processing that 
takes place when the brain is representing visual in format ion . Visual 
perception is about interpreting and making some fo rm o f evaluation o f that 
informat ion . Rather than just describing the structures and mechanisms 
underlying the encoding o f the visual scene or an image i t involves acting 
upon that in format ion , using i t to perform transformations upon the wor ld . 
Perception is crucial to the notion o f intelligence as adaptive behaviour, our 
abi l i ty to solve problems in an environment that is constantly changing, in 
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order to survive. (Beer, 1989). A possible def in i t ion o f visual perception is 
as fo l lows : 
Extracting from the retinal image a meaningful description of the world 
that can be used to carry out necessary actions on that world. 
Bearing in mind that the image that is projected onto the retina is static and 
meaningless, whereas the wor ld we see is constantly changing and 
meaningful , g iv ing an image meaning involves going beyond understanding 
the image in terms o f how it is represented through its processing. (Bruce & 
Green, 1990.) 
This i n turn means that perception is not necessarily l imi ted to a description 
o f the wor ld in terms o f visual sensory input alone. I t is possible to separate 
perception in general into two types, local and global. Local perception 
would be the meaningful interpretation o f sensory processing in a particular 
sensory area. For example visual perception would be a product o f visual 
processing and auditory perception a product o f auditory processing, etc. 
Global perception would be a combination o f a l l the available local 
perceptions to form an overall description o f the wor ld based on al l the 
available sensory informat ion. Global perception is extremely complex and 
does not simply consist o f the result o f visual sensory processing, i t also 
incorporates the result o f sensory processing f rom al l the other senses, 
informat ion about the wor ld that we have encountered previously and stored 
in memory. 
Visual processing can thus be explained as low level neuronal processing in 
the brain whereas visual perception is about the relationship between that 
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low level processing and higher level cognitive processing. Higher level 
cognitive processes being so called "higher" functions o f the brain, such as 
language, memory and learning, usually described by psychological theory 
rather than through neurophysiology. In relation to vision such functions 
might include object recognition, visual attention and visual memory. 
Central to this idea is how the links are made between higher level 
cognitive interpretations o f the image and low level neuronal 
representations. We can interpret and react to visual information extremely 
quick ly , recognising and acting upon visual sensory input almost 
instantaneously. I t is evident that we can make judgements about visual 
s t imul i in as l i t t l e as 150 ms (Biederman et al , 1982). Further, 
neurophysiological measurement o f cortical cell responses are in a similar 
t ime domain (Oram and Perrett, 1994). I t is therefore extremely unl ikely 
that high level cognitive processing is separate f r o m the low level neuronal 
processes that underlie visual perception. The two must be l inked i n some 
way. The question is at what point in the processing is the l ink made, and 
how? Do we have two very separate and distinct levels o f understanding 
visual in format ion , one encoding and the other interpreting, operating in 
serial, or is visual perception inextricably interwoven into the underlying 
neuronal processes? I f the latter is the case at what point does low level 
neuronal act ivi ty become high level cognitive perceptions? 
THE B I N D I N G P R O B L E M . 
A t the level o f processing and at the level o f perception, local or global , 
whether separate or simultaneous, a key issue arises, how are al l the 
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separate parts o f the visual scene combined to form an overall 
representation? How are low level neuronal processes linked to high level 
cognitive interpretations? How are local perceptions l inked to global 
perceptions? Somehow al l this informat ion has to be "bound" together, 
combined at all levels to provide a complete and meaningful understanding 
o f our wor ld . This problem o f combining all the relevant informat ion about 
an object in the visual scene is referred to as the "binding problem" 
(Hummel & Biedermann, 1990; 1992.) or more simply, the problem o f 
integration o f informat ion . A t its lowest level , i n terms o f visual sensory 
informat ion binding is related to the "segmentation problem" (Marr, 1976) 
or "feature l i nk ing" (Gray & Singer, 1989). The segmentation problem 
refers to how the various segmented parts o f an object in the visual scene 
are combined to fo rm a single representation. For example how are al l the 
segments that go to make up the outline o f an object l inked together. The 
problem is accentuated by the fact that objects have several aspects o f form 
that have to be taken into account when they are encoded, for example 
whether or not the object is moving or in what orientation i t occurs. 
The binding problem has become a central issue in both developing theories 
o f vis ion and in developing a r t i f i c i a l systems capable o f vis ion. In terms o f 
developing theories o f binding, typical ly top-down psychological 
approaches have been dominant wi th l i t t l e evidence o f a mul t i -d isc ipl inary 
approach. Recently however the development o f bottom-up 
neurophysiological approaches that has enabled mechanistic theories o f 
binding to emerge. U n t i l recent discoveries in neurophysiology, theories o f 
binding were dominated by "feature detection" theories, which suggested 
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that visual binding in object recognition was a product o f the hierarchical 
detection o f more and more complex features by cells in the visual cortex. 
Eventually at the top o f the hierarchy was a cell that represented that 
particular object in its^ entirety (Barlow, 1972). This theory was wel l suited 
to informat ion processing models in a r t i f i c i a l intelligence (Lindsay & 
Norman, 1972) and so was dominant in the field for some time. It was also 
supported by apparent neuronal mechanisms in the primary visual cortex 
(Hubel & Wiesel, 1962). Recent discoveries in neurophysiology have 
changed that view, through the advent o f so called "population models". 
Such models suggest that object recognition is a product o f the distributed 
encoding o f informat ion across populations o f neurons. Previously evidence 
for mechanisms to support this idea was non existent resulting in l i t t l e 
interest being taken in theories based on this idea (Stryker, 1989). 
Wi th the advent o f new neurophysiological evidence and wi th the fai lure o f 
a r t i f i c i a l systems based on tradit ional informat ion processing models to 
either provide adequate support for feature detection theories or produce 
systems capable o f visual binding (Stryker, 1989), mul t i -d isc ipl inary 
approaches are now being pursued. Previously general accounts o f binding 
included theories f r o m cognitive science implemented in standard neural 
networks, e.g. mult i - layer perceptrons (Hinton et a l , 1986; Chalmers, 1990; 
Pollack, 1990; Blank et a l , 1992). Standard neural networks is a term given 
to the class o f neural networks or iginat ing f r o m work in the 1980's 
popularised by Rumelhart and Mc Clelland's "parallel distributed 
processing" (PDP) group (Rumelhart & Mc Clel land, 1986). The problem 
wi th this approach is that standard neural networks do not really provide 
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any insight into the mechanisms that underlie binding. Further, standard 
neural network theory alone has been shown to be insuff ic ient in the 
development o f successful implementations o f models o f visual binding 
(Hummel & Biedermann, 1990; 1992). This approach has doubtful relevance 
in the advancement o f understanding binding because to implement a theory 
of binding in this way requires that you already have both a theoretical and 
conceptual understanding. An implementation in standard neural networks, 
which are unrelated to actual brain mechanisms, is simply one possible way 
of representing a model or theory. I t is l ike translating your theory f rom a 
verbal description to a pictor ial description. It tells you no more about i t , it 
just provides another form for representing i t . Therefore implementing a 
psychological theory o f binding through a network that is unrelated to 
actual brain mechanisms w i l l te l l you no more about binding than you knew 
before the implementation. Clearly to discover more about the nature o f 
binding, and to bui ld more successful vision systems, developing models 
that incorporate more realistic brain mechanisms is essential. What is 
needed, and what is now becoming apparent, is a mul t i -disc ipl inary study 
into the very nature o f perception, an iterative procedure based on both top-
down theories supported wi th bottom-up mechanisms that, through 
implementation, w i l l a l low modif ica t ion and support o f each other. 
CONCLUSIONS. 
Two levels o f understanding vision are proposed: the level of processing, 
which demands a detailed analysis o f structure and funct ion o f the parts o f 
the brain involved in vis ion; and perception, which involves g iv ing meaning 
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to the product of low level neuronal activity through high level cognitive 
representations. Perception or higher level cognitive interpretations take 
place locally, being "sensor specific", and globally, incorporating 
information from all available senses and from memory. It is possible to 
study vision in terms of processing alone, but it is not possible to study 
perception without studying the processing that underlies perception. So to 
look at visual perception involves understanding visual processing. Through 
the development of a conceptual model of visual perception based on low 
level neuronal processing a possible solution to the binding problem can 
also be proposed. 
The development of a truly multi-disciplinary model of vision begins with 
looking at the neurophysiology of the visual system. An investigation into 
the architectures and mechanisms that underlie vision provides the next 
step, bearing in mind that several theoretical assumptions about the nature 
of perception have already provided an outline for the development of a 
conceptual model of vision. By taking a truly multi-disciplinary approach it 
is hoped that both the aims of the thesis w i l l be fu l f i l l ed , to provide new 
algorithms for machine vision and insight into the nature of perception. The 
intention is to start by introducing what is known about vision from a 
bottom-up view, and then relate this to theories of visual perception at a 
higher cognitive level, ultimately providing a deeper understanding of what 
vision is, and deriving new architectures and algorithms for developing 
artificial vision systems. 
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SYNOPSIS OF T H E F O L L O W I N G 5 CHAPTERS. 
Chapter 2 aims to provide an overview of the neurophysiology underlying 
visual perception. This chapter comprises of a simplified account of the low 
level neuronal processes that constitute visual processing. It is from these 
descriptions of structure and function that an architecture for a conceptual 
model of visual perception has been constructed. This chapter forms the 
basis of the so called bottom-up explanation of visual perception as 
discussed previously in this chapter. As the visual system, like the rest of 
the brain is extremely complex, a simplified account of the architecture and 
function is all that can realistically be achieved. 
Chapter 3 aims to provide an overview of both the psychological and 
neurophysiological theories of visual perception. The neurophysiological 
theories are accounts of visual processing rather than of visual perception 
whereas the psychological theories are attempts at explaining perception 
rather than visual processing. This chapter is more concerned with a top-
down approach to investigating visual perception, although the 
neurophysiological theories are best described as top-down interpretations 
of bottom-up accounts of visual processing. The psychological theories are 
"purely" top-down in that they do not have to make reference to bottom-up 
descriptions. This distinction is not as clear as it seems as there is an 
enormous amount of overlap between neurophysiological and psychological 
theories. The aim of this chapter is to provide an evaluation of the available 
theories of visual perception enabling the development of a theory on which 
the conceptual model has been based. 
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In Chapter 4 both the theory and the conceptual model have been made 
explicit. Initially a theory of perception has been outlined which has then 
been used to shape the conceptual model. The theory originates from a 
combination of current explanations of visual perception and the conceptual 
model provides a structural and functional description that supports the 
theory. The theory and resulting conceptual model that have been developed 
in this chapter attempt to both explain visual perception in novel way and 
provide new and innovative approaches to the development of artificial 
vision systems. 
In chapter 5 additional support for the theory and the model as outlined in 
chapter 4 has been made. Although chapters 2 and 3 provide the foundations 
for the component parts of the model this chapter provides more concrete 
support for the model and theory as a whole. 
Finally, chapter 6 comprises of a summary and discussion of the 
achievements of the thesis and suggestions for further work. 
The thesis attempts to provide a "complete" account of visual perception 
through the development of a theory and conceptual model that supports 
that theory. It attempts to do this through a multi-disciplinary approach that 
unites both bottom-up neurophysiological and top-down psychological 
accounts of vision. Further it is envisaged that the development of such a 
model wi l l provide new insight into the development of artificial vision 
systems and new algorithms for perceptual function in such systems. 
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C H A P T E R 2 
T H E VTSIJAT. S Y S T F M » 
AN O V E R V I E W O F T H E N E U R O P H Y S I O L O G Y 
O F V I S U A L P E R C E P T I O N . 
This chapter aims to introduce a simplified account of the neurophysiology 
of vision, providing an overview from which the outline of a conceptual 
model might be developed. Part one attempts to explain why we need to 
understand the neurophysiology of vision, and introduce a general view of 
visual processing. Part two then gives a more detailed account of the visual 
processing pathways in the brain and explanations of the various areas 
associated with visual perception. From the point of view of the thesis as a 
whole, the description here will be general in the sense that when the 
conceptual model is introduced in chapter 4 a more detailed account of 
neurophysiology will be made in order to support the model. 
UNDERSTANDING VISION. 
INTRODUCTION TO STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION. 
The aim of developing any model of vision involves understanding both the 
processing, in the form of neuronal behaviour that takes place, leading to an 
eventual understanding of the higher level cognitive states that enable us to 
perceive our world. I f we regard low level processing as being the 
foundations from which higher level interpretations occur, then its seems 
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reasonable that a good starting point in attempting to explain vision would 
be to trace its evolution from light falling on the retina to the areas of the 
brain that deal with that information. It is important to emphasise that most 
of what we know about the structure and function of the brain originates 
from extrapolating the results from experimental work with animals to the 
human brain. The majority of the work presented in this chapter is the result 
of experimentation in the cat or monkey, and not in the human brain. 
Although we have extremely advanced techniques for tracing the flow of 
information in the brain there is stil l a great deal to be discovered about the 
structures and their underlying function. The speed at which understanding 
advances is hampered by the differing methods of investigating the brain 
and a lack of consensus in terms of the results such work produces (van 
Essen, 1985). This means that a lot of neurophysiological evidence is often 
speculative in terms of the less well understood areas of the brain. As van 
Essen points out i t was only twenty years (now thirty years) ago that the 
area of the brain processing visual information was thought to be made up 
of three concentrically organised areas (van Essen, 1985). The next step 
would be to describe the underlying mechanisms of these structures. To do 
this the relationship between structure and function in the cortex must be 
addressed. 
The structure of the cortex is not entirely independent of its underlying 
function. It is not as simple as having a set of pre defined structures that 
any old function can be applied to. How neurons behave influences how 
structures develop and evolve. In the same way, how structures evolve can 
influence how neurons behave, not necessarily individually but as groups. 
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Many studies have been conducted addressing the issue of cortical plasticity 
and the effects of visual deprivation on the development of the visual cortex 
and resultant perception. I f the visual apparatus is in some way damaged, 
for example monocular deprivation through one eye not functioning, then 
the visual cortex loses its binocularity. Projections from the retina are 
pronounced from one eye causing a change in the normal structure of the 
visual pathway where both eyes would share the same distribution of 
ganglion projections (Le Vay, Wiesel & Hubel, 1981; Hubel, Wiesel & Le 
Vay, 1977). In the same way, i f young animals are raised in artificial 
environments deprived of specific visual information the brain is unable to 
readjust to normal function when the animal is no longer visually deprived, 
suggesting that some of the structures of the brain have not been able to 
develop fu l ly . (Hirsch & Spinelli, 1971). It is important to note that up until 
recently it was thought that there are so called critical periods in the 
development of the visual system, in cats and monkeys this is from birth to 
6 or 7 months whereas in humans the critical period is up to 6 years (Hubel 
& Wiesel, 1970; Thompson, 1985). After this critical period has elapsed the 
visual system no longer changes in its structure significantly enough to 
effect visual perception. Recently though new research has suggested that 
this may not be the case (Gilbert, 1992). It seems that both the structure and 
function of the visual system are intertwined, changes to either influence 
visual perception. It is not sufficient to merely model one or the other to 
understand visual perception. 
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A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF VISUAL PROCESSING. 
The starting point for developing a biologically plausible model of visual 
perception means understanding and developing a model of visual 
processing. Initially investigation must follow the path of visual 
information from it entering the brain to its end product, recognition and 
identification. The process of investigation demands an understanding of 
the architectures that form part of that pathway, and how they function in 
terms of processing that information. To begin to describe vision in simple 
terms is in itself a complicated task. How the brain deals with light falling 
on the retina, and describing the areas of the brain that deal with this 
sensory information, is not as clear as i t first seems. Already, confronting 
the problems discussed in chapter 1 relating to the multi-disicplinary nature 
of modelling perception is a major issue. Firstly there is a need to have an 
understanding of physics so that the form, which information is transmitted 
to the visual system can be understood. There is then a need to understand 
neurophysiology, the behaviour of neurons and the structures they form as 
well as psychological theory explaining the eventual behaviours that are a 
result of interpreting and acting upon the information that has been 
processed. Because of this diversity of understanding and the enormity of 
the information available, this chapter aims to introduce a "simplifying 
brain model" (Sejenowski, Koch & Churchland. 1988), as discussed in 
chapter 1. Then from this general understanding of global principles a more 
detailed model can be developed (Wehmeier, Dong, Koch & van Essen, 
1989). It cannot be stressed enough that the enormity and complexity of 
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information from neurophysiology alone means that only an extremely 
simplified description of vision is possible i f the issue of perception in its 
global form is to be addressed. 
In its simplest terms the visual process begins with information being 
transmitted to the perceiver in the form of waves of light. These waves of 
light are reflected from objects and forms that make up the visual scene and 
are absorbed by the first part of visual apparatus, the retina. The retina is 
the starting point for the processing of visual information and is often 
referred to as a "pre processing stage". The retina is made up of light 
sensitive receptor cells that absorb the waves of light being refiected from 
the objects in the visual scene. At this point the first transformation of 
information takes place as light waves are turned into electrical signals, a 
medium with which the brain is able to work. (Bruce & Green, 1990; 
Dowling, 1992.) Although at this stage a certain amount of processing takes 
place it is generally regarded as preparation, transformation by the retina of 
the information from the visual scene into a form that can be understood 
and passed on for in depth processing by dedicated areas in the brain. The 
image at the retinal level is only two dimensional. As we are able to 
perceive three dimensions it is assumed that further processing allows us to 
infer three dimensional interpretations of a two dimensional image. The 
destination of the outcome of retinal processing of the two dimensional 
image is therefore all important to understanding perception. 
There are two major pathways that retinal information is transmitted on, 
both via the optic nerve. The first route known as the "primary visual 
pathway" leads from the retina down the optic nerve to the dorsal part of the 
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lateral geniculate nucleus (dLGN) in the thalamus and then on to the visual 
cortex. The path that those signals follow, through the primary visual 
pathway, can be traced to at least six synapses. Two are in the retina, the 
> 
third in the dLGN, the other three represent at least three distinguishable 
levels of processing in the visual cortex (Dowling, 1992). 
The visual cortex is divided into two main areas: the striate cortex which 
consists of the primary visual cortex ( V I ) where most of the information 
from the dLGN is projected to and the extra striate areas which are those 
areas beyond the primary visual cortex (see figure 1). 
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Figure 1. A schematic of the visual processing areas of the brain including 
the primary and secondary visual pathways. 
It is this pathway that is of most interest as it leads to the area in the brain 
that carries out the processing of visual information that leads to eventual 
perception. I t is well accepted that the cortex is the area of the brain that 
processes sensory information due to the large number of ganglion axons 
terminating there, other pathways are considered to be less important in 
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terms of the processing of the visual scene. (Bruce & Green, 1990; 
Dowling, 1992; Cowey, 1981.) 
The secondary visual pathway leads to the superior colliculus (SC), which 
is thought to be involved with controlling eye movements and possibly 
plays a role in visual attention (Churchland, 1986). The SC is also 
implicated in the integration of the processing of sensory information as it 
also responds to auditory input enabling the eyes to foveate on objects 
omitting sound, thereby linking visual and auditory information 
(Churchland, 1986). However essentially the role of the SC in perception is 
indirect rather than direct, that is, its role is more with controlling what we 
see rather than saying what it is we are seeing (see figure 1).There are other 
visual pathways leading from the retina to other areas in the brain but their 
function is not as well defined. That is not to say that these pathways are 
not significant. In relation to both global and local perception as outlined in 
chapter I these pathways may perform key roles. One reason for the lack of 
interest in these other pathways could be due to the role they play in visual 
processing. Like the secondary visual pathway their involvement in the 
visual process is related more to the control of what is perceived rather than 
performing the action of perception. They are often referred to as dealing 
with so called reflexive "non cognitive" processing, therefore are not given 
the attention they perhaps demand (Cowey & Stoerig, 1990). However i f 
perception is seen as an emergent property of the brain as a whole then the 
importance of these pathways could be said to be being overlooked. 
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INTRODUCTION TO T H E NEUROPHYSIOLOGY OF T H E 
VISUAL S Y S T E M . 
THE RETINA. 
The retina is the point at which visual processing begins. A mapping of the 
visual scene on to the retina is the beginning of the perceptual process. The 
retina then encodes that representation and passes the information on for 
further analysis. A great deal of research has been conducted into the 
structure and function of the retina, it is perhaps the most well understood 
part of the visual system. As a result it has been possible to develop 
extremely sophisticated models of the retina, and it has even been possible 
to implement such models in hardware (Mead & Mahowald, 1990; 
Mahowald & Mead, 1991). The retina does more than just sample the visual 
scene. Although i t is beyond the retina that visual processing begins in 
earnest, it is important to mention key points about the retinas role in the 
processing of the visual scene as certain aspects of the retinal image are 
preserved in the processing that takes place in the cortex. 
The retina encodes both spatial and temporal information present in the 
visual scene in a series of light sensitive receptor cells. This information is 
then transformed into a pattern of electrical activity that translates the 
spatio-temporal information into a form that can be used by the relevant 
structures in the brain (Bruce & Green, 1990). The transformations that take 
place at the retina have been studied in great detail in lower level l i fe forms 
such as the mudpuppy (Werblin & Dowling, 1969) and the horseshoe crab 
(Hartline & Graham, 1932; Hartline, Wagner, & Ratliff , 1956). The retina 
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of vertebrates has also been investigated in depth (Kuffler , 1953; Dowling, 
1968). The retina as described by Dowling consists of two layers of 
synaptic cells (two plexiform layers) each having its own distinct kind of 
processing. Light hits photoreceptor cells providing input to the outer 
plexiform layers. In this first layer two main sorts of cells are found, 
horizontal cells which mediate lateral interactions within the layer, and 
bipolar cells that send the resultant processing to the inner plexiform layer. 
Amacrine cells in the inner plexiform layer perform the same lateral 
mediation tasks that the horizontal cells carry out in the outer plexiform 
layer. Ganglion cells then act as the output from the inner plexiform layer 
and the retina as a whole, their axons making up the optic nerve fibres 
terminating mainly in the dLGN and SC (see figure 2). 
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Figure 2. The basic structure of the retina. 
There are only two action potentials generated in the retina by amacrine and 
ganglion cells. The photoreceptors, bipolar and horizontal cells respond 
with graded potentials (Dowling, 1992). Masland notes in a review of 
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retinal processing that the functionality of the retina was until recently 
thought to be directly related to the five sorts of cells present in its 
structure; an example of structure defining function. However he goes on to 
point out that these five classes of cells comprise of subtypes that multiply 
the number of functional elements by at least 50. (Masland, 1986). 
The basic function of the mammalian retina in terms of the processing that 
takes place can be summarised as follows. There are essentially two paths 
of information flow, one from the photoreceptors to the brain and the 
second is lateral mediation pathway that affects the processing within the 
retina itself. An important feature of the vertebrate retina is the 
convergence of information, with a ratio of approximately 100 to 1 from 
photoreceptors to ganglion cells (Dowling, 1992). Each ganglion then has a 
corresponding group of photoreceptors related to i t , this is known as the 
receptive field of the ganglion. The closer to the fovea the receptive field is 
the smaller it is, so conversely ganglions with the receptive fields on the 
edge of the retina have larger receptive fields. Receptive fields are not 




Figure 3. The receptive fields of retinal ganglion cells. 
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Recent research into the nature of receptive fields suggests that they are 
able to adapt and change dependent on a number of factors including 
attentional mechanisms, and contextual information relating to the 
presentation of given objects (Gilbert, 1992). This has direct effects on the 
stability of the structure of the cortex. As retinotopicy is maintained 
throughout the primary visual cortex, changes to the receptive field size on 
the retina directly affect the structure of V I . (Le Vay, Wiesel & Hubel, 
1981; Hubel, Wiesel & Le Vay, 1977; Miller & Stryker, 1990) As 
mentioned previously there are two main sorts of information about the 
visual scene that are encoded, the spatial information and temporal 
information. It is possible to distinguish at least two sorts of receptive field 
properties of ganglion cells, relating to the encoding of either temporal or 
spatial information. 
Information is encoded through two processes known as "on-centre" or "off-
centre" (Kuffier , 1953). Kuff ler discovered that retinal ganglions respond to 
information from photoreceptors grouped in such a way that they form two 
concentric circles with either inhibitory cells (off-centre) or excitatory cells 
(on centre) in the centre circle and the opposite in the outer circle (see 
figure 4). 
"Off Centre" "On Centre" 
Inhibitory Cells Excitatory Cells 
Figure 4. "On centre" and "of f centre" retinal ganglions. 
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On-centre cells fire with sustained bursts i f light falls directly on its centre. 
I f light falls in the surround then the firing is inhibited, finally i f it falls 
across the two a weaker response takes place as the two regions 
"antagonise" each other. Off-centre cells behave in exactly the reverse way 
(Dowling, 1992; Bruce and Green 1990). It is possible to discriminate 
further between two different sorts of concentric field ganglions, X & Y 
(Enroth-Cugell & Robson, 1966). X ganglions conduct more slowly than Y 
ganglions and respond in a sustained "tonic" way whereas Y ganglions 
conduct quickly and respond in a transient or "phasic" way (Carlson, 1986). 
Hence X cells are thought to encode spatial information and fine detail, 
whereas Y ganglions code for temporal information and direction. Another 
difference is in the distribution of X and Y ganglions. X ganglions are 
concentrated in the central part of the retina whilst the opposite is true of Y 
ganglions (Bruce & Green, 1990). Both X and Y ganglions project mainly to 
the dLGN. There is also a third class of ganglion, the W ganglion, that does 
not correspond to the concentric receptive field and projects unlike the 
other two types mainly to the SC (Stone & Fukuda, 1974). W ganglions 
respond weakly and like Y cells prefer moving stimuli. They also have large 
receptive fields responding in both a sustained and transient way (Carlson, 
1986). The result of this processing is that a spatio-temporal encoding of 
the visual scene takes place and is transmitted down the axons of the 
ganglion cells to form the third synapse along the primary visual pathway, 
in the dLGN (see figure 5). 
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Figure 5. The primary visual pathway from the retina to the dLGN showing 
the X, Y and W ganglion classification. 
Obviously not all ganglion cells transmit to the dLGN, as mentioned earlier 
there are other pathways formed by these ganglion cells. The secondary 
visual pathway to the SC mainly consists of W ganglions as well as a small 
amount of Y ganglions. X ganglions along with the majority of Y ganglions 
terminate in the dLGN. A small number of W ganglions also terminate in 
the dLGN. Each retina is divided into left and right visual fields, and this 
structural feature is retained in the passage of information down the optic 
nerve to the optic chiasma, the point at which the optic nerve crosses. At 
the optic chiasma left visual field information from both retinas goes to the 
right hemisphere and vice versa for the right visual field (see figure 5). 
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THE LGN. 
The lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) is one of the many nuclei that make 
up the two parts of the thalamus, which sits on the top of the brain stem, 
one part being in the left hemisphere the other in the right. The thalamus is 
considered to be crucial to the integration and transmission of incoming 
information to the brain, described as "a brain within a brain" (Churchland, 
1986). A l l primary sensory information projects initially to a specific nuclei 
in the thalamus, where i t is then transmitted to the relevant processing area 
in the cortex (Shepherd. 1979; Carlson, 1986; Churchland & Sejnowski, 
1992; Dowling, 1992). Significantly the thalamus is hidden by a mass of 
both feedforward and feedback axons both providing massive input from 
sensory organs to their respective processing areas in the cortex and 
receiving information back from these cortical areas (Mumford, 1991). Not 
all the thalamic nuclei relay primary sensory information, some correspond 
to other areas in the brain projecting to related areas in the cortex, and 
others relay information within the thalamus itself, such as the midline 
nucleus which receives input from the reticular formation and projects to 
other thalamic nuclei (Carlson, 1986). Three distinct types of nuclei can be 
identified: specific central relay nuclei such as the LGN, which send 
incoming sensory information to the relevant area in the cortex; specific 
central nuclei, which relay information from the cortex to the cerebellum; 
and non specific thalamic nuclei, which receive information from the 
reticular formation and project mainly to the neocortex (Shepherd, 1979). 
As the majority of the retinal ganglions terminate in the dLGN (dorsal 
lateral geniculate nucleus) of the thalamus, it is regarded as the gateway to 
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both the striate and extra striate areas in the visual cortex, these areas being 
the ones that are assumed to carry out so called cognitive processing, 
leading to eventual perception. It is important to note that the processing of 
visual information beyond the retina in higher mammals is not well 
understood at all (Dowling, 1992). It is estimated that 1,000,000 optic nerve 
fibres (retinal ganglions) terminate in the dLGN and the same number of 
neurons are thought to exists in the dLGN (Shepherd, 1979). Neurons in the 
dLGN have the same receptive field properties as retinal ganglions, 
responding in the same "on and o f f centre" way (Dowling, 1992). The 
existence of an almost 1:1 ratio between retinal ganglions and neurons in 
the dLGN as well as the retained receptive f ie ld organisation or 
"retinotopicy" suggests that little processing is carried out by thalamic 
nuclei (Shepherd, 1979; Dowling, 1992). Retinotopic representation refers 
to the fact that the spatial relationship between retinal cells and neurons in 
the dLGN and further, in the cortex is maintained (Churchland, 1986). 
However anaesthetics used in the experimentation from which these 
conclusions about the role of the thalamus are drawn, would significantly 
effect the results, (Dowling, 1992). There are both neurophysiological and 
psychological theories of perception that implicate the thalamus as central 
to sensory processing (Mumford, 1991; 1992). 
The structure of the dLGN reflects the intertwined relationship between 
structure and function in the brain. The complicated coding of sensory 
information at the retina is maintained in the dLGN As previously noted 
there are three types of retinal ganglions, W, X, and Y making up the optic 
nerve, two of which, X and Y, project mainly to the dLGN. This distinction 
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between different ganglions carrying different sorts of information is 
maintained in the structure of the dLGN, The dLGN, like the cortex, is 
constructed of layers of cells (lamina) of which there are six. Each lamina 
consists of a retinotopic map of one half of the visual field for each eye. 
Further, the left half of the visual field for each eye projects to the right 
side of the dLGN and the opposite for the right half of the visual f ield. 
(Bruce & Green, 1990). These lamina can be divided into two types, 
magnocellular and parvocellular, based upon the size of the cells in each 
layer. The X ganglions form synapses in the parvocellular layers and the Y 
ganglions form synapses in the magnocellular layers (see figure 5). This 
classification of cell types coding for different sorts of information lead to 
the development of a theory of parallel processing in the visual system 
(Stone, 1983) arising from this structural/functional distinction. This w i l l 
be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. There is a further functional 
distinction represented by the architecture of the lamina in the dLGN, that 
is each eye projects to separate lamina. This is "occularity"' means that 
layers 1, 4 and 6 correspond to the opposite or "contralateral" eye and 
layers 2, 3 and 5 to the same side or "ipsilateral". This implies that cells 
dealing with binocular information do not occur at this stage in the 
processing (Dowling, 1992) (see figure 5). In simple terms there seems to 
be separate pathways for different sorts of information about the visual 
scene, and that is reflected in the encoding of information at the dLGN. An 
important question has to be how much information processing takes place 
at any particular point in the perception process? Arguably, the dLGN does 
not play a significant role in the extraction of information as little of the 
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retinal encoding is changed. I f this is the case why then bother with this 
stage at all? Surely visual perception would be faster i f ganglions projected 
straight to the next stage of processing. The question then is what is the 
function of the dLGN? 
THE STRIATE CORTEX. 
The next stage in the primary visual pathway is the cortex. Since the early 
work carried out by Brodmann (Brodmann, 1909) anatomists have described 
the brain and subsequently the cortex in terms of distinct regions. 
Historically the areas of the cortex involved in visual processing have 
undergone extensive investigation, resulting in detailed descriptions of their 
structure and related functionality. This has lead to the development of what 
is referred to as "functional anatomy", the classification of the brain in 
terms of both structure and the related function for given structures. The 
cortex is vast and unlike the rest of the brain does not divide so neatly into 
physically distinct parts. By adopting an approach based on functional 
segregation, distinctions are more easily made between areas in the cortex 
resulting in what is commonly referred to as its "functional architecture" 
(Hubel & Wiesel, 1962). Interestingly most reviews of functional anatomy 
agree that there are areas of the cortex that have a particular functional 
anatomy, but the exact nature of the underlying function of such structures 
is unknown (Churchland, 1986; Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Bruce & 
Green 1990; Dowling, 1992). Understanding the organisation of the cortex 
through the identification of distinct regions is possible using more than 
one methodology, for example patterns of connectivity, differences in 
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neuronal behaviours, lesioning, topographic mapping and chemical and 
structural differences (Rosenquest, 1985; van Essen, 1985). Despite this the 
cortex lends itself well to functional segregation and therefore mapping of 
the cortex continues to be dominated by this approach. 
Initially the visual processing areas of the brain can be identified by tracing 
the flow of information through the visual pathways, notably the primary 
visual pathway. From the dLGN the ascending primary visual pathway 
synapses mainly in the area of the cortex known as the "Striate Cortex", 
also referred to a the "primary visual cortex", "area 17" and V I . For the 
purpose of clarification it wi l l be referred to hence forth as V I . From here 
information passes on to other distinct cortical processing areas known 
collectively as the "extra striate" areas. There are direct projections from 
the dLGN to the extra striate areas such as V2, V3, V3a V4 and V5 (MT 
(medial temporal area)), however these are weaker in monkey's and humans 
than in other animals such as the cat (van Essen, 1985; 1991; Oram & 
Perrett, 1994; Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Bruce & Green 1990; 
Dowling, 1992). Arguably the primary visual pathway, terminating in V I 
must be intact for "conscious" visual perception (Bruce & Green, 1990), 
supporting the theory that the primary visual pathway is the non-reflexive 
pathway and the visual cortex constitutes the cognitive processing areas of 
the brain. There is however, contradictory evidence that suggests that 
"perception" occurs even i f damage to the primary visual pathway is evident 
as demonstrated by patients suffering form "blindsight" which wi l l be 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter (Churchland, 1986; Bruce & 
Green, 1990; Cowey & Stoerig, 1992; Weiskrantz, 1986; Weiskrantz, 
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1992.). This does not necessarily support a counter argument, that the 
striate and extra striate areas are not essential for cognition or perception. 
As previously mentioned information flow does not rely entirely on the 
primary visual pathway. 
Our present understanding of visual processing, and more importantly V I , 
originates with a collection of work, some of which has already been 
mentioned, conducted by Hubel and Wiesel (Hubel & Wiesel, 1962; Hubel 
& Wiesel 1970; Hubel, Wiesel, & Le Vay, 1977; Hubel & Wiesel, 1977.) 
The work of Hubel and Wiesel was primarily experimental neurophysiology 
based on extra-cellular recordings, predominantly single cell, but also multi 
unit and staining studies, conducted mainly in V I . This initial work resulted 
in the formulation of a neurophysiological theory of perception which has 
been extensively developed and expanded by many researchers (Barlow, 
1972; Perrett et al, 1986; Perrett et al 1987; Oram & Perrett, 1994). 
Theories of visual perception w i l l be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter. Since the publication of the original work on the visual 
cortex, technology has allowed the development of more sophisticated 
methods of investigation. Research no longer relies completely on single or 
multiple cell recordings in animals. With the development of the positron 
emission topography (PET) scanners and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 
it is also possible to use human subjects. Technology has provided us with 
the ability to construct a complex and detailed understanding of the 
structure of the cortex (Oram & Perrett, 1994). 
The visual cortex, like the dLGN is constructed of six main layers formed 
by a mass of cell bodies. Axons of the cells in the cortex mainly project 
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vertically but there are also a limited amount of "local" horizontal 
connections (Bruce & Green 1990; Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992). 
Information from the dLGN typically terminates in layer 4 in V I . As with 
the dLGN further functional distinctions can be made between the layers 
that make up V I . This distinction is not directly related to the input 
received by V I , rather i t is a distinction relating to the function of the 
neurons within each layer. Layer 4 is where information enters the cortex, 
and can be divided into three sub layers, 4a 4b, and 4c. Magnocellular 
layers in the dLGN project mainly to the upper half of 4c referred to as 4ca, 
and parvocellular layers terminate mainly in the lower areas of 4c referred 
to as 4cp. (Dowling, 1992). magnocellular projections also terminate in 
layer 4b and parvocellular projections also terminate in layers 2 and 3 
which is where the clusters of colour sensitive cells are found (these 
clusters w i l l be discussed later). This has important implications for 
parallel theories of visual processing that w i l l be discussed in chapter 3. 
Layers 5 and 6 project mainly to "deep brain" structures, for example back 
to the dLGN and layers 2 and 3 as well as 4 project to the extra striate 
cortex and other cortical areas. As mentioned before both feedforward and 
feedback connections exist and are present in layers 2, 3, 4 and 6 (Oram & 
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Figure 6. A schematic diagram showing the basic structure of the striate 
cortex ( V I ) . 
It is possible to distinguish between feedforward and feedback pathways 
due to the fact that feedforward, or ascending pathways arise in the 
superficial layers and terminate predominantly in layer 4. Feedback, or 
descending pathways arise in the deep layers and terminate in the both the 
superficial and deep layers (van Essen, 1985; Maunsell & Newsome, 1987). 
An even more general functional description of the visual cortex can be 
seen in the relationship between input to the cortex and the processing that 
takes place within i t . It has been demonstrated that retinotopicy is 
maintained in at least 25 visual areas (Rosenquist, 1985). Further, that it is 
possible to distinguish between "first order transformations", where the 
visual field is represented isomorphically with neurons in V I , and "second 
order transformations" where the relationship is not as strong, apparent in 
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the extra striate areas (AUman & Kaas, 1971; 1974). 
There are two main classes of cells in the visual cortex, pyramidal and 
stellate. Pyramidal cells project over distance to other areas of the cortex 
whereas stellate cells are project within the visual cortex. Stellate cells can 
be classified further into two sorts, "spiny" and "smooth". Spiny stellates 
have lots of spines on their dendrites in comparison to smooth stellates 
which have very few or even none. A functional distinction can also be 
made, spiny stellates are excitatory and smooth stellates are inhibitory. A l l 
pyramidal cells are excitatory, and like spiny stellates have complex 
dendritic trees. (Dowling, 1992). Interestingly it is the dendritic 
"structural" feature that seems to determine the functional difference in 
cells, illustrating the inseparable nature of structure and function in the 
cortex. Layers 4 (a, b & c) of V I mainly consists of stellate cells whereas 
pyramidal cells are found predominantly in the other layers. Layer 4c cells 
have the same receptive field "centre on" and "centre off* properties as 
retinal ganglions whereas cells in other layers do not demonstrate this in 
such a definite way. These cells are also monocular, responding to either 
the right or left eye but not both (Bruce & Green 1990). Pyramidal cells are 
generally binocular, responding to input from both eyes, and the further 
away from layer 4 they are the greater their binocularity (Dowling, 1992). 
These layer 4 cells have also been classified in terms of function as "simple 
cells" (Hubel & Wiesel, 1962; Hubel & Wiesel, 1977). These simple cells 
are thought to process simple information such as the detection of edges, 
bars and blobs, responding in an excitatory way. They are also particularly 
sensitive to orientation of lines in their receptive field. This information is 
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then passed on to the next layer which consists of "complex cells" (Hubel & 
Wiesel, 1962; Hubel & Wiesel, 1977) which like simple cells respond to 
edges, bars and blobs present in their receptive field with excitatory 
responses. They also extract more complex information such as geometric 
form in the shape of angles etc. and are sensitive to motion. Complex cells 
have a typically non-linear response pattern like Y ganglions, whereas 
simple cells respond in a linear fashion to light intensities like X ganglions. 
Finally there are "hypercomplex" cells" (Hubel & Wiesel, 1962; Hubel & 
Wiesel, 1977) which are again sensitive to bars edges and blobs, but they 
also perform something called "end stopping" where the inhibition occurs in 
the cell i f its edge, bar or blob goes beyond the boundaries of its excitatory 
region. 
The existence of hypercomplex cells is much debated, it has been suggested 
that complex and hypercomplex cells are the same, as complex cells are also 
sensitive to the ends of bars edges, and blobs. (Bruce & Green, 1990). It has 
been suggested that simple cells are in fact stellate cells whereas complex 
cells are pyramidal, the evidence however for such a distinction is not 
conclusive (Dowling, 1992). However i f hypercomplex and complex cells 
are considered to be the same it is tempting to adopt this cell classification 
parallel. There is also evidence to suggest that cells in the visual cortex are 
sensitive to spatial frequency as well as geometric shapes (Campbell & 
Robson. 1968; De Valois et al 1982). 
The relationship between structure and function in V I is extremely 
complicated. As well as differences between single cells there are also 
structural divisions based on the function of groups of cells, "ocular 
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dominance" is an example of such a distinction. Ocular dominance concerns 
the cortical organisation of binocular information. As mentioned previously, 
until the cortex sensory input from each eye is kept separate. The 
segregation of information from right and left eye is maintained in V I 
notably layer 4c where dLGN projections terminate cells prefer input from 
one or the other eye. These cells are grouped together in terms of eye 
preference in vertical columns roughly 0.5mm thick, alternating left eye, 
right eye (see figure 7). 
2mni 
Input fh>m LGN 
Figure 7. A schematic diagram of the functional architecture of the striate 
cortex ( V I ) . 
However in other layers (4a, 4b, 1-3 &5-6) this is not as easy to 
demonstrate as both simple and complex cells respond to both eyes. Each 
cell has a "preferred eye" but the structural organisation is less clear (Oram 
& Perrett, 1994; Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Dowling, 1992 Hubel & 
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Wiesel, 1962; Hubel & Wiesel 1970; Hubel, Wiesel, & Le Vay, 1977; Hubel 
& Wiescl. 1977). 
A second functional anatomical distinction is evident in cell grouping which 
is most prevalent in all the layers except 4c, that of orientation selectivity. 
It seems that V I can be organised into vertical columns of cells running 
through layers l-4b and 5-6 that demonstrate a preference for sensory input 
lying in a given orientation. Changes of around 10"* in the preferred 
orientation for a given column occurs roughly every 0.05mm continually 
eventually repeating themselves, across the length of the cortex (see figure 
7). The combination of both ocular dominance column and orientation 
columns was identified as a single functional structure referred to as 
"hypercolumns" (Hubel & Wiesel, 1962; Hubel & Wiesel 1970; Hubel, 
Wiesel, & Le Vay, 1977; Hubel & Wiesel, 1977). Each hypercolumn 
consists of a block of cells running vertically through V I about 1mm by 
1mm by 2mm thick. A single hyper column incorporates 2 ocular dominance 
columns, one for each eye, roughly 20 orientations columns, one for each 10 
orientation preference and both simple and complex cells (see figure 7). 
The borders of these hypercolumns over lap to a certain degree meaning that 
the changes across the cortex are graded rather than definite (Dowling, 
1992; Bruce & Green, 1990). 
There is a further functional structure apparent in this layer and column 
organisation related to colour vision. Although the conceptual model to be 
developed does not include a detailed description of colour processing in 
early visual processing, namely in the retina and V I , the processing of 
colour information plays a significant role in the relationship between 
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structure and function and our understanding of parallel processing within 
the visual system. It is therefore important to explain very simply some 
aspects of colour processing in V I which clarify the nature of visual 
information flow in the so called "higher" visual processing areas of the 
cortex. It was discovered through staining studies in V I that within the 
hypercolumns there were groups of colour sensitive cells prominent in 
layers 2 and 3 but also in layer 1, 5 and 6. This implies that layer 4 has no 
real colour processing abilities, and has important implications in parallel 
theories of the neurophysiology of vision to be discussed in the next 
chapter. They were referred to as "pegs" as they looked like small round 
pegs that had been driven vertically into the cortex through the previously 
mentioned layers (Dowling, 1992) (see figure 7). They were independent of 
ocular dominance or orientations columns, and on closer inspection were 
found to be constructed of colour sensitive cells (Hubel & Livingstone, 
1983; Livingstone & Hubel, 1984). These "colour pegs" seem to be 
independent of the rest of processing in V I and receive independent input 
from the dLGN (Livingstone & Hubel, 1982). 
The columnar structure of the cortex particularly the hypercolumns indicate 
that specific regions of the cortex are dedicated to the processing of 
information from restricted inputs (Carlson, 1986). This further suggests 
that because synaptic connectivity in the cortex is mainly vertical, giving 
rise to this columnar structure, visual processing in V I is mainly localised. 
A complete understanding of the visual scene is not well supported by 
neurophysiology within V I 
It seems then that a highly complex pattern of information processing 
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emerges from the functional organisation of V I , which through 
simplification indicates specific information is extracted about the visual 
image at this stage in the processing. Arguably this "simplified picture" of 
V I is not only incorrect, it detracts from the real capabilities of V I in the 
processing of visual information (Gawne et al, 1994). 
THE EXTRA-STRIATE AREAS. 
At least 25 cortical areas associated with the processing of visual 
information have been identified in the primate, the striate cortex being one 
such area (van Essen et al, 1991). In the Macaque monkey it is possible to 
identify 11 areas that are dedicated primarily to the processing of visual 
information. There are 4 areas that have a marked preference for visual 
processing but also process other information. Finally there are 5 further 
areas that could be dedicated to either of the previous groups, and it is 
suggested many more remain to be discovered (van Essen, 1985). The areas 
involved with the processing of visual information beyond the striate cortex 
( V I ) are commonly referred to as the "extra striate" or "pre striate cortex". 
Beyond the extra striate cortex are other areas relating to vision namely the 
"association areas", for example the parietal and temporal cortices (see 
figure 8), where i t is thought that the resultant visual processing is 



















Figure 8. A schematic of the extrastriate and association areas of the visual 
cortex. 
Arguably the extra striate cortex is part of the association cortex, however 
the extra striate areas tend to be purely concerned with visual information 
processing whereas the association areas are not necessarily dedicated 
purely to visual processing (Carlson, 1986). The extra striate areas and the 
association areas are assumed to perform so called higher level functions or 
cognitive processing resulting in "conscious" perception. It is these areas 
and this high level processing that we know very little about (Churchland, 
1986; Maunsell & Newsome, 1987). It could be argued that due to the 
significant amount of feedback from the extra striate areas to the striate 
cortex and dLGN the role of V I in high level processing is underestimated. 
Unlike V I the extra striate cortex consists not just of one cortical region, 
but of many, for example V2 and V3 are both visual cortical areas within 
the extra striate cortex. The identification of these extra striate areas 
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generally involved classic lesioning studies trying to trace the flow of 
information in the cortex. By destroying known visual areas, initially V I , 
and seeing which other areas were affected it is possible to "parcelate" the 
cortex. For example in lesioning V I , degeneration of another visual cortical 
area was apparent, V2. The next step was to lesion V2 and so on and so on 
(Rosenquist, 1985). Although identification of further distinct visual 
processing areas has been possible, their function is not as clearly defined. 
It is possible to make some kind of interpretation as to the underlying 
functionality of the extra striate areas, and some functional and structural 
themes are continued from V I . 
As with the previous accounts of the visual system the outline given here of 
the extra striate cortex is primarily concerned with charting the information 
flow through the cortex identifying structures and attempting to define their 
function (see figure 8 for a simplified overview of the extra striate areas 
and their pattern of connectivity). The projections making up both the 
feedforward and feedback pathways from and to V I are extremely complex. 
At least 100 pairs of major visual pathways have been identified along with 
many more suspected ones (Van Essen, 1985). It is only possible to discuss 
a limited number of the pathways that are significant in terms of a 
simplified model of visual perception (for a more comprehensive review of 
the patterns of connectivity see van Essen, 1985). Detailed accounts of 
structure and function w i l l be discussed when necessary in further chapters. 
In simple terms then, from V I the feedforward pathways project mainly to 
V2, although V I projects directly to two other areas in the extra striate 
cortex, V3 and V4. V3 sends projections on to V3A, but V I is not directly 
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connected to V3A. From V2 projections go to V3, V4 and also directly to 
the frontal eye fields. The frontal eye fields are located in the frontal lobes 
and involve the control of eye movement. V3 then projects to V3a, V5 (MT) 
and IT. V4 projects to IT and V5 to the posterior parietal cortex. In terms of 
functionality, V3 and V3a are sensitive to orientation but not colour. These 
are only the major pathways, there are many more. As mentioned previously 
retinotopicy to some degree is maintained in all these areas but not to the 
same degree as in V I (van Essen, 1985; Allman & Kaas, 1971; 1974). 
The visual cortex, especially the extra striate areas have been shown to be 
organised in a hierarchical fashion (van Essen, 1985; Maunsell & Newsome, 
1987). Further, it is suggested that at least two anatomically separate 
streams of information How exist. The first attempt at classification of two 
stream of information suggested a dorsal and ventral pathway (Ungerleider 
& Mishkin, 1982; van Essen, 1985; Maunsell & Newsome, 1987; Bruce & 
Green, 1992; Oram & Perrett, 1994). The dorsal or 'Svhere" pathway 
proceeded from V1-V2-V5 (MT), terminating predominantly in the posterior 
parietal region and the ventral or "what" pathway, from V l - y 2 - V 4 , 
terminating in the inferior temporal (IT) regions of the cortex (Ungerleider 
& Mishkin, 1982). The parietal area of the cortex is involved in the 
processing of visio-spatial information and language and IT is the "highest" 
level in the association cortex of the monkey, thought to be the area of the 
cortex where object recognition takes place (Churchland & Sejnowski, 
1992; Carlson, 1986). Through classic lesioning studies it is possible to 
support this theory of visual processing (Mishkin et al, 1983), but this w i l l 
be discussed in the next chapter. It has been suggested that this distinction 
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between two separate pathways originates in the separation of retinal 
information at the dLGN into magno and parvo cellular layers which is 
maintained in V I in the 4c and 4cp input layers (Livingstone & Hubel, 
1988). However the neurophysiological evidence for this is not conclusive 
(Goodale & Milner. 1992). 
Beyond the parietal areas and IT, projections for both ventral and dorsal 
pathways go on to the medial temporal lobe. In the medial temporal lobe it 
seems that the pathways maintain their segregation. The medial temporal 
lobe includes the tail of the caudate, the claustrum, the amygdala and the 
hippocampus. These areas are thought to be involved in learning and 
memory processes as well as the generation of emotional states. It seems 
that visual processing does not have to reach IT or the parietal regions 
before it passes to the medial temporal lobe, there are direct projections 
from earlier visual processing areas.(see O' Shaughnessey, 1994; Oram & 
Perrett, 1994 for reviews). The implications of this are that object 
recognition and consequently visual perception could be taking place before 
visual processing is complete. This could mean that vision is not completely 
bottom-up, and explain why it takes longer to recognise things we have no 
experience of compared to things we have previously encountered. Oram 
and Perrett suggest that how much visual processing is necessary before 
information goes to the medial temporal areas is dependent on the task in 
hand. I f cues are given as to the nature of the information that needs to be 
extracted then it takes less time than i f no cue is given. 
In terms of functionality the extra striate areas have both similarity and 
dissimilarity with V I . V2 is very much like V I , having the same structure 
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and functional distinctions, retinotopicy is also maintained in V2. Like V I , 
V2 is sensitive to orientation as well as binocular disparity suggesting V2 is 
sensitive to depth information (Carlson, 1986). The architecture of V2 
consists of thin and thick vertical stripes with faint interstripes separating 
them. It has been shown that the thin stripes are sensitive to wavelength and 
the thick stripes to motion. Form sensitivity is distributed across all of the 
stripes. (De Yoe & van Essen, 1985; Hubel & Livingstone, 1985; Shipp & 
Zeki, 1985). It is also clear that beyond V2 extra striate areas are tuned to 
respond to particular types of information (Zeki, 1978a; 1978b; 1980; 1983; 
1988; 1992) Lesion studies have shown that by destroying certain areas in 
the extra striate cortex it is possible to remove the ability to process certain 
types of information. For example V3, which is anatomically separate from 
V3a but functionally similar, is sensitive to orientation but not at all to 
colour. Neurons in V3 have larger receptive fields than both neurons in V I 
and V2 suggesting that a more global form of processing is taking place. 
Lesions to V4 demonstrate inability to perceive colour, and lesions to V5 
(MT) show inability to detect motion. Since the development of a an 
anatomical and functional basis for two separate streams of information 
processing in the cortex there has been extensive revisions. It is now clear 
that the early distinctions are not fu l ly supported by neurophysiology and it 
has been suggested that there are in fact 4 separate pathways in the extra 
striate cortex processing information, one for colour, one for motion and 
two for form (Zeki, 1978a; 1978b; 1980; 1983; 1988; 1992; van Essen, 
1985; Maunsell & Newsome, 1987; Bruce & Green, 1992; Oram & Perrett, 
1994). Again this w i l l be discussed further in the following chapter. 
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Therefore it is possible to create a very simplistic schematic idea of visual 
processing from V I . V2 can be thought of as a parcelling point where, as in 
V I , a retinotopic representation of the image is directed to various areas in 
the extra striate cortex that process certain information. There are at least 
two main pathways through the extra striate cortex operating in parallel 
with a possible third and fourth, processing colour, form and motion. Two 
of the pathways can be seen to originate in V I where colour and motion in 
formation are processed separately, colour in the "pegs" and motion on 
direction selective cells. These direction sensitive cells are found mainly in 
layer 4b which projects to V5 (MT) and V3 and in layer 6 which is known 
to project directly to V5 (MT) where motion information is thought to be 
processed (Livingstone & Hubel, 1988; Zeki, 1978a; 1978b; 1980; 1983; 
1988; 1992; van Essen, 1985; Maunsell & Newsome, 1987; Bruce & Green, 
1992; Oram & Perrett, 1994). It is possible to make a further anatomical 
distinction between the extra striate areas and the association areas of the 
cortex. Init ially there are the areas that are stil l concerned with the 
processing of the retinal image, extracting information. Beyond this are 
further areas that are concerned with the integration of information and 
possibly learning and recognition of the result of such integration. Areas 
considered to involve information extraction include; V2, V3, V3a & V4 
and VS. The areas thought to be significant in the integration of all this 
visual information include the inferior temporal cortex (IT), and the 
posterior parietal cortex (see figure 8). 
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OTHER PATHWAYS: REFLEXIVE 'TsTON COGNITIVE" PATHWAYS. 
As mentioned previously there are a number of other pathways from the 
retina that do not pass through the dLGN. These pathways do not all project 
to the visual cortex, some project to the brain stem, and play a significant 
role in the regularity system, controlling for example eye movement and 
focus. These secondary or reflexive, non cognitive pathways include retinal 
projections to, the superior colliculus (SC), pulvinar nucleus (PN), ventral 
lateral geniculate nucleus (vLGN), olivary nucleus of pre-tectum (ONPT), 
nucleus optic tract (NOT), dorsal terminal accessory optic nucleus 
(dTAON), lateral terminal accessory optic nucleus (ITAON), medial 
terminal accessory optic nucleus (mTAON), and the suprachiasmatic 
nucleus (SCN) (see figure 9). Pathways that project to the cortex include 
the SC and the PN whereas pathways to other areas such as the brain stem 
include the vLGN, ONPT, NOT, d, 1, and mTAON and the SCN (Cowey & 
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Figure 9. The secondary, reflexive visual pathways. 
The superior colliculus (SC) as discussed previously, receives mainly W 
ganglion projections from the retina and is thought to play a major role in 
the control of eye movements. The SC then projects to the extra striate 
areas via the inter-laminar areas of the dLGN, and the pulvinar nucleus 
(PN). The SC receives information from nearly all of the areas in the visual 
cortex. The PN is one of the many nuclei that make up the thalamus and it 
both projects to and receives projections from the extra striate areas, 
namely MT. MT being concerned with the processing of motion 
information. The pathways projecting to the SC and the PN are inextricably 
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linked, i t is therefore hard to determine exactly what information is 
transmitted by the PN. The vLGN projects retinal information not to the 
cortex, but to sub-cortical structures including structures that already form 
secondary visual pathways of their own such as the pretectum, SC, and the 
SCN. Its role in the processing of visual information is not at all clear. The 
ONPT is thought to be involved with the control of pupil size and the 
accessory optic nuclei, d, 1, and mTAON, in the co-ordination of eye 
movements and the detection of self movement. Finally the SCN which is 
part of the hypothalamus involves the regulation of the day/night cycle and 
is sometimes thought of as a biological clock. (Carlson, 1986; Cowey & 
Stoerig, 1992). 
The role of these secondary visual pathways in relation to the processing of 
visual information resulting in perception not clear. As already suggested 
one distinction that has been made between these secondary visual pathways 
and the primary visual pathway is that of conscious/non conscious, 
reflexive/non-reflexive processing. However as it is clear some of these so 
called secondary reflexive pathways project to and receive projections from 
the extra striate cortex, the very areas of the visual cortex with which we 
associate with the processing of higher cognitive "conscious" processes. 
Experimentation with patients suffering with the disorder "blindsight" has 
suggested that the information enabling conscious perception could be 
carried along these pathways. Blindsight is a condition where part of the 
visual cortex, usually V I has been destroyed either through illness in human 
subjects, or through lesions in animal studies, making it impossible for 
them to recognise or respond to visual stimuli. It has been shown that i f 
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subjects suffering from blindsight are asked to "guess" where objects are 
they can correctly locate them even though they are clinically "blind" 
(Weiskrantz, 1986; 1992). However the evidence is not conclusive and there 
is much work to do before the role of these secondary pathways is more 
clearly defined (Cowey & Stoerig, 1992). 
CONCLUSIONS. 
There cannot be enough emphasis on the point made earlier (in chapter 1) 
that a simplifying brain model is the best that can be hoped to be achieved. 
The outline of the neurophysiology of the visual system presented here is a 
gross simplification. The information available in the neurophysiological 
literature is far more detailed and complex. Even though it is possible to 
pursue more and more detailed accounts of the neurophysiology of the 
visual system, information is stil l incomplete. The problem of incomplete 
information is directly related to the techniques available in experimental 
neuroscience. Intracellular recordings are extremely hard to conduct 
successfully, and extracellular techniques are less reliable. 
Neurophysiological research is continually providing new information about 
the structure and function of the brain, meaning that any model developed is 
by no means complete. As research continues finer levels of detail are 
achieved, going beyond neurophysiological descriptions, to include 
biochemical descriptions and even to the level of molecular physics. At this 
point the problem of multi-disciplinary research becomes most apparent. To 
provide a global picture of what is actually happening causes an overload of 
information of which a great deal is meaningless without in depth 
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knowledge in given disciplines. 
It seems from the amount of literature published that more is known about 
the structure and function of the visual cortex than any other cortical area. 
It seems that even with this wealth of knowledge we may know a great deal 
about visual processing, but we know very little about how visual 
processing becomes visual perception (Oram & Perrett, 1994). This makes 
the task of developing artificial vision systems capable of perception 
extremely dif f icul t . 
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CHAPTER 1 
THEORIES OF VISUAL F E R C E P T I Q N ; 
N E U R O P H Y S I O L O G I C A L AND 
P S Y C H O L O G I C A L T H E O R I E S O F VISION. 
This chapter introduces theories of visual processing and visual perception 
that originate in both neurophysiology and psychology. The first part of the 
chapter discusses neurophysiological, bottom-up theories of both visual 
processing and visual perception. The emphasis being on theories that 
explain the processing of visual information. The second part of the chapter 
discusses psychological theories some of which originate in 
neurophysiology others are pure top-down approaches. The difference from 
neurophysiological theories being that psychological theories aim to 
explain global perception. However overlap occurs between psychological 
and neurophysiological theories especially in regard to explaining local 
perception. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N . 
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL THEORIES. 
It is not always a simple task to distinguish between neurophysiological and 
psychological theories of visual perception. This is because some 
psychological theories have grown from accounts of neurophysiology, 
taking ideas suggested in the structure and function of the visual system and 
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using them to explain behaviour. Conversely some neurophysiological 
theories originate within the field of neuropsychology, using behavioural 
accounts to develop theories of brain structure and function and supporting 
them through classical neurophysiological techniques. With 
neurophysiological theories it is often hard to decide whether what is being 
proposed by any piece of research is actually an account of either a 
localised or global aspect of the neurophysiology of vision or an actual 
theory supported by such descriptions. With psychological approaches it is 
often hard to see how behavioural accounts in the form of psychophysical 
experimentation can be related to the structure and function of the 
underlying neurophysiology. 
One possible distinction that can be made is that neurophysiological 
theories of visual perception tend to be based on accounts of visual 
processing, whereas psychological theories are based more on visual 
perception. This equates to psychology taking a top-down approach to 
vision, having a theory of what vision is then testing that theory against 
behavioural experiments. Neurophysiology on the other hand works from a 
bottom-up approach. This means constructing a theory of visual perception 
by starting at its lowest level, and building on this until a theory emerges. 
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate this point and also to combine the 
best of the two approaches in the development of a theory of perception. 
Most attempts at theorising about or modelling perception are directed at a 
specific visual task, especially top-down psychological approaches. For 
example psychological theories of vision include theories of object or 
pattern recognition, depth perception, motion perception, object constancy 
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and theories of selective attention. There are very few "global" theories of 
vision, most seem to be task orientated, possibly with the exception of 
Marr's and Gibson's theories respectively (Marr, 1982; Gibson, 1950). 
Arguably such theories are really frameworks within which visual 
perception is investigated (Bruce & Green, 1990). Neurophysiological 
theories of vision tend to be directed more at accounts of how the visual 
system might work. Rather than having different theories argued in 
conjunction with each other theories tend to be updated or replaced as new 
information comes to light. These like psychological theories of perception 
tend to be task orientated, for example face detection, or colour processing. 
It does seem that neurophysiological theories attempt to be global but 
within that global theory of visual perception a specific aspect of visual 
processing is focused on. 
N E U R O P H Y S I O L O G I C A L T H E O R I E S O F V I S I O N . 
Two main types of theory emerge from the structural and functional 
descriptions of the visual processing areas of the brain. Firstly there are 
those theories which are based on the notion of vision as a hierarchical, 
sequential process. Secondly there are those theories that suggest visual 
processing is to some extent hierarchical but there are separate and distinct 
streams of visual processing that occur in parallel. Therefore it possible to 
class neurophysiological theories o f vision as being either of one sort or the 
other. Underlying either class of theory is a further functional distinction 
related to the coding of information. In hierarchical sequential theories of 
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visual processing each neuron in V I is thought to encode a specific piece of 
information about the visual image. As processing continues through the 
visual system neurons encode for more and more abstract pieces of 
information, until at the highest level their are neurons that respond only to 
specific combinations of information in the form of whole objects. With 
parallel theories of visual processing encoding is thought to be based on 
populations of neurons all contributing to the processing of the visual 
image, with no one neuron in any visual area having complete information 
on any aspect of the visual image. Neurons in V I for example encode form 
information, whereas neurons in V4 encode colour information. The image 
is encoded as a pattern of activity across populations of cells.(Churchland & 
Sejnowski, 1992). Exactly how this "distributed" representation becomes a 
coherent whole is the subject of much debate and is discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter. 
As the visual system can be divided into a number of separate stages of 
processing involving anatomically distinct areas of the brain there are also 
localised theories of vision. These theories may relate only to a particular 
area of visual processing rather than providing a global model or theory of 
perception itself. However such theories can provide insight into the way in 
which global theories of visual processing can be constructed. 
BARLOW'S SINGLE CELL FEATURE DETECTION THEORY. 
The single cell feature detection (SCFD) theory of visual processing and 
eventual perception evolved from the work carried out by Hubel and Wiesel 
on the structure and function of the visual cortex as discussed in chapter 2 
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(Hubel & Wiesel, 1962; Hubel & Wiesel 1970; Hubel, Wiesel, & Le Vay, 
1977; Hubel & Wiesel, 1977). The theory is based on Hubel and Wiesel's 
description of visual processing from the retinal ganglions to neurons in 
V I . The first level of detection being light intensities in the retinal 
ganglions terminating in the dLGN. Feature detection becomes more 
abstracted as simple cells in V I code for edges and orientation in a given 
retinal location. The third level of abstraction is with complex cells that are 
not bound by retinotopic representation (Bruce & Green, 1990; Churchland, 
1986). This is supported by the laminar columnar structure of V I , and the 
strict organisation of information flow within that structure, as well as the 
existence of the primary visual pathway from the retina to V I . Although 
Hubel and Wiesel themselves did not propose that visual processing 
throughout the cortex exists in this way, their work provided 
neurophysiology with the evidence it needed for a single cell doctrine to 
develop. 
Quite simply the SCFD theory suggests that information is processed in a 
series of hierarchical sequential steps resulting in a more and more 
sophisticated description leading to the "Grandmother Cell" hypotheses 
proposed by Barlow (Barlow, 1972). Barlow suggests that the brain has 
single cells acting as feature detectors in the cortex responding to more and 
more abstract geometric features until at the top of the hierarchy they 
respond only to particular objects, for example one*s grandmother. When a 
particular feature falls into the receptive field of a neuron in layer 4 of V I 
tuned to that feature it fires. This neuron projects to those in a layer 
directly above it which is tuned to respond to an even more abstract feature 
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until eventually it projects to an area in the extra striate cortex that actually 
contains a neuron that fires only when a certain persons face has been 
detected, maybe ones grandmother (see figure 10). The problem is whether 
this theory can be upheld by neurophysiological evidence. 
o o 
Figure 10. Single cell feature detection theory. 
I f the SCFD holds true then it would be expected that the transmission of 
information from the dLGN to the striate cortex would be solely 
feedforward, and this would be reflected in the structure of the primary 
visual pathway (Bruce and Green, 1990), Initially it would be expected that 
i f this was the case then dLGN cells would connect directly and only to 
simple cells in V I . It has been shown that projections from the dLGN 
connect to both simple and complex cells in V I . Complex cells also receive 
projections from other cortical cells. It must be noted however that simple 
cells do only get information in from the dLGN being predominantly in 
layer 4 of V I and complex cells do provide output from V I (Ferster & 
Lindstrom, 1983). One major problem with the SCFD theory is that there 
are more feedback pathways than feedforward ones, so as much goes back to 
the dLGN as comes in (van Essen, 1985; Oram & Perrett, 1994; Churchland 
& Sejnowski, 1992; Dowling, 1992). However the organisation of the visual 
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cortex has been shown to be hierarchical in that information entering the 
cortex proceeds in a feedforward way and is processed in stages. Although 
specific connection patterns may not be upheld there is a consensus that the 
cortex is to some extent organised in a hierarchical fashion (see van Essen, 
1985; for a review). 
Another problem for the SCFD theory is that it assumes that single neurons 
in V I code for geometric features. A pattern of light falls on the retina and 
is coded as an abstract symbolic representation of the retinal image which 
consists of simple geometric features present such as line angles etc. 
Neurons in the visual cortex then respond in a hierarchy to more and more 
complex patterns of these geometric features. The centre-on cells for 
example in the LGN do not just respond to straight lines they can respond to 
any number of patterns. To be a line detector they would have to respond 
only to straight lines (Bruce and Green, 1990) Bruce and Green argue that 
proponents of the SCFD theory would suggest that simple cells in V I 
respond to lines of cells in the LGN not just single centre-on cells. 
Therefore simple cells in the next stage of the hierarchy are coding for 
geometric features. However simple cells do respond to variations in line 
orientation in the retinal image, as coded by lines of centre-on cells, so 
detecting different lines. This is not the whole picture, the response of 
simple cells increases with other variables such as contrast and position of 
the light falling in its corresponding receptive field. Therefore the 
information i t imparts is ambiguous (Bruce & Green, 1990). 
The SCFD theory also has been shown to be fiawed through classic lesion 
studies. I f the theory holds true it would be expected that i f V I was 
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removed through lesions, object and complex pattern recognition would not 
be possible. In a series of experiments it has been consistently shown that 
this is not the case. However in the same series of experiments it was shown 
that lesions to the extra striate cortex do impair object and pattern 
recognition, providing support for the SCFD theories claims that whole 
objects are represented at the highest level in the hierarchy, namely IT in 
the extra striate areas. (Sprague et al, 1977; Berlucchi & Sprague, 1981), 
This work also casts doubt on the significance of the spatial frequency 
tuning of neurons in V I in contour processing for pattern recognition 
(Berlucchi & Sprague, 1981). The results of Berlucchi and Sprague support 
this in that visual acuity is lost with V I , however pattern recognition is not. 
A possible explanation for this is that the secondary visual pathways are 
sufficient to transmit information to the extra striate areas. This is a 
contentious issue and has been investigated extensively in relation to 
blindsight patients who when pressed to make perceptual "guesses" about 
objects do so correctly even though they cannot see them. However it is stil l 
not certain as to how much information can be passed on via the secondary 
pathways (see Cowey & Stoerig, 1992; for a review). One suggestion for 
blindsight is that i t is very rarely the whole of V I that is destroyed, and 
what is left is sufficient to process images to a limited degree (Campion et 
al, 1983). The evidence in support of the SCFD theory is not conclusive 
though the single cell doctrine dominated both theories of visual processing 
and experimental research in neurophysiology for a long time. 
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THEORIES OF PARALLEL PROCESSING IN THE VISUAL SYSTEM. 
More recently and as a result of conflicting evidence for single cell theories 
and extensive investigation into the relationship between the striate and 
extra striate areas of the cortex, theories of visual processing have been 
readdressed. It has become clear that beyond V I processing in the extra 
striate cortex is not purely hierarchical and by no means a sequential 
process. By looking at specific aspects of visual processing, for example the 
processing of colour, motion, shape, and size information, research has 
shown that there are separate areas for processing this information beyond 
V I . Destruction, either artificial or through illness and disease, of certain 
areas of the cortex supports this. Zeki and his colleagues have conducted a 
vast number of experiments that show that the extra striate areas of the 
cortex are specialised in their function (Zeki, 1978a; 1978b; 1980; 1983; 
1988; 1992). As mentioned in chapter 2. Zeki showed that V5 (MT) is 
specialised for motion detection, and cells in V4 are particularly sensitive 
to wavelengths of light used in colour identification as well as orientation 
for detection of form. Neurons in V3 and V3a are also tuned to form 
information but do not respond to colour information. This lead to the 
development of a functional specialisation hypothesis which has also 
extended to V I . Zeki suggested that both V I and V2 are also specialised in 
their function, and they act as a "parcelling" point where information is 
grouped and sent to the relevant specialised area in the extra striate cortex 
for processing (Zeki, 1978a; 1978b; 1980; 1983; 1988; especially 1992 for 
review). This hypothesis is supported by the structural and functional 
distinctions in V I where, as mentioned in chapter 2, colour and motion 
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information is coded separately. 
UNGERLIEDER & MISHKIN*S TWO STREAM THEORY OF VISUAL 
PROCESSING. 
The SCFD theory was predominantly hierarchical, and there is evidence 
suggesting this to be the case in the primate visual cortex with several areas 
of processing making up each level with extensive feedback from higher to 
lower levels (van Essen, 1985). The existence of a hierarchy does not mean 
serial processing feature detection theory is right. Especially as SCFD 
theory claims processing to be feedforward, and evidence to support 
hierarchical processing suggests that feedback connections are equally as 
important. The parcelling model suggests different areas code for different 
things. V I and V2 "parcel" information out to areas that code for different 
things in parallel (Zeki, 1978a; 1978b; 1980; 1983; 1988; 1992). So within 
the bounds of the striate cortex functional and structural evidence lend 
support to single cell accounts of visual processing. However when looking 
beyond V I to the extra striate areas the evidence is not so convincing. The 
failure of the SCFD to explain why pattern and object recognition was stil l 
possible after lesions to V I (Sprague et al, 1977; Berlucchi & Sprague, 
1981) along with the evidence for functional specialisation within the extra 
striate areas (Zeki. 1978a; 1978b; 1980; 1983; 1988; 1992) led to the call 
for a parallel theory of visual processing. 
As mentioned in chapter 2 Ungerleider and Mishkin proposed a two stream 
theory of visual processing based on two different visual processing 
capabilities, recognition and visio-spatial. One pathway determines what an 
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object is and another determines where it is. There theory was based on a 
proposal by Schneider (Schneider, 1969) who suggested that there were 
separate sites dedicated to object recognition and object location. 
Ungerlieder and Mishkin conducted a series of experiments that enabled 
them to support such an idea as well as give it substance through proposing 
the exact anatomical pathways for information flow, ventral and dorsal, to 
two separate processing sites, IT and the parietal areas of the cortex. The 
theory is also supported by neuropsychological studies. Patients suffering 
from visual agnosia due to damage to the occipitotemporal regions of the 
cortex are unable to identify objects yet can sti l l manipulate them, 
conversely patients suffering from optic ataxia due to damage to the 
posterior parietal cortex are able to identify but not move objects (see 
Goodale & Milner, 1992 for review). 
More recently the two stream theory has been substantially reviewed in the 
light of neuropsychological studies that suggest the distinction between 
'Svhat" and *'where" pathways is not quite so straight forward (Goodale & 
Milner, 1992). They suggest that neuropsychological evidence used to 
support the original two stream theory is conflicting. In some cases of 
patients suffering from optic ataxia they are unable to use the information 
relating to grasping rather than being completely incapable of doing so. 
Goodale and Milner suggest that the "where" pathway should be renamed 
the "how"' pathway. They suggest that two systems exist, one relating to 
predominantly to perception and the other to action, both processing visual 
information in different ways. There is a certain amount of interaction 
between the two systems through connectivity, meaning that it is not as 
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easy to separate perception and action as suggested by previous models 
(Goodale, & Milner, 1992). 
MAUNSELL & NEWSOME'S PARALLEL MODEL OF VISUAL 
PROCESSING. 
Ungerleider and Mishkin's two stream theory was primarily concerned with 
visual capabilities. It also suggested that divergence of the two streams took 
place early in the extra striate areas (Maunsell & Newsome, 1987). Revision 
of the two stream theory taking account of early vision was proposed by 
Maunsell and Newsome. (Maunsell & Newsome, 1987). The two stream 
theory they proposed was based on the formulation of possible pathways 
through the extra striate cortex in view of Zeki's work on functional 
specialisation. Maunsell and Newsome propose that there are two main 
pathways functioning in parallel, rather than lots of different areas all 
processing different things as the parcelling theory suggests. Both pathways 
begin in V I , and it is suggested even earlier in the 
magnocellular/parvocellular separation in the dLGN, but as mentioned in 
chapter 2 the basis for such a distinction is not clear. One pathway 
processes motion and spatial information resulting in visio-spatial 
processing, whilst the other processes colour and form information resulting 
in object recognition. Each stream is organised hierarchically, with 
differing levels of processing in each of the relevant areas associated with 
that particular stream. Maunsell and Newsome refer to the two pathways as 
the "colour form pathway" and the " motion pathway" and emphasise the 
point that they are related to but not the same as Ungerleider and Mishkin's 
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streams of processing (Maunsell and Newsome, 1987). 
The motion pathway originates in V I in layer 4b which projects directly to 
V5 (MT). From V5 projections go to the medial superior temporal area 
(MST) and then to area 7a in the parietal cortex. The colour form pathway 
originates in the colour "pegs" in V I and the "interpeg" regions that are 
sensitive to orientation. This segregation is maintained in V2 where the 
pegs in V I project to the thin stripes in V2 which are sensitive to colour. 
The interpegs project to the inter stripes in V2 which prefer a similar 
orientation preference as in V I . From V2 projections go to V4 then to IT, 
specifically the posterior inferotemporal area (PIT) and to the anterior 
inferotemporal area (AIT) . In both pathways retinotopicy decreases as they 
move away from V I and evidence suggests that as the pathways progress 
deeper into the extra striate areas more complex information is developed. 
Finally Maunsell and Newsome cite experimental work that suggests extra 
retinal inputs via the secondary visual pathways to the parietal and IT 
regions of the cortex play a significant role in the information processing 
that takes place there and should not be dismissed as merely modulating 
visual processing (see figure 11). 
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Figure 11. A schematic diagram illustrating Maunsell and Newsome*s two 
stream theory of visual processing. 
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Maunsell and Newsome make it quite clear in their paper that the extra 
striate areas are still very much under investigation and that some areas 
have been the subject of intensive study whilst other have not been 
scrutinised at all well. They go on to suggest that the two streams of 
processing are not totally independent of each other either functionally or 
anatomically. The colour form pathway does contain direction sensitive 
cells and orientation specificity is present in the motion pathway. Also 
there is evidence for connections between V4 and V5 and evidence from 
psychophysics that suggests completely independent processing does not 
exist. They suggest visual processing consists of two streams of serially 
connected visual processing areas that are in no way completely sequential 
due to feedback and diverse connection patterns. The complexity of the 
functional and structural relationship between the two streams is such that it 
is not possible to demonstrate conclusively that they operate completely 
independently of each other (Maunsell & Newsome, 1987). It seems then 
that although it is possible to regard visual processing in terms of parallel 
streams of processing there is a certain amount of overlap. 
ZEKI'S FOUR STREAM THEORY OF VISUAL PROCESSING. 
Zeki has revised the two stream theory further to flt with recent 
neurophysiological evidence from positron emission tomography (PET) 
scans. The results of PET scans carried out in conjunction with visual 
experimental tasks support Zeki's parcelation hypothesis (Zeki, 1992). Zeki 
proposes four parallel pathways operate in the visual cortex, one for colour, 
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one for motion and two for form. Zeki suggests there is an overlap between 
the pathways but the motion and colour pathways are quite distinct, having 
origins in the magnocellular parvocellular layers in the dLGN and in V I . 
One of the two form pathways is linked to the colour pathway originating in 
the parvocellular layer in the dLGN and passing to V4 via the areas between 
the colour pegs in V I (interpegs) and the thin stripes in V2. Then second 
form pathway is independent of colour, and follows the magnocellular 
pathway via layer 4b in V I to the thick stripes in V2 to V3 and directly to 
V3 from layer 4b in V I . Zeki refers to this as the "dynamic form" pathway 
as i t is thought that V3 processes form and motion information. Zeki argues 
that the "pigeon hole" nature of V I and V2's role in processing and direct 
connections between extra striate visual areas allows for complete 
interaction between pathways even though they can be seen to be distinct 
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Figure 12. A schematic diagram illustrating Zeki's four stream theory of 
visual processing. 
Support for the four stream theory comes not only from existing structural 
and functional experimental evidence but also from neuropsychology. 
Damage to V4 results in achromatopsia, where the patient st i l l has a fu l ly 
functioning V I , but is not able to see colour. Interestingly patients are also 
unable to recall colour information from before the damage occurred. These 
patients are completely capable of form and motion perception. In contrast 
patients with damage to VS resulting in akinetopsia, are unable to see things 
when they are in motion. The form pathways are less well supported by 
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neuropsychology, however some achromatopsia patients with damage in the 
striate cortex cannot perceive form unless either they or the visual world is 
in motion. Zeki argues that this is because they have to rely on the dynamic 
form pathway rather than through the damaged colour form pathway. 
Strikingly in support of the role of V I and V2 in the four stream theory is a 
syndrome that Zeki has termed "chromatopsia of carbon monoxide 
poisoning". People who suffer the effects of smoke or fume inhalation tend 
to have visual problems but their colour vision is not affected at all . In fact 
colour becomes the dominant medium for object recognition. Zeki suggests 
this is due to the fact that the colour pegs in V I and the thin stripes in V2 
have a high density of oxygen supplying blood vessels meaning that oxygen 
is less likely to be deprived to these areas than in others in the event of 
fume inhalation (Zeki, 1992). 
Zeki also proposes that V I is needed for long term visual experience, 
suggesting that V I and V2 are as important to perception as the extra striate 
areas that are assumed to underlie cognition. Zeki suggests that V I is used 
for short term perception in that it initialises the processing of visual 
information which is then processed in its specialist area and then passed 
back to V I and V2 for further specialist analysis. He uses blindsight 
patients as support for this idea. Blindsight patients cannot see as such but 
Zeki argues secondary pathways allow enough information to get to the 
specialised areas for them to "guess" correctly. They cannot add detailed 
specific information but can guess at motion and colour. 
There are other neuropsychological disorders providing support for parallel 
stream theories such as Zeki's. However it must be noted that 
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neuropsychological deficits and savings are generally partial. This means 
that although there may be a distinct deficit in certain processing abilities 
these are not necessarily completely abolished. Obviously individual cases 
differ due to the extent and nature of damage. Further, deficits in the 
processing of one particular type of information processing generally means 
a deficit is present in another. The nature of the cortex is such that damage 
occurring to certain areas wi l l affect the processing capabilities of others. 
Other disorders providing support include akinetopsic patients who cannot 
tell direction or coherence of motion but can stil l determine the existence of 
motion (Baker et al, 1987; Baker et al, 1991). However as mentioned above, 
patients suffering with akinetopsia generally have impaired form processing 
as well. Similarly achromatopsies can interpret waveform information but 
not as colour. Patients in both disorders st i l l had an intact V I , therefore 
Zeki implies V I is not just important in terms of providing detailed form 
information but for visual perception as a whole process. Conversely 
serious damage to extra striate regions but not to V I causes problems in 
long term perceptual abilities. Zeki cites the case of a man whose V I was 
intact but had severe stroke damage to the extra striate areas. He could copy 
drawings in incredible detail but had no idea what he had drawn. This 
suggest that V I and V2 are not just simply parcelling points, their role in 
perception is complex. Zeki parallels this segregation in the cortex to 
memory, initial processing can be used like a "working memory" (Baddeley 
& Hitch, 1974) whereas later processing is essential for long term storage 
(Zeki, 1992). 
This also supports Zeki*s earlier findings that suggested the parallel 
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pathways operated hierarchically extracting more and more abstract 
information as they progressed. There is evidence in support of hierarchical 
processing within the colour form pathway, where it has been demonstrated 
that cells in V I are selective for wavelength and respond even to changes in 
wavelength brought about by changes in lighting conditions. Cells in V4 
however do not change their response in this way, they demonstrate colour 
constancy. This ensures that an object that is red remains red even when 
lighting conditions change. This suggests that colour processing in V4 is 
more abstract than that in V I (Zeki, 1983). The notion of hierarchical 
processing does not mean that early visual processing is not essential for 
visual perception rather it suggests that higher visual processing is less 
dependent on retinal processing. 
One important question that has to be addressed in any parallel theories of 
vision is the integration of information allowing perception to take place. 
SCFD theory does not call for information to be combined. Zeki says there 
is no one "master" area where information converges, claiming there is no 
anatomical evidence to support such an idea. Zeki says integration occurs 
through the many links right from dLGN upwards that run between areas 
and forward and back in cortex. He illustrates this by pointing out that V5 
detects motion, but its receptive fields are too large to pinpoint the exact 
location of what is moving. It is by sending information back to V I , that the 
visual system is able to determine exactly what and where objects are 
moving. In reverse Zeki argues this is also an explanation of illusions. V I 
does not fa l l for illusions. It is the larger receptive fields and increased 
processing power of V2 that perceives things to be present that are not. This 
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led Zeki to formulate his theory of "multistage integration" in which 
perception takes place across the visual system simultaneously. Perception 
is mediated by vast re-entrant (feedback) connections to all areas of the 
visual cortex. Forward connections are "patchy and discrete" but feedback 
connections are non-specific and diffuse. This means that a feedback system 
could perform several important functions including the integration of form, 
colour and motion information, and provide detailed spatial information for 
extra striate processing (Zeki, 1988; 1992). 
EVIDENCE FOR INTEGRATED THEORIES OF PERCEPTION. 
Contrary to theories of segregated visual processing there is evidence to 
suggest that there is a great deal of interaction between processing channels 
in the visual system. As mentioned previously neuropsychological deficits 
are not generally distinct. When one form of processing is impaired other 
perceptual capabilities are usually also affected. Akienotopic patients who 
have damage to the motion pathways also suffer from form perception 
impairments. This implies that form processing is not necessarily distinct 
from motion processing. 
The neurophysiological and psychological literature also supports the 
distribution of processing between processing channels. It has been shown 
that the chromatic properties of visual stimuli effect the detection of motion 
(Krauskopf & Fareil, 1990). Psychophysical research has also shown that 
the processing of motion information seems to be dependent on form 
information. In a series of experiments Adelson and Movshon showed that 
the coherent motion perception of two spatial gratings was facilitated i f the 
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two gratings had similar spatial frequencies and were of a similar contrast 
(Adelson & Movshon, 1982: 1984). This has been interpreted as being 
evidence that segmentation of the object is directly responsible for coherent 
motion perception (Albright, 1991). 
Neurophysiological accounts of perception that suggest that visual 
processing is carried out in separate channels acknowledge that integration 
within the visual cortex occurs at all stages. However parallel theories of 
visual processing are concerned with the overwhelming evidence that 
supports segregated streams of processing within the visual system. This 
does not mean that the processing of form and motion information is not an 
integrated process, rather that is predominantly segregated. 
PERRETT AND COLLEAGUES -THE SINGLE CELL REVISITED. 
Further, and more recent support for the SCFD theory and hierarchical 
processing in the visual system comes from work conducted by Perrett et al 
(Perrett et al , 1986; Perrett et al, 1987; Oram and Perrett, 1994), based on 
earlier findings by Gross et al (Gross et al, 1972). Perrett et al have 
extensively investigated cells in IT that have been found to be selectively 
responsive to faces. (Perrett et al , 1986; Perrett et al, 1987; Oram and 
Perrett, 1994). The implication of this is that while cells in lower levels 
detect edges, bars, blobs and orientation, at the highest level cells respond 
to complex abstract combinations of features such as faces. As mentioned 
previously, IT is thought to be the area of the visual cortex involved in 
object recognition. Therefore a tenuous conclusion can be drawn that 
perhaps IT contains cells that respond to individual faces and objects. 
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In a review article Perrett et al provide examples of evidence from both 
neurophysiology and neuropsychology to support hierarchical abstraction of 
complex features in visual processing, where object recognition is 
dependent on a step by step process culminating in the association cortex 
possibly in IT. They suggest that Hubel and Wiesel's work along with the 
clinical condition prosopagnosia, where people are able to identify objects 
but not faces, provides the foundations for such a theory. The existence of 
cells that respond to faces provides strong support for such a theory. They 
stress that the neuropsychological work is controversial. One problem that 
could be construed is that it is hard to see how IT could be selectively 
damaged so as to stop face responsive cells but not cells responsive for 
other objects. On closer examination of their claims it seems that the 
behavioural responses of such cells are not as clear as i t first seems. Cells 
respond not just to one face but to faces. Cells recorded from monkey 
cortex responded to human and monkey faces. They did however not 
respond at all to other complex objects such as an alarm clock. Cells that 
did respond to faces however did so despite position, viewing distance, 
orientation and luminance of the face. Perrett et al also stress that this does 
not mean that visual processing does not occur in parallel, they merely 
suggest that hierarchical feature extraction is a possibility in the process of 
object recognition. Interestingly further experimentation showed that cells 
responded to particular facial features as well as they did to complete faces. 
However they go on to cite experimental evidence suggesting that certain 
cells responded best to "normal" arrangement of complete facial features. 
Finally response latency was affected by view, in that it took longer for 
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cells to respond to uncommon views, (for review see Perrett et al, 1987). 
It seems that the evidence is not conclusive. There could be cells 
responding to faces but at the same time there are cells that are responding 
to a lot of other things as well. They still maintain that the recognition of 
faces relies not on features encoded across populations of cells, but on 
small groups of selective cells and single cells. They also conclude that 
because cells responsive to faces are clumped together there are areas of the 
brain to deal specifically with face recognition. This does not mean it is 
exclusively dedicated to face recognition, but that is one of its particular 
functions. The implications of these findings are vast. I f there are cells 
responsive to faces then is it possible that there are cells that respond to 
other objects. I f there are then such a theory would fa l l foul of the problem 
of combinatorial explosion. It would also suggest that for recognition of 
new objects and new faces new cells would have to develop. This is not 
borne out by neurophysiological evidence. Arguably just because a cell 
responds to a face doesn't mean it is actually a speciflc feature detector. 
The numbers o f cells that respond in this way are extremely small, only 
10% of a sample of cells taken from IT (Perrett et al, 1982). Further 
criticisms include experimental evidence that shows the responses of cell in 
IT to be ambiguous, they respond to other things as well as faces. They also 
respond to faces with differing degrees of intensity (Bayliss et al, 1985). 
Another problem for purely feedforward hierarchical feature detection is 
that the response of cells in V4 in the colour form pathway are affected by 
their attentional state whereas cells in V I are not (Moran & Desimone, 
1985). I f visual processing is feedforward hierarchical with the highest 
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level of processing holding a complete abstract representation like a face 
then you would not expect one level of processing to be affected by the 
animals state and not others. Also it has been shown that cells in anterior 
inferotemporal cortex (AIT) respond very differently in a delayed matching 
to sample task. Some respond to the sample, different cells respond in the 
delay period and a further class of cells responded to the colour the animal 
eventually chooses regardless of the colour i t was shown. (Fusler & Jervey, 
1982). Fuster and Jervey conclude from this that the extra striate pathways 
do not function independently of other areas of the brain. Other processes 
such as attention and memory influenced the strength of response in so 
called feature detecting cells. The fact that cells respond to the chosen 
colour, which is different from the colour of the object presented to the 
retina, suggests that visual information is not completely processed in a 
feedforward hierarchical way. Information feeds back and forth not only in 
the visual pathways but to and from other sensory processing areas. 
Oram and Perrett in a recent paper outlining how models can be derived 
from neurobiological constraints revise feature detection theory to fit with a 
more general view of visual processing (Oram & Perrett, 1994). They 
discuss in further detail the nature of cells in IT and their role in object 
recognition. They maintain grandmother cells do exist but now describe 
them as cells that are responsive to "biologically important visual 
patterns..." such patterns include faces, limbs, eyes etc. and include groups 
of features or just single features. They acknowledge work which has shown 
cells in IT are selective for complex patterns but suggest that biologically 
important visual patterns are more abstract than these complex patterns. 
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They cite neurophysiological evidence that suggests that cells in IT prefer 
specific combinations of features to be present and in a specific order for 
such cells to respond maximally (Oram & Perrett, 1994). This fits with 
psychological research that suggests neonates are capable of face 
recognition at extremely young ages (Fantz, 1961; Bushnell et al, 1989). In 
one reported case a two day old neonate is capable of distinguishing 
between its mother and a stranger (Bushnell et al, 1989). Oram and Perrett 
do emphasise that although visual perception involves the interaction of 
many different areas of the brain the model they are concerned with is one 
that involves constructing a visual image from a bottom-up approach. They 
are trying to model visual perception arising from being asked *Svhat is this 
picture of?" Exactly how much of visual perception is based on such an 
approach is questionable, and even i f you ask such a question experience 
surely plays a large part in analysis of individual components of the picture 
(Oram & Perrett, 1994). 
Evidence from neurophysiology and neuropsychology shows strong support 
for parallel models o f visual processing. It is possible to support a SCFD 
approach within a parallel model. In view of the fact that the mechanisms 
for integration of information in parallel models is not at all clear SCFD 
attracts much attention, especially in relation to the development of 
artificial vision systems. There is stil l much debate as to whether the SCFD 
model is correct. Evidence from both SCFD and parallel models suggest that 
visual processing is hierarchical. However parallel models especially that 
proposed by Zeki emphasise the significance of feedback from higher to 
lower levels for visual perception. Whether visual perception can be 
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explained in terms of bottom-up processing leading to the abstraction of 
features of increasing complexity is not clear. The strongest support comes 
from studies of object recognition, or more specifically face recognition. 
Arguably this is a very specialised area of visual processing, involving a 
great many other factors. It may not be sufficient to extrapolate the 
mechanisms of face recognition to general visual processing. One advantage 
of adopting SCFD as a model of visual processing is that i t is easy to see 
how it may operate at the functional level. Inputs from neurons ultimately 
converge in a feedforward hierarchical fashion on a single cell in IT. 
Parallelism in the visual system can be seen even in retinal processing of 
the image. It seems then that it is an important feature of the visual system 
right from early vision to late vision. Single cell feature detection might be 
part of visual processing but it does not explain visual perception. Because 
a single cell fires in the presence of certain visual stimulus does not mean 
all our understanding of that object is stored in that one cell. Even i f you 
accept the feature detection theory you must stil l have an explanation of the 
mechanisms underlying early stages of processing. Most of the evidence to 
support single neurons responding to faces concentrates on static images. 
Bearing in mind that motion information is processed in the parietal areas 
how does a SCFD approach cope with the recognition of moving faces? 
Visual perception means combining processing from other visual, and 
sensory areas as well as incorporating information from past experiences 
involving the mechanisms of memory and learning. It may be that there are 
cells that respond to biologically important objects, but this is just a small 
part of visual processing and it does not explain vision as a whole. 
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OSCILLATIONS AS AN UNDERLYING MECHANISM FOR VISUAL 
PROCESSING. 
It seems that processing in the visual cortex can be explained as a 
combination of hierarchical and parallel processing. This means that within 
the cortex there is a need for a functional mechanism for visual processing 
capable of explaining the linking of resultant processing in separate areas of 
the visual cortex. Since the late 1980*s and more significantly the early 
1990's a new body of research within the field of neurophysiology has 
evolved that has changed not only our understanding of how the brain 
functions but has also had a major implications in the field of neural 
modelling (Gray & Singer, 1987; 1989; Eckhorn et al, 1988; Gray et al, 
1989; Eckhorn et al, 1989; Eckhorn et al, 1990; Engel et al. 1990; Eckhorn 
& Schanze, 1991; Eckhorn 1991; Engel et al, 1991a; 1991b; Engel et al, 
1992.), This work has provided new explanations as to how the brain 
processes information specifically in the visual cortex. In general terms the 
findings of this research suggest that information about stimuli can be 
encoded in the brain as patterns of oscillation. Most of the work has focused 
on the presence of oscillatory behaviour in the neurons of the cat visual 
cortex, however this oscillatory behaviour has been found to exist in other 
areas of the brain as well as the visual cortex, including the olfactory bulb 
and the thalamus (Skarda & Freeman, 1987; Crick, 1984). Recently 
oscillatory activity has also been shown to exist in humans (Ribary et al, 
1991). 
The discovery of oscillatory activity in the cortex occurred simultaneously 
100 
by several groups of neurophysiologists.(Gray & Singer, 1987; Eckhorn et 
al, 1988.) Initially the work was purely experimental, but later research lead 
to the development of theoretical models based on the results of these 
experiments ( Eckhorn et al, 1989; Eckhorn et al, 1990; Engel et al, 1990; 
Eckhorn & Schanze, 1991; Eckhorn 1991.) This theoretical work enable 
neurophysiologists to experiment with and analyse the complex emergent 
behaviours of these oscillatory neurons. This was done by replicating the 
experimental findings through computer simulation and mathematical 
analysis. The work generated has provided an important link between 
experimental and theoretical analysis of theories of both brain and mind. It 
has also provided insight into the underlying functionality of neurons in the 
visual cortex. This is extremely important, because although we have a 
reasonable understanding of the structure of the visual cortex we know little 
about its underlying mechanisms. 
The synchronisation of oscillations in separate cells acting as feature 
detectors was first put forward by von der Malsburg, who proposed cells 
that discharged with the same frequency and in phase would form strong 
excitatory links with other cells behaving in the same way. Eventually 
individual cells would become a group of cells all representing the same 
stimulus (von der Malsburg, 1981). Since the discovery of oscillatory 
neurons in the cat primary visual cortex a great deal of research has been 
conducted into the significance of these oscillatory behaviours. Eckhorn and 
his fellow researchers also propose phase locking in groups of oscillating 
neurons as a mechanism for feature linking in the visual cortex. They 
propose that this temporal coding through phase locking in oscillating 
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groups of neurons that are spatially separate, but functionally similar, is a 
mechanism for secondary visual coding. Primary visual coding is 
represented by the receptive field properties of individual neurons. This 
secondary processing is stil l pre-attentive, enabling the appropriate features 
in the visual scene to be linked together before high level processing takes 
place. (Eckhorn et al, 1988; 1989; 1990; Eckhorn & Schanze, 1991; 
Eckhorn, 1991). 
In relation to the problems of integration of information in parallel models 
of vision this provides a possible solution. Zeki proposes in his model 
outlined previously, that the integration of information from spatially 
separate sites could be explained by diffuse feedback connections. However 
he does not discuss in any detail the mechanisms underlying such 
connections, further this does not account for integration between sensory 
areas such as the visual cortex and the auditory cortex. In view of this the 
idea of integration through oscillation sounds very appealing. At least a 
combination of both feedback connections and oscillations could be 
considered. In a review of the work so far into temporal codes Engel et al 
conclude they provide a solution to the integration in distributed neuronal 
networks. (Engel et al, 1990; 1991a; 1991 b; 1992). 
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P S Y C H O L O G I C A L T H E O R I E S OF VISION, 
When discussing neurophysiological theories there is a tendency to talk 
about visual processing rather than perception. This is generally because it 
is assumed that processing is an integral part of perception, and it is the 
underlying mechanisms of perception that are being described at the 
neurophysiological level. Psychological approaches can be thought of as 
being on a level above, dealing with perception from a behavioural point of 
view rather than its underlying mechanisms, trying to establish the nature of 
higher level cognitive function rather than the so called lower level visual 
processes associated with early vision. Neuropsychology is perhaps where 
vision is both thought of as perception and as processing. Psychological 
theories of vision are not always concerned with attempting to describe 
visual perception in its entirety. Vision can be thought of as modular, and 
theories of particular problems of vision are common in psychology. Marr 
refers to the breaking down of vision into a series of smaller theories as 
"independent modules of perception" (Marr, 1982). Marr goes on to argue 
that there are in fact very few general theories that attempt to describe 
visual perception, because it so complex it tends to be broken down into its 
component parts and each being investigated alone: 
"...students of the psychology of perception have made no serious attempts 
at an overall understanding of what perception is, concentrating instead on 
the analysis of properties and performance. " 
(Marr, 1982). 
The problem with this approach is that it becomes di f f icul t i f not impossible 
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to see how all the modules fit together to constitute perception. Further, it 
makes the unification of top-down and bottom-up descriptions even harder. 
Reducing many explanations of the nature of visual cognition to underlying 
neurophysiology becomes too complex to even consider in terms of visual 
perception. Arguably it becomes easier within the separate modules, but 
does this equate to perception? 
As with neurophysiological theories of vision it is possible to distinguish 
between two main categories of theories of visual perception, "concept 
driven" or top-down theories and "data driven" or bottom-up theories 
(Lindsay & Norman, 1972). These two approaches are related to the terms 
used to describe the general relationship between neurophysiological and 
psychological approaches to understanding visual perception as discussed in 
chapter 1. Data driven theories hold the premise that perception can be 
explained in terms of interpretation of the visual scene from the data as it 
streams through the system. No prior knowledge about the world is needed 
to interpret the world. A l l that is needed for perception is the information 
present in the visual world. Concept driven theories on the other hand 
suggest that the visual scene is interpreted by making comparisons to stored 
knowledge about the world acquired through experience, or genetically 
determined. Perception is not about constructing an image from data it is 
about using data to test hypotheses about the world. 
CONCEPT DRIVEN THEORIES OF PERCEPTION. 
Early explanations of vision focused on concept, or hypothesis driven 
models of vision. The retinal image provided a hypothesis that could then 
104 
be tested against what was known about the world. Such approaches to 
explaining vision were strongly linked to the constructivists view of 
cognitive psychology, that the retinal image was insufficient on its own. It 
was through building upon the retinal image through successive stages of 
processing including referral to information stored about the world that 
resulted in perception (Best, 1986).This approach to the explanation of 
perception was popularised in the 1970's as "information processing theory" 
(Lindsay & Norman, 1972). In turn artificial intelligence models were 
developed based on this approach (Tenenbaum & Barrow, 1976). Although 
there was a great deal of neurophysiological research into how the brain 
processed visual information the findings of this work were seen as the data 
element in a process that was far more concerned with cognitive states. The 
emphasis for any model was that i t had to be couched in a discipline. That 
discipline was predominantly psychology, however there were theories 
within psychology that were firmly rooted in neurophysiology. Such 
theories though were transformed to f i t psychological terms and research 
methods. Neurophysiology provided descriptions of the mechanisms and 
psychology provided the models. 
The gestalt psychologists proposed that perception involved the grouping of 
the elements of objects in the visual scene into whole objects or "gestalts". 
The gestalt psychologists were particularly interested in how we perceive 
ambiguous images. They proposed that "the whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts". Ambiguous images provide exactly the same retinal information 
yet they have more than one possible interpretation. The gestalt 
psychologists suggested that this is because vision is top-down, you have 
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two possible interpretations of the data and what you perceive depends on 
which interpretation you apply. High level cognitive processes are in 
control of the underlying neuronal mechanisms of lower level vision (Bruce 
& Green, 1990). They went on to describe what are commonly referred to as 
the "gestalt laws of organisation" which comprises of a series of principles 
that underlie the grouping of various component parts of and image to from 
a gestalt. These include, proximity, similarity, structure from motion, 
continuity, closure and goodness of fit. They suggested that the visual scene 
was represented isomorphically in the brain according to these principles. 
The work of the gestalt psychologists had a significant impact on early 
approaches to the development of artificial vision systems (Waltz, 1975) 
and to Marr's computational model of vision (Marr, 1982). The grouping 
principles aid scene analysis by allowing various segmented parts of the 
image to be grouped together to enable object recognition. However one of 
the biggest criticisms of the gestalt approach was that there is no evidence 
to suggest the mechanisms that underlie the laws of organisation exist 
(Bruce & Green, 1990). Gregory points out that i f the visual scene is 
represented isomorphically in the brain, you would need a further eye in the 
brain to see it (Gregory, 1973). It seems that the emphasis should not be on 
the details of the theory but rather on its more global implications. The 
suggestion that perception is a top-down process is st i l l very much debated 
even today. The effect of experience on perception provides a great deal of 
support for this to be the case. This has been highlighted through the results 
of psychophysical experiments with visual illusions. Cross cultural research 
into the effect of the Muller-Lyer illusion suggests that previous visual 
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experience from our environment determines whether or not we see the 
illusion (Deregowski, 1972). 
Gregory also proposes that visual perception is predominantly top-down. He 
suggests that visual perception involves testing hypotheses about the world 
in order to make sense of i t : 
"Perception is not determined simply by the stimulus patterns; rather it is a 
dynamic searching for the best interpretation of the available data... the 
senses do not give us a picture of the world directly; rather they provide the 
evidence for checking hypotheses about what lies before us. " 
(Gregory, 1972). 
Gregory also looks to visual illusions for support for his theory suggesting 
high level cognitive processes shape the interpretation we make about the 
visual image. As well as the Muller-Lyer evidence he sites the example of 
depth perception in visual illusions. Using a hollow mask of a face he 
demonstrated that it is only when the viewer is close to the face that depth 
information from the image itself is used to interpret i t . Meaning that when 
the hollow face is held at distances of more than a few feet it is perceived 
as being convex as opposed to concave or hollow. We are perceiving what 
we expect to see rather than what we are really seeing. 
MARR'S THEORY OF VISION. 
More recently interest has moved away from the idea of vision being a top-
down process and the emphasis has been on data driven approaches, an 
example of which is David Marr's computational approach (Marr, 1982). 
The approach proposed by Marr is particularly relevant, as it provides an 
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example of an attempt at both outlining a theoretical framework and then 
developing a model within that framework. Marr's theory of vision has had 
a significant impact on attempts at understanding visual perception, in the 
field of cognitive science and on the development of artificial vision 
systems in the fields of engineering and computer science. It also poses an 
important question about the nature of multi-disciplinary approaches to 
science that have direct bearing on the approach taken in this thesis. It 
could be argued that these approaches are not truly multi-disciplinary, and 
that at the level of description of the model they are firmly linked to a 
particular sort of representation. For example with Marr, his approach is 
very much a computational approach and the level of description for his 
model, although based on general ideas from both neurophysiology and 
psychology, is dominated by the fact that i t translates everything into a 
computational form. This means that Marr's model is subject to the 
problems associated with the translation from one description to another 
"universal" description. The other problem that is apparent in this approach 
is that research is then directed towards trying to find evidence to support 
the existence of the model of vision rather than looking at what vision 
really involves. Psychologists for example, interested in Marr's theory of 
vision dedicate their research to look for behavioural evidence to suggest 
that Marr's levels exist rather than looking at what vision actually is. 
Although Marr's intention was that vision could be described at many 
levels, the major impact of his work has been the implementation of 
computer vision systems that are in fact far removed from the visual 
processing mechanisms that takes place in the brain. 
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Marr's approach to the study of vision took the opposite view to the 
traditional information processing theories that had preceded it . Marr 
believed that vision could be explained in terms of bottom-up processing. 
His model was "data-driven" rather than top-down "hypothesis-driven". The 
theory was based on the assumption that you did not need prior information 
about the world to perform the task of visual perception. A l l the 
information needed for interpreting the world was present in the incoming 
data (Marr, 1982). A symbolic representation of the light falling on the 
retina was derived from the positions, orientations and movements of 
surfaces and their relations to one another. Marr proposed that visual 
processing took place on three levels. Firstly the retinal image has to be 
translated into data that can be processed. Translation involves matching 
each cell on the retina with the corresponding grey level image associated 
with i t , giving rise to a "grey level image" (GLI), from which a grey level 
description is computed. Computation of the description is through the 
detection of certain features in the GLI intensities that help to explain it . 
These intensities are represented symbolically as signatures for features 
corresponding to edges, bars, blobs and terminations in the image. The 
result of this level of processing Marr referred to as the "primal sketch". 
The second level of processing involves describing the "layout" in the world 
of the structures in the primal sketch in relation to the viewer. This can be 
explained as taking the symbolic descriptions of features and their geometry 
and putting them in a frame of reference, or co-ordinate system, making 
explicit orientations and depth. This level involves computing the 
underlying structural description from the features in the primal sketch and 
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results in the 2 1/2 D sketch. The third level of visual processing attempts 
to solve the problem of higher level visual processing. It is not a well-
defined problem and ultimately not complete in Marr's theory. The emphasis 
is on the construction of a three dimensional object based on an object 
centred description as opposed to a retinotopic description that has been the 
case up until this stage. This is because i f the description was viewer 
centred every time the view changed the object would appear to change and 
so its description would have to be altered. As we know, objects do not 
change every time our view of them changes, their form remains constant. 
Therefore a computation of the "volumetric primitives" of the two 
dimensional image takes place. Objects are described by taking a principle 
axis within them and building up a hierarchy of generalised "nested cones". 
This gives a two dimensional "stick" object three dimensional structure. 
Marr refers to this level of processing as the 3D sketch. (Marr, 1982). 
The early stages of visual processing proposed in Marr's theory are based on 
strong neurophysiological understanding of the vision system, for example 
the work of Hubel and Wiesel. They discovered cells in the primary visual 
cortex were organised in a very specific way, that led them to believe they 
acted as feature detectors looking for things like orientation, movement and 
edges in the information transmitted from the retinal image (Hubel & 
Wiesel, 1962). The later stages of the model are not so well supported by 
neurophysiological evidence. This might explain why the 3D sketch is not 
so clearly developed in the model. Whereas the primal sketch has strong 
foundations in neurophysiology, the 3 D sketch is about explanations of 
higher level cognitive function, something that has little support in 
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neurophysiological experiments. Also it is relatively easy to translate the 
primal sketch into a computational description that is easily implemented 
(Marr & Hildreth. 1980). The 2 1/2 D sketch also translates relatively well 
in a modular fashion but has not been implemented as a complete model. 
However the 3 D sketch does not translate in the same way, since the 
information it conveys is not easily described computationally. The 
implementation of the primal sketch has not been without problems. 
Neurophysiological evidence since the Marr-Hildreth algorithm was devised 
has contradicted its formulation (Schiller, 1982). So in translation to the 
computational level information was misinterpreted, providing evidence to 
support the notion that a single language is not necessarily the solution to 
multi-disciplinary study. This also supports the idea that implementation is 
perhaps best thought of as an aid to the development of theories rather than 
the end product of a theory. 
VON DER MALSBURGS CONSIDERATIONS. 
Contrary to Marr's theory of vision is one relating more to the early 
approaches to vision and Gregory's views. In brief von der Malsburg has 
constructed an outline for the development of a model of vision referred to 
as "considerations for a visual architecture" (von der Malsburg, 1990). 
Importantly von der Malsburg insists that the theoretical work in modelling 
vision is central to understanding vision. The depth of understanding and 
available technology should enable a model of vision to be constructed 
through the assimilation of information from many disciplines to form a 
coherent whole: 
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"What is needed now is the integration of all the components into one 
coherent functional whole: the definition of a visual architecture " 
(von der Malsburg, 1990). 
Central to the view of von der Malsburg is that vision is in fact an active 
process of testing and constructing visual information from stored 
knowledge we have about the world. This is a very different approach from 
that of Marr, who saw vision as being independent of our understanding of 
the world. Unlike Marr's theory of vision von der Malsburg suggests that 
top down information in the form of schema's are crucial for perception. 
Therefore von der Malsburg's account of perception goes beyond the visual 
processing areas of the brain to include discussion of the role of memory in 
visual perception. The account of the nature of perception given by von der 
Malsburg is theoretical, so unlike Marr's account it is not addressed at a 
computational level necessary for possible implementation. 
There are two key components to von der Malsburg's theory: architecture 
and data structure. According to von der Malsburg architectures are 
structures which shape and direct understanding of a system: 
"Architectures are standardised, flexible formulations of data structures 
and processes." 
(von der Malsburg, 1990). 
Data structures are the elementary parts that make up the architectures, for 
example neurons are the data elements of the brain. It is the organisation of 
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those elements within the architectures that lead to the understanding of 
vision. The theory is very much a series of "considerations" and it is not 
always possible to agree with some of the assumptions made by von der 
Malsburg. However the approach outlined is sympathetic to the aims of this 
thesis. Rather than translate information into one language, as with Marr's 
approach, transfer of information between disciplines is much preferable. 
By constructing a well-defined theory it is possible to combine information 
from various disciplines, thus also combining both a top-down and bottom-
up approach. 
CONCLUSIONS. 
It would seem then that there is no clear answer as to which theory, 
neurophysiological or psychological is correct. Development in either field 
seems to be related to trend as much as anything else. Within 
neurophysiology new evidence tends to lead to the adaptation of existing 
theories to f i t new information. With psychology there seems to be separate 
evidence to support either one view or another. It seems clear that in terms 
of understand real perception no one theory is right. It would seem fair to 
suggest that vision at the neurophysiological level is a combination of 
distributed hierarchical processing with the possibility of specialised cells 
for biologically important information (although this is far from 
conclusive). In terms of providing a psychological description of perception 
again i t seems that it must be a combination of the two approaches, data 
driven and concept driven. 
In the next chapter the evidence from chapters 2 and 3 w i l l be used to 
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develop both a theory and a conceptual model of visual perception. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A M Q P E L OF VISUAL PERCEPTION; 
AN OUTLINE OF A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF 
PERCEPTION FROM A TOP-DOWN AND 
BOTTOM-UP APPROACH. 
Chapter 4 can be divided into two parts all of which are heavily based on 
the general descriptions of the neurophysiology and psychology of vision 
provided in chapter 2 and 3. Part one briefly outlines a very general theory 
of perception. Part two describes a more detailed conceptual model 
outlining possible architectures and functions underlying the theory and 
includes a section on the architecture and function of the model and a 
section on their underlying mechanisms. 
A T H E O R Y OF VISUAL P E R C E P T I O N . 
The aim of this chapter is to create a hypothesis about how perception might 
be explained both theoretically and as a conceptual model. This means that 
some aspects of the model are purely speculative, whereas others are more 
factual and therefore described in more detail. In turn this means that some 
aspects of the model are more relevant to the development of artificial 
vision systems and others to the advancement of our understanding of the 
neurophysiology and psychology of perception. It is envisaged that the 
conceptual model w i l l provide an "architecture" with which to direct further 
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work. Therefore the less detailed, more speculative aspects of the model can 
be addressed in future research. 
INTRODUCTION. 
In chapter 3 psychological or top-down theories of perception were classed 
as being one of two possible types. The first class of theory suggested that 
vision was essentially concept driven (top-down), where information 
entering the brain at the retina consisted of hypotheses that were interpreted 
through testing against experiential or genetically predetermined 
knowledge. Theories based on this approach include Gregory's theory which 
describes perception as hypothesis testing (Gregory, 1973). The second 
class suggested that vision is a data driven process (bottom-up) where 
stored knowledge is not needed to perceive, all the knowledge that is 
needed is already present in the world itself. Such theories of vision include 
Marr's and suggest that no previous experience of the world is needed in 
order for perception to take place. Marr's theory however does imply that 
although early visual processing may be structured like this higher level 
interpretation, for example object recognition relies on stored knowledge in 
the form of a collection of three dimensional model descriptions (Marr, 
1982). Both classes of theory are limited, data driven theories such as 
Marr's best explain low level vision whereas concept driven theories such 
as Gregory's provide better explanations of high level visual processes such 
as object recognition. 
The theory of vision I wish to propose here is not new. It merely combines 
or extends the best aspects of existing theories. Unlike existing combination 
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theories (Nakayama, 1990) this theory wi l l attempt to explain perception in 
its fullest sense rather than just provide a functional explanation of the 
organisation of the visual system. At the same time it aims to provide 
insight into how architecture, function and possible underlying mechanisms 
support the theory as well as provide ideas for artificial vision systems. 
A COMPLETE THEORY OF VISUAL PERCEPTION. 
The theory underlying the model suggests that visual perception results 
from a combination of both data driven (bottom-up) and concept driven 
(top-down) processes. Representations are constructed within the visual 
system which form hypotheses about the world. Such representations are not 
necessarily generated entirely from visual input. Other sensory input is 
combined with visual input in the form of a poly sensory hypothesis at the 
highest level of processing. These hypotheses are then tested by comparing 
them to knowledge acquired through previous interactions with the world, 
and knowledge that is genetically predetermined. Stored associations made 
between previously encountered visual information and other sensory 
information also contributes to the interpretation of hypotheses. The result 
of this •'testing" allows for some form of identification or labelling of the 
visual image based on this top-down knowledge. Conformation results from 
the labelled hypothesis being propagated back through the system to be 
"checked" against bottom-up data. 
Data driven processing amounts to the construction of representations of the 
visual scene using knowledge that is implicit in the world and exists 
independently of high level knowledge gained through intelligent reasoning 
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processes. It is essentially an unconscious process. Concept driven 
processing involves the use of high level cognitive processes both conscious 
and unconscious that allow us to reason about data driven representations. 
So visual perception involves building bottom-up or data driven 
representations that can be compared in some way to existing knowledge 
about the world resulting in the interpretation of the world which can then 
be acted upon. 
SOME PREDICTIONS OF THE THEORY. 
• It is possible to describe vision in terms of the three levels outlined in 
chapter 1. Visual processing equates to the construction of a hypothesis 
using data driven information. Local perception equates to the 
identification of a hypothesis in terms of its visual content alone. Finally 
Global perception equates to the use of top-down information in the form 
of memory and other sensory input resulting in perception. 
• Visual perception is facilitated by experience. Knowledge about the 
world enables us to perceive it more quickly and accurately than i f we 
have no knowledge. 
• A visual representation is not necessarily the same as a visual perception. 
Information processing using top-down information means that the 
resultant perception can comprise more information than is made 
available through data entering the visual system. 
• I f a hypothesis cannot be constructed through damage to the visual 
system then visual perception would be greatly impaired. However, it is 
possible that i f the visual image has been experienced before, top-down 
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information could evoke a visual response. As it would be impossible to 
check this response against incoming data it would be expected that it 
may be extremely diff icul t to consciously report on the visual 
information being experienced. 
A C O N C E P T U A L MODEL OF VISUAL P E R C E P T I O N . 
The development of a conceptual model is strongly rooted in 
neurophysiology. The aim is to build a model based on the architecture and 
function of the visual system that w i l l uphold the top-down theory of 
perception outlined. The development of the model is strongly influenced 
by chapters 2 and 3, however there is significant difference between what 
was described there and what w i l l be described here. Chapters 2 and 3 
described in general terms the visual system in a biological brain. What is 
described here is a model based on the biological vision system, not a 
replica of that biological visual system. The biological visual system is 
extremely complex, and it is almost an impossible task to build a conceptual 
model on such a scale. Even i f it is possible it stil l may not function in the 
same way that the biological vision system does when it stands alone from 
the rest of the brain. To develop a conceptual model of perception capable 
of supporting a theory of perception requires gross simplification. This is 
even more important i f at any time the model is to be implemented in 
software. Therefore the conceptual model outlined here is by no means 
definitive, it is highly speculative and at best w i l l be biologically plausible 
rather than biologically real. 
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The approach taken to developing such a model involves starting with the 
simplest possible description and continually refining it until a detailed 
model emerges. This is done firstly for architecture, outlining the structure 
of the model, and then gradually functional descriptions of structure can be 
added resulting in a complete conceptual model of visual perception. The 
first stage of the development of the model is to begin building a structure 
that gives a global interpretation of the system. This process equates to the 
general philosophy of the thesis that you start with a "grand theory" or 
"general model". Once this has been achieved satisfactorily the global 
model can be broken down into its component parts and structure can be 
outlined at the local level for the various modules. This section of the 
chapter aims to illustrate how the conceptual model is developed. 
ARCHITECTURE & FUNCTION. 
The conceptual model is based on the neurophysiology described in chapter 
2 and 3. In its simplest form the model can be outlined in terms of a 
functional architecture. Basically it w i l l comprise a series of units 
corresponding to the major areas that make up the visual system in the 
brain. Each of the units outlined can be looked at in two ways, firstly 
through connections between the units as a whole system, and secondly as a 
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The model comprises of a series of hierarchically connected visual areas 
with both feedforward and feedback connections throughout the whole 
system. As with the biological visual system the feedforward connections 
are specific, (specific information is transmitted along certain pathways) 
and the feedback connections diffuse (information is projected back across 
the whole system regardless of its nature). The retina and dLGN to V I 
represent the equivalent of the primary visual pathway. V I represents the 
striate cortex and V2, V3, V3a, V4 and V5 the extra striate areas. IT and the 
PARIETAL regions represent the association areas and MTL (medial 
temporal lobe) and the PFC (pre frontal cortex) represent "memory" in its 
broadest sense. I t is suggested that MTL is needed for the consolidation of 
memories, especially declarative memory, and the PFC is strongly 
implicated in working memory. In terms of the model detailed discussion of 
these areas is not necessary and it is sufficient to refer to them as "memory" 
(See O' Shaughnessy, 1995 for a detailed review of the structure and 
function of these two areas). 
In general terms the overall functionality of the model can be classified into 
two streams of information flow operating in parallel as suggested in the 
biological visual system. One stream is the "WHAT" pathway and the other 
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The WHAT pathway is concerned with the identification of visual stimuli 
whereas the HOW pathway is concerned with how to use or respond to the 
visual stimulus. The separation of information into two pathways begins at 
the retina and continues through V I and V2. In the biological vision system 
the division of two major pathways in the dLGN, V I and V2 is extremely 
complicated as both pathways pass through the same structures. In the 
development of the conceptual model this has been simplified. 
Simplification is necessary at all levels to enable the development of a 
model capable of explaining biological perception in its global sense and to 
be able to use the model in the development of artificial vision systems. 
Beyond V2 the segregation of information fiow becomes less complicated, 
the WHAT pathway being a general description of the colour and colour 
form pathway terminating in IT where objects are identified, and the HOW 
pathway the same for the motion and dynamic form pathway terminating in 
the PARIETAL regions where spatial information is processed. The WHAT 
and HOW distinction is thought to be maintained in the PFC where there is 
evidence to suggest that "what" and "where" information is processed 
separately (Eraser et al, 1993). This suggests that working memory, thought 
to be located in the PFC, like the visual system is modular (see Service, 
1993 for a brief review). 
Functionally the model w i l l perform as dictated by the biological visual 





























MOTOR PLANNING & 
WORKING MEMORY 
POLY SENSORY AREAS 
MTL: 
Facilitation of... 
Retrieval of previous knowledge. 
Storage of new knowledge. 
Declarative memory 
POLY SENSORY AREAS; 
Visual information 
passed on for use 
in other systems 
Figure 15. A simple outline of feedforward functional processing. 
Data enters the system at the retina where i t w i l l pass on to the dLGN. From 
the dLGN data is relayed to V I which constructs an early representation of 
the image in terms of form. V2 then acts as a parcelling point where 
specific information is sent for further processing, directly to V4 for colour. 
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to V4 via V3 and V3a for colour and form information combined, to V5 for 
motion detection and to V5 via V3 for dynamic form information. At the 
highest levels in the visual system IT is the area where object recognition 
takes place, and the PARIETAL region where spatial layout information is 
interpreted. From here information is processed for two main purposes 
firstly for object recognition (what), and secondly for action (how). 
Therefore IT connects both to the MTL and directly to the PARIETAL 
region. The MTL is necessary for the retrieval of past experience or 
"memories" that facilitate recognition in IT, and for the storage of new 
experiences or objects for future use. IT also relies on HOW information 
from the PARIETAL region to identify objects. Where objects are in 
relation to each other can be.used to aid interpretation as can information 
on what to do with objects. It is possible to identify things by their purpose 
as well as by form information especially when form information is 
incomplete in some way. The PARIETAL region is predominantly concerned 
with spatial and motion information and so has direct connections to the 
motor cortex and PFC, the motor cortex for action generation and the PFC 
for planning and working memory. The PARIETAL regions also need direct 
connections to IT so that a label for the visio spatial information is 
available immediately. As with IT, connections to the MTL also allow for 
previous experiences to be incorporated in HOW decisions and new 
information can be stored for future use. 
As with biological vision there are extensive feedback connections 
throughout the system. These connections are non specific, meaning that all 
of V2 and V I and the dLGN receive feedback from both high level streams. 
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One suggestion for a possible role for diffuse feedback connections in the 
biological visual system is to provide a possible mechanism for complete 
integration of information processed in the four separate streams at all 
levels (Zeki, 1992). Functionally separate information is distributed to areas 
that did not receive it through feedforward pathways, via diffuse 
connections. Therefore abstract global information about object identity and 
visuo spatial relationships is integrated with detailed form information via 
these diffuse feedback connections (see figure 16). 
127 
PFC 
Information on hoWi 
to use object 
Working - memory. 
MTL 
fTop down 
knowledge used to 






Addition of other 
sensory information 
to aid object 
recognition. 
Idmtifies: 
Where it is; 
How to use it; 
Is it moving? 
Identifies object X, 
V5 





V3 V3a V4 






X is red and motionless. 
V I 
Detailed information about what bits are moving and what 
colour they are. 
dLGN 
Check top down hypothesis 
against bottom up data. 
Does X match X ?? 
Figure 16. A simple outline of feedback functional processing. 
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Feedback connections in the model perform three crucial roles: 
1 To enable the integration of information for perception including: 
• Information processed in functionally separate structures such as 
colour and motion information. 
• Top-down information about the world stored in memory accessed 
via the MTL and PFC. 
• Information from other sensory processing available via poly 
sensory areas in the association cortex notably the superior temporal 
gyrus (STG) and the posterior and anterior superior poly sensory 
areas (STPp and STPa respectively). 
2 To maintain the visual representation in all areas for detailed analysis: 
• Allowing for detailed low level form information to be associated 
with high level abstract information about object identity. 
• To enable an incorrectly confirmed hypothesis to be re evaluated. 
3 To provide a mechanisms for checking hypotheses constructed about the 
visual scene: 
• Once a hypothesis has been constructed and compared to stored 
knowledge feedback enables the possible interpretation to be 
checked against the incoming data. 
At this point the model based on both bottom-up neurophysiology and top-















• - I 











F E E D F O R W A R D : 
Qcate hypothesis by processing fonn. colour and motion infonnation which is then 
idenhfied through comparison to past experiences. If no past experiences fit then 







B o a. dLGN 
Relays information 
into visual system. 













right pathway V3 
Dynamic] 




Object identified Oabelled) based upon: 
(i) Previous knowledge fiom (MTL) 
(i) Other sensory information via Poly 





Locates object spatially in relation 
to rest of visual field and detects 
movement 
F E E D B A C K : 
Tfests hypothesis via comparison to retinal image in dLGN. If no match reiterate. 
Integrates information from spatially seperatc areas and other sensory inputs including 
based on incoming data from that world. Top-down information in the form 
of both stored and genetically determined knowledge is used to test 
hypotheses, as is bottom-up data entering the system in the dLGN. The 
model functions as follows: 
The visual image is basically processed in two ways, one to identify WHAT 
things are in the image and two HOW to use and react to the visual image. 
Although integration of WHAT and HOW information is important it is not 
always necessary. You can identify things without actually having to know 
there exact spatial location in relation to other objects, and how to 
manipulate and use them. By the same token you do not necessarily need to 
know what something is in order to react to i t or know how to manipulate it . 
The first step towards perception involves the construction of a hypothesis. 
Initially the hypothesis consists of detailed form information ( V I ) , then 
more abstract properties such as colour and motion information (V3, V3a, 
V4 and V5 via V2) are incorporated. The result causes particular cells in IT 
to fire. These cells or groups of cells represent particular features of objects 
and possibly in some cases whole objects themselves. The representation 
formed in IT is very much abstracted with no detailed form colour or 
motion information. Detailed information is associated with the 
representation in IT via diffuse feedback connections. At the same time in 
the PARIETAL regions spatial information is processed and passed on to IT 
which enables the features to be associated by where they are in relation to 
each other to form the collective hypothesis in IT. 
From IT connections go directly to the MTL where two things happen. Top-
down information in the form of stored knowledge is matched against the 
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hypothesis in IT and i f a match is made identification of the hypothesis 
occurs. I f however there is no previous recollection of the representation in 
IT it is stored in memory for future use. This aspect of the model is 
speculative and in relation to biological vision there is no concrete 
neurophysiological evidence to provide possible mechanisms for how that 
matching occurs. However in relation to artificial vision systems there are 
possible pattern matching algorithms that could support this aspect of the 
model (Carpenter & Grossberg. 1987; Carpenter & Grossberg, 1987). At the 
same time top-down information in the form of other sensory processing is 
incorporated via input from poly sensory areas namely the STG, STPp and 
STPa. Sensory information from other areas can be crucial in the 
identification of a hypothesis i f visual information alone fails. It is also 
necessary to incorporate information from other senses for complete 
perception. This information is then fed back through the visual system for 
confirmation, detailed analysis and integration. This confirmation occurs 
where feedback connections converge on the dLGN. The dLGN acts as a 
"detail assessor" checking that the identified representation in IT correlates 
with the incoming data from the retina. 
In the PARIETAL region the hypothesis is interpreted in terms where things 
are in relation to each other in the visual image. This is continually updated 
so that objects that are moving can be monitored at all times. This visuo 
spatial information can then be used in the planing and execution of actions 
in relation to the visual image. The PARIETAL region also connects to 
MTL so that top-down stored knowledge about spatial relationships can also 
be incorporated in the spatial analysis and prediction of movement. Direct 
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links to the PFC facilitate motor actions and working memory. Connections 
with IT are also used for the facilitation of action through object 
identification in working memory. In sum then, a hypothesis has been 
created and tested both in relation to top-down and bottom-up information. 
Figure 18 gives a simplified example of how the model might function. 
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Figure 18. A simple representation of visual processing in the model. 
The dLGN acts as a blackboard providing the most up to date representation 
of the visual image from the retina (Mumford, 1991). V I carries out 
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detailed form processing recognising edges blobs and bars and is also 
responsive to motion and colour information. The representation in V I is 
not of for example a red circle but of a series of edges, bars, blobs and 
termination in given orientations, with wavelength sensitive cells 
responding to colour. V2 then holds a more abstract version of V I where the 
edges, bars, blobs and termination relate to larger receptive fields. It stil l 
does not represent a red circle. V4 responds to colour information alone, but 
V3 and V3a combine input from V2 about form with V4 colour information 
to hold a representation of what forms are what colour. V5 responds to 
motion information which is combined in V3 to represent form and motion 
together. Within the model IT is the point at which a representation is 
formed that could be classified as "red circle", but has no detailed 
information about form colour or motion. This representation takes the form 
of groups of cells that fire in response to all the attributes associated with 
red circle, but not to any specific details. The response is to the high level 
representation "red circle" rather than to detailed form, colour or motion 
information. MTL provides the mechanism which enables access to stored 
knowledge against which the representation in IT can be compared to and 
identified with, as well as enabling new information to be stored for future 
identification purposes. It is important to emphasise at this point that in 
relation to the model the role of the MTL is to facilitate memory. Detailed 
descriptions of the structures and mechanisms that underlie memory are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
MTL also provides the same service for the PARIETAL region. The PFC 
can generate and co-ordinate the execution of actions relating to the visual 
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stimulus through input form the PARIETAL region. The connections 
between the IT and the PARIETAL region, direct and indirect via the MTL, 
perform a number of functions including: 
• The integration of spatial information with object identification. IT relies 
on the PARIETAL regions for information about spatial location of a 
given object in relation to other objects. The PARIETAL region knows 
that motion is occurring in a particular form in a particular direction, but 
relies on IT for information as to the identification of form. 
• An aid for object recognition when incomplete information is available to 
IT. Some things are not easily recognisable from their visual 
representation. Procedural information from the PFC such as how 
something is used may facilitate object interpretation in IT via the MTL. 
The poly sensory areas enable the incorporation of other sensory 
information detected in relation to the object, for example smell, taste, and 
sound. Two way connections from the poly sensory areas to IT and the 
PARIETAL regions also perform a number of possible tasks including: 
• Facilitates recognition in that i f there is insufficient top-down 
information to identify an object other sensory information may provide 
invaluable association cues. 
• Reconciliation of ambiguous bottom-up information, for example 
determining a real object from a replica object such as a real apple from a 
wax apple using olfactory information as well as visual information. 
• Following on from the previous example, facilitating the correct response 
to an object when there is a choice. For example a hot baked potato 
requires careful handling, although visually the cues do not distinguish 
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between hot and cold, smell can elicit information that would enable care 
to be taken in its handling. 
Meanwhile feedback which is continually occurring at all levels ensures 
that the representation is maintained in the visual system. It also enables 
adjustments to be made to the processing at each stage based on top-down 
information. Such adjustments might occur as a result of extra information 
from poly sensory processing and from memory. This may mean that the 
representation fed back through the visual system has more detail than the 
original representation resulting from feedforward retinal input to the 
system. These adjustments can then be checked against the representation in 
the dLGN for confirmation against incoming bottom-up data. This is 
particularly necessary for new visual examples that have not been 
experienced before. It is essential that a correct representation is committed 
to memory. 
MECHANISMS UNDERLYING ARCHITECTURE AND FUNCTION. 
Within the model i t is proposed synchronous oscillatory activity w i l l 
underlie the maintenance of a distributed visual representation for 
integration, detailed analysis and hypothesis checking. This w i l l mean that 
the visual representation is distributed across the whole system as opposed 
to the single cell approach discussed in chapter 3, which suggests that at the 
highest level of representation there are cells that respond to given objects. 
In the model in IT there are cells that respond to extremely abstract 
properties of the visual scene but the representation of the visual image is 
distributed across the whole system. It is then integrated or "bound" 
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together by neurons all oscillating in synchrony. This oscillatory activity is 
a function of feedback connections throughout the system. Oscillatory 
activity has recently become the focus of much attention in the role it has to 
play in visual processing. It has been suggested as a mechanism for feature 
linking or binding in early visual processing and there is a wealth of 
literature, both neurophysiological and simulation based, providing support 
for its role in visual processing (see Basar & Bullock, 1992; Denham & 
Troup, 1992; Troup, 1991 for comprehensive reviews and detailed 
discussion of the nature of oscillations). 
As with most models of visual processing feedforward connections enable 
neurons to act as "feature detectors". The role therefore of feedforward 
connections in the model is to enable neurons in feedforward processing to 
respond in an excitatory fashion to certain features i f they are present in the 
visual image. Therefore neurons in V I are f ir ing in response to detailed 
aspects of form such as edges bars and blobs in given orientations. Neurons 
in other modules w i l l respond to other particular aspects of the retinal 
image. Within the model diffuse feedback connections produce synchronous 
oscillations in the relevant neurons namely those that have received retinal 
input allowing them to be associated with each other in each module as well 
as across modules. As feedback occurs at all levels neurons in V I may 
produce synchronous oscillations as a result of feedback from V2 before 
recognition in IT occurs. This means it would be possible to identify the 
colour of something before i t is actually perceived. The hypothesis about 
colour could be tested against thalamic input before recognition in IT has 
occurred. 
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At the very highest level neurons in IT respond to complex features and in 
some instances actual objects. The pattern of response generated in IT is 
then matched against or compared to memories for instances of previous 
patterns via the MTL. I f a match is made then synchronous oscillations are 
induced in the neurons representing the features that fit with the stored 
pattern. Top-down information in the form of poly sensory input that 
represents other sensory information associated with the visual image also 
contributes to the generation of oscillatory activity. It also feasible that 
poly sensory activity associated with the visual stimulus could also oscillate 
in synchrony with neurons in IT representing that stimulus. It is worth 
noting that the extent of oscillatory behaviour in neurons in high level 
processing is speculative in regard to the neurophysiology of visual 
processing. In terms of the aims of developing the model oscillatory 
activity has to speculative in relation to understanding human visual 
perception. However in the development of an artificial model of visual 
perception it could be extremely relevant. Direct connections with the 
PARIETAL region allows for spatial information to be incorporated into the 
representation in IT. Neurons in IT oscillate in synchrony with neurons in 
the PARIETAL region relating to their location. 
Synchronous oscillations also provide a mechanism for integration or 
feature linking within modules as well as across modules. Lateral 
connections allow information with similar receptive field properties to be 
associated or bound together. This would mean that the various edges, blobs 
and bars that might make up a particular line in a given orientation in V I 
can be associated or bound together through synchronous oscillations. 
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However this kind of processing is localised so it does not allow for the 
integration or binding of information in edges, blobs and bars having 
different receptive field properties, yet belonging to the same object. 
Integration of this nature is actuated by diffuse feedback connections and 
not localised lateral connections, (for a detailed discussion based on 
neurophysiology and simulation work of laterally induced oscillations see 
Basar & Bullock, 1992; Troup, 1991; Denham et al. 1991; Denham & Troup, 
1992). 
To implement the model poses some extremely complex problems even at 










Figure 19. A schematic diagram of a possible implementation of the model. 
By comparing the diagram above to that in chapter two reflecting the 
extremely complex functional structure of the dLGN shows how little 
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information can actually be extracted from the biological visual system in 
the development of artificial vision systems. For the purposes of possible 
implementation the retina has been omitted and retinal input reduced to a 
pattern of activity in a module likened to the dLGN. As mentioned 
previously in chapter 2 there are already detailed models of the retina 
available. Input in this theoretical implementation is a one dimensional red 
square moving slowly across the visual field to the left . It is represented in 
the dLGN as three grids of excitatory neurons. Visual field information as 
well as ocular dominance information has been omitted and the dLGN has 
been reduced to a simple retinotopic representation of form, colour and 
motion information. As with the biological visual system this is processed 
separately reflecting X, Y and W information pathways. 
This representation is then mapped directly onto a module representing V I 
in the same way reflecting the 1:1 relationship between the dLGN and V I . 
Again the main theme carried across from the biological vision system is 
that of functional separation rather than anatomical detail. The form 
information is processed separately from motion and colour information in 
readiness for separate streams of processing later on. Again the complex 
way in which the biological visual system expresses its functional 
architecture has to be greatly simplified. I f a model of processing purely in 
V I was being developed i t would be possible to reflect this detail far more 
accurately. This however is supposed to be a model of visual perception 
rather than a model of specific visual processing. 
This is then mapped again directly to the V2 module where the receptive 
f ie ld size has been reduced significantly. The square now consists of a grid 
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for form, colour and motion information. At this point the information is 
split into three pathways. One to V4 where a cell fires in response to a 
given colour, in this case red. Another to V5 where the same occurs for 
motion in a given direction. Lastly one to V3 where form information is 
incorporated with colour or motion information with even larger receptive 
fields. V3 then projects to V3a but only for colour and form information. 
V3 grids for colour and form connect to V4 whereas the grid for motion 
connects only to V5. V3a projects directly back to V3 enhancing colour 
form projections to V4. 
V4 then sends information to IT where a pattern of activity occurs which 
represents the object as red square. It does not reflect specific information 
although in the biological system there is some evidence for retinotopicy to 
exist in IT. The same occurs in the PARIETAL region, but here cells 
represent spatial information in relation to each other using a co-ordinate 
system. Finally the pattern in IT is matched with patterns stored in memory, 
facilitated by the MTL, for identification. A positive match results in 
neurons in IT oscillating, which in turn, through diffuse feedback 
connections, causes oscillatory activity in all the neurons at the various 
other stages in the visual system. This oscillatory activity is then correlated 
against the retinal input in the dLGN. A positive correlation results in a 
further strengthening of synchronous activity in V I which in turn influences 
the strength of oscillatory activity across the whole system. Synchrony 
across the system enables binding and integration, and a positive correlation 
indicates a confirmed hypothesis. 
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PREDICTIONS OF THE MODEL. 
• Top-down information from other sensory areas can cause a 
representation in IT to be active, i.e. a group of cells oscillating in 
synchrony, before feedforward visual information has reached IT. 
Information stil l has to feed back through the system for detailed analysis 
and for confirmation with the retinal input in the dLGN. 
• Top-down information in the form of either a memory or other sensory 
information is sufficient to evoke a pattern of synchronous oscillatory 
activity in the model without retinal input. Such a pattern of response 
would be weak compared to a retinally induced one, and it would not be 
possible to check the visual hypothesis against a retinal input correlated 
in the dLGN. This would mean that i f blindfolded you were asked to 
identify a lemon using smell and touch as sensory inputs a visual 
representation would be generated. You would not however be able to 
confirm that the lemon was in fact a lemon, as you would not be able to 
confirm the hypothesis that other sensory information had provided. I f 
for example the lemon had been coloured green i t would be impossible to 
check. The pattern of activity in V4 would say yellow, as the associated 
colour for lemon is exactly that, however without retinal input it would 
be impossible to test this hypothesis. 
' It is also possible that i f the response pattern in IT is incomplete and that 
the stored pattern consists of features not present in the retinal image 
then neurons not responding could be induced to do so due to MTL input. 
This means that incomplete visual information can be completed by 
comparison of a partial pattern to a stored complete pattern. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUPPORT F O R T H E O R Y AND M O D E L : 
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR BOTH THE 
THEORY AND MODEL. 
This chapter provides additional support for the theory and conceptual 
model explaining perception outlined in the previous chapter. Firstly it 
addresses support from neurophysiology and psychology for the claim that 
visual perception has a strong top-down component. Secondly it looks at 
how neuropsychology also provides support for various aspects of the 
theory and model notably the top-down component of visual perception. 
Thirdly support for the role of oscillations as a possible mechanism of 
visual processing in the model is discussed. 
INTRODUCTION. 
Support for both the theory and conceptual model originates initially in 
chapters 2 and 3. This aim of this chapter is to provide additional support 
for certain aspects of both the theory and model that have not previously 
been made explicit. 
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VISION AS BOTH A TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP 
PROCESS. 
SUPPORT FROM NEUROPHYSIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 
The conceptual model of visual perception presented in the thesis has been 
based upon a general theory of perception that claims vision to be both a 
top-down and bottom-up process. Based upon this, visual perception is 
explained in general terms as the construction of hypotheses which are 
identified through comparison to previous knowledge, and then verified 
against incoming data. 
As mentioned in chapter 3 it is not a new idea that visual perception is 
reliant on top-down processes in the form of memory being used to make 
sense of bottom-up incoming sensory data. Neurophysiological descriptions 
of the visual system indicate both massive feedback as well as feedforward 
pathways are in operation indicating that deep brain structures are exerting 
their influence on incoming sensory data. Such structures include those 
thought to be associated with the storage and retrieval of memories. 
Recently research in developmental neurobiology has provided architectural 
support for the claim of the model that visual perception is strongly reliant 
on top-down processing in the labelling of bottom-up sensory data. It is 
widely reported that the human visual system is immature at birth (see 
Burkhalter, 1993 for a review). Recent research has shown that both 
feedforward and feedback connections in the visual system only emerge just 
prior to birth. It is not until 4 months of age that feedforward connections 
are developed in the same way as the mature adult cortex. Importantly 
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feedback connections are at this stage immature by comparison (Burkhalter, 
1993). Burkhaller suggests that this implies that in the first few months of 
l ife the infant is only capable of local processing, for example image 
segmentation in V I , it is not until later on that the infant is capable of 
global processing in the form of object identification. 
It is possible to interpret these findings more generally to provide support 
for the theory underlying the conceptual model. I f the visual system is 
reliant on memory for the labelling of hypothesis then it would be expected 
that the focus of the immature visual system is to develop a repertoire of 
memories that can be used to aid identification. Therefore the first few 
months of the infants l ife are devoted to the development of feedforward 
pathways to enable a repertoire to be constructed. It is only when enough 
sensory stimulation has been encoded and stored that the feedback pathways 
are of any use. Therefore they develop more slowly and do not mature as 
quickly as the feedforward paths. So i t is not until the visual system is 
capable of processing both local bottom-up information and global top-
down information that perception is complete. It is possible to provide 
further support based on the above interpretation in the developmental 
psychology literature. 
There is a whole host of experimental evidence from developmental 
psychology to suggest that the functional capabilities of the visual system 
are extremely limited at birth (for example Banks, 1980; Banks & 
Salapatek, 1983). Infants w i l l respond to high contrast patterns (Banks and 
Ginsburg, 1985) and objects that are moving (Slater et al, 1985) but form 
perception is limited (Banks & Ginsburg, 1985). This fits with the recent 
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neurophysiological findings outlined in the previous section that suggest the 
visual pathways are not fu l ly developed until well into the first year of l i fe . 
Research into infants ability to store patterns also provides experimental 
results that support the neurophysiological findings in the previous section. 
It seems that infants under 2 months respond equally well to new patterns as 
they do to ones which they have experienced before. However infants over 
two months of age respond better to patterns they have experienced before 
(Olson & Sherman, 1983; Banks & Salapatek, 1983). There is an exception 
to this in that genetically important patterns such as the pattern of a 
mothers face produce responses a few days after birth (Bushnell et al, 
1989). This supports the neurophysiological data suggesting that the visual 
system is immature at birth. Further it supports the theory outlined in 
chapter 4 in that i t suggests that memory or experience is essential for 
perception, in that we need top-down information to perceive the world. 
Developmental psychologists have even gone as far to claim that the very 
young infant is essentially a "stimulus seeker" with a biologically 
programmed disposition to actively search for novel stimuli keeping the 
visual neurons active to promote development (Haith, 1980). In relation to 
the conceptual model this could be interpreted as building a repertoire of 
experiences for the future labelling of hypotheses. 
The role of past experience in perceptual processes is well documented in 
psychology, and there is a great deal of experimental evidence supporting 
top-down processes in the interpretation of bottom-up data. Research by 
Biederman into how context affects ones ability to identify objects 
demonstrated the importance of top-down information in perceptual 
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recognition tasks. Subjects were asked to identify both contextually related 
and unrelated objects in real world scenes. Performance for contextually 
related objects was significantly faster and more accurate than for non 
related objects (Biederman, 1972; Biederman et al, 1973). Exposure to 
stimuli facilitating recognition is also well documented in psychology. In 
the 1960*s Haber and Hershenson demonstrated in a series of experiments 
that in a word recognition task the more times a string of letters was 
presented the more likely subjects would perceive them correctly (Haber & 
Hershenson, 1965). As well as supporting the role of top-down information 
in visual perception it is also possible to demonstrate hypothesis testing 
experimentally. In an experiment which involved showing two images one 
to each eye tachistoscopically Engel was able to show how subjects 
interpret bottom-up visual data. Subjects were shown two identical 
stationary figures, one to each eye. One figure was naked and the other 
clothed. When subjects were asked to report what they had seen they either 
said a figure getting dressed or a figure doing a "strip tease". Subjects had 
perceived motion that was in fact not present to make sense of the visual 
information they had received (Engel, 1956). 
Visual illusions provide further evidence for the role of top-down processes 
in perception. Many visual illusions present the visual system with a 
representation that has more than one possible interpretation yet only one 
retinal image. Examples include the goblet/two faces illusion (see figure 
20), the mouse/old man illusion, the young woman/old hag illusion etc. As 
well as ambiguous illusions there are illusions which involve the visual 
system actively adding information that is not actually present in the retinal 
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image. Kanizas triangle is one such illusion (see figure 20). 
Figure 20. Examples of visual illusions: The goblet/two faces illusion and 
Kanizas triangle. 
Here the visual system interprets the retinal image as a triangle even though 
there is no actual triangle present, only the illusion of one. The 
interpretation of such illusions is reliant on top-down information, not on 
bottom-up processing alone. There is also experimental results showing that 
contextual effects influence the visual systems interpretation of ambiguous 
illusions. I f subjects are shown pictures of young women before being 
shown the young woman/old hag illusion almost 100% report seeing a 
young woman as opposed to 65% when not shown the pictures first (Leeper, 
1935). The same effect has been demonstrated using the mouse/old man 
illusion but instead of specific pictures of a rat, various animal pictures 
were presented showing generalisations in interpretation (Bugelski & 
Alampay, 1961). 
Other top-down information which facilitates perception includes 
genetically predetermined information and information from other sensory 
processing areas. Genetically predetermined input to visual perception is 
much debated, as with most psychological research there is evidence both in 
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support and against the claim that visual perception is innate. Animal 
studies have shown that certain biologically important visual behaviours are 
present from birth. Herring gull chicks w i l l peck at the red spot on the adult 
birds beak as soon as it is born, before it has made the association between 
food and the red spot (Tinbergen, 1952). There is evidence to suggest that 
certain visual information in humans is genetically determined. Experiments 
in developmental psychology have shown that infants are capable of 
demonstrating certain innate visual behaviours such as depth perception 
(Gibson & Walk. 1960) and object constancy (Bower, 1966). It has also 
been suggested that infants are able to recognise their mothers face at 3 
months of age (Barrera & Maurer, 1981), even though they are unable to 
easily discriminate between carers and strangers faces until they are 5-7 
months old (Cohen et al, 1979). According to the research discussed in an 
earlier section the visual system is neurophysiologically incapable of 
processing the kind of global information needed for face recognition. This 
could be interpreted as being support for the suggestion that some 
biologically important visual information such as face identity could be 
facilitated by pre determined information about faces, enabling a certain 
amount of perception to occur without repeated experience. This may also 
explain the existence of cells in IT responsive to faces. 
More recently it has been suggested that "backward masking" is controlled 
by the top-down process of voluntary visual attention (Ramachandran & 
Cobb, 1995). Backward masking is where a target stimulus is presented 
followed by a non-target stimulus, causing subjects to be completely 
unaware of the existence of the original target stimulus. Gregory goes 
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further to suggest that bottom-up data is ''topped up" by top-down 
information (Gregory, 1995). Gregory's interpretations can be seen as 
further support for the role of top-down information in both the theory and 
conceptual model. 
SUPPORT FROM NEUROPSYCHOLOGY -BLINDSIGHT. 
The existence of certain neuropsychological disorders affecting visual 
perception also provide support for the theory and the model, blindsight 
mentioned previously in chapters 2 and 3 is one such disorder. The 
destruction through illness or accident of the striate cortex leaves a person 
clinically blind. It must be reiterated that vision in patients suffering from 
blindsight can be partially, rather than fu l ly impaired. Research has shown 
that some of these supposedly clinically blind patients are in fact able to 
make judgements about stimuli which they reportedly claim they are unable 
to "see". This is what is referred to as blindsight, and has been extensively 
investigated (for reviews see Weiskrantz, 1986; 1992). As the amount of 
information they can report about such stimuli is restricted to things like 
whether or not it was moving, or what colour an object was rather than 
detailed form information, i t seems that information about the stimulus is a 
product of processing in the extra striate cortex. Arguably the existence of 
blindsight could be interpreted as demonstrating that perception is not 
purely a bottom-up process. I f this was the case destruction of the striate 
cortex should result in complete blindness. The ability of people suffering 
from blindsight to make judgements about visual stimuli however limited 
suggest that visual perception is still possible even i f the bottom-up 
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pathways are destroyed. 
Attempts to explain the existence of blindsight have given rise to two main 
theories, briefly mentioned in chapter 3. The first suggests that the 
secondary visual pathways mentioned in chapter 2 allow sensory processing 
to occur. The emphasis originally has been on the pathway leading from the 
superior colliculus (SC) via the pulvinar to V5. However more recently, 
research has shown that the destruction of other pathways, specifically the 
lateral pretectum and the accessory optic system, have a greater effect on 
the ability to see with existing damage to V I than destruction of the SC. 
Further to this some blindsight patients are able to detect colour 
information in a stimulus, since the SC is unable to transmit wavelength 
information this suggests that other pathways are responsible for the 
transmission of colour information (see Cowey & Stoerig, 1992 for a review 
on the pathways mediating blindsight). The second theory suggests that the 
secondary visual pathways do not contribute to the ability of blindsight 
patients to make perceptual judgements. Perception in cortically blind 
patients is due to scattered light falling on areas in V I where cortical tissue 
has been spared, and are able to function as normal (Campion et al, 1983). 
Neither theory is conclusive, there are lots of possible pathways that could 
account for the resultant perceptual judgements demonstrated in blindsight 
patients (see Cowey & Stoerig, 1992). 
In relation to the theory blindsight provides support for its claim that visual 
perception results from the construction and subsequent testing of 
hypotheses about the world by the visual system, a combination of both top-
down and bottom-up processing. In terms of the model a blindsight patient 
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would at best only be able to construct limited hypothesis. Detailed form 
information would not be available due to the damage to V I . Although there 
are at present no secondary pathways defined in the model it is possible to 
speculate their ability to carry limited information to the extrastriate areas. 
For example it is possible to envisage a pathway from the SC to V5 via the 
pulvinar. The processing that is carried out in V5 would only be able to 
provide a hypothesis of "motion" and limited spatial information but 
nothing more. It is possible that the information from the secondary visual 
pathways is not sufficient to engage the memory processes, meaning that 
object labelling would not occur. Further to this i t would be impossible due 
to damage to V I to ''test" any hypothesis against incoming data in the 
dLGN. This would mean that conscious perception would not be possible. 
However i t would be possible to send the resultant motion processing 
information on to other cortical areas such as the motor cortex, or the poly 
sensory areas for integration with other processing. This would mean it may 
be possible to point to a visual stimulus without being visually aware of it . 
The importance of top-down information in the labelling of hypotheses is 
emphasised by other neuropsychological disorders such as prosopagnosia. 
Sufferers from prosopagnosia are impaired in certain aspects of perceptual 
recognition in that they are generally unable to identify the faces of familiar 
people, they can however differentiate between faces (for a general review 
of the literature see Young & De Haan. 1992). In relation to the model this 
demonstrates an ability to construct a hypothesis but there is a problem in 
labelling that hypothesis. Feedback would st i l l be possible meaning that the 
hypothesis could be "checked" but i t would not have a label hence would 
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not be identified. This indicates that visual perception of some sort is 
occurring, but complete visual perception is not. This w i l l be discussed 
further in chapter 6 in relation to levels of processing as outlined in chapter 
1 and how they relate to the model outlined in chapter 4. 
Another form of agnosia, associative visual agnosia, can be seen to provide 
support for the claim made by the model outlined in chapter 4 that top-down 
information in the form of poly sensory information is also important in 
visual perception. Some patients suffering from associative visual agnosia 
are able to replicate drawings of objects with ease, but when asked verbally 
to draw objects they are unable to do so. They are unable to associate the 
verbal description with the visual description. When asked to describe 
verbally the object they have been unable to draw they can do so without 
problem so it seems they are aware of what it is they have been asked to 
draw even though they are incapable of doing so (Ratcliff & Newcombe, 
1982). Another case study of a person suffering from some form of visual 
agnosia also provides evidence to support the role of poly sensory 
processing in visual perception. This particular patient was unable to 
recognise objects visually. However when studying pictures of objects he 
made unintentional gestures with his hands that in some way related to the 
picture he was studying. The hand gestures enabled him to identify the 
objects in question (Carlson, 1986). The model suggests that i f a hypothesis 
is unlabeled through incomplete visual input or through failure to match 
with a stored memory then the result of processing from other sensory areas 
can facilitate recognition. It could be that the motor response pattern 
generated by the agnosic facilitates the retrieval of a stored description of 
154 
the object. This can then be instantiated at all the possible levels of sensory 
description previously associated with the object. Damage to the visual 
processing areas of the brain would mean that i t could not be fed back 
through the visual system and "confirmed" at the dLGN. However i t could 
be fed back through other sensory processing pathways and identified at a 
different level of description. 
The evidence presented by neuropsychology is in no way conclusive. As 
mentioned in chapter 3 i t is extremely di f f icul t to determine the exact 
nature of damage to the visual cortex resulting in neuropsychological 
disorders. Further, most disorders are not clearly defined and tend to be 
partial rather than complete. However it does seem that there is a great deal 
of psychological as well as neurophysiological evidence that can be used to 
support the model and especially the theory outlined in chapter 4. 
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SUPPORT FOR MECHANISMS U N D E R L Y I N G 
P E R C E P T I O N . 
INTEGRATION OF INFORMATION THROUGH SYNCHRONOUS 
OSCILLATORY ACTIVITY. 
Within the conceptual model i t is proposed that the problem of integration 
of information can be solved by synchronous oscillatory activity. Such 
activity serves to integrate information both within modules via lateral 
connections and across modules via diffuse feedback connections. Further 
to this synchrony as a function of feedback also provides a mechanism for 
confirming hypotheses about the world by correlating them against 
incoming data. The key to such a mechanism is that the visual image can be 
represented by distributed temporal activity across populations of neurons 
rather than by dedicated processing in specific neurons. This means that a 
given neuron can become part of the representation for more than one 
stimulus. 
The role of oscillatory behaviour in the integration of distributed 
information was introduced in chapter 3. This work had a major impact on 
both the development of our understanding of visual processing and the 
development of artificial models of visual perception. Since the early work 
investigating oscillatory behaviour a great number of models have been 
developed that exploit synchrony as mechanism of feature linking. This 
early work, both experimental involving the recording of cells, and 
simulation based involving the development of models, suggested that 
synchrony in oscillations occurred in two ways. Firstly through lateral 
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connections between neurons or groups of neurons with similar receptive 
field properties, and secondly by diffuse feedback connections linking 
neurons with unrelated receptive fields (see Werner et al, 1993 for a 
review). 
In a series of neurophysiological experiments Gray and Singer demonstrated 
that neurons in the cat visual cortex oscillated at a frequency of around 40 
Hz. They also demonstrated that these oscillations correlated with a 
rhythmic firing pattern, suggesting that groups of neurons were using 
temporal information to synchronise their oscillations in spatially separate 
areas of the visual cortex, (Gray et al, 1987; 1989). Their experiments 
showed that groups of neurons within a functional column with the same 
receptive fields responded to a moving stimulus by discharging 
rhythmically. Gray and Singer concluded from the experimental results that 
when responding to a given stimulus, adjacent neurons in the stimulated 
receptive field are more likely to fire at the same time and in synchrony. 
Further more this phenomenon is not a product from interference from other 
areas of the brain such as the thalamus, which is known to produce 
oscillation. In the discussion of their results Gray and Singer suggest that 
although the underlying mechanisms that are producing this behaviour are 
unknown, i t seems that simple inhibitory and excitatory links between 
neurons is a sufficient explanation as to how oscillations are produced, 
(Gray & Singer 1989) (see figure 21). 
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Figure 21. A summary of Gray and Singers findings. 
In more detailed experiments Gray et al went on to show that these 
synchronous oscillatory responses explained how spatially separate features 
of a given stimulus could be bound together, (Gray et al, 1989). They 
recorded at between 5 and 7 spatially separate sites in the visual cortex, and 
used a cross correlation function to determine whether the oscillatory 
responses were present at any of the sites when stimulated. They then 
selected from 132 recordings, 99 pairs of sites producing oscillations that 
had the same orientation preference, also having overlapping receptive 
fields. To determine whether synchrony (or phase locking) was present, a 
cross correlation function was applied to the results of the oscillations of 
these pairs when they were stimulated by a single bar of light falling across 
both sites. It was demonstrated that synchrony was present when the two 
sites were stimulated by the single bar. The conclusion is that 
synchronisation of oscillation was being used to identify the stimulus as a 
long bar in a given orientation (see figure 22). In a second experiment 
recordings were made in pairs of sites as far apart as 7 mm. These sites did 
not have the same receptive f ield, but st i l l shared the same orientation 
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preference. The rationale behind this was to see i f synchrony was just a 
result of the receptive fields being the same. I f stimulation was achieved 
through the use of a stationary light bar that fe l l across two sites, the 
oscillatory responses were in synchrony. I f the light bar was split into two 
separate stationary bars of the same orientation, each fall ing across one of 
the sites synchrony was also evident. I f the two bars of light were moved 
across the recorded areas in the same direction again synchrony is evident. 
However i f the two light bars were moved across the two separate areas in 
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Figure 22. Gray and Singer's 4 experiments. 
Gray et al conclude: 
"We propose that the synchronisation of oscillatory responses in spatially 
separate regions of the cortex may be used to establish transient 
relationships between common but spatially distributed features of a 
pattern." 
(Gray et al 1989). 
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Through the mechanism of synchrony it is possible to establish overall or 
"global" features including continuity, orientation preferences, and 
consistency of motion, (Gray et al 1989). 
Further research based on these findings explored the results more 
extensively with a larger data set, (Engel et al 1990). As in the previously 
mentioned work the study aimed to investigate activity in functional 
columns. Measurement of the local field potential (LFP) indicated that 
functional columns of neurons, each column having a different orientation 
preference, oscillated in synchrony. By recording multi-unit activity (MUA) 
it was demonstrated that groups of neurons in these functional columns also 
demonstrated oscillatory behaviour. By taking the local field potential it 
could be seen that neighbouring columns did not contribute to the 
oscillations produced by a given column. The cross correlation of MUA 
activity in the pairs of recording sites produced the evidence for feature 
detection through synchrony. In this more detailed analysis previous results 
were confirmed and a more detailed understanding was created. Firstly, the 
strength of synchrony depends on the distance between the spatially 
separate sites. The further the recordings were apart, the weaker the 
synchrony. With groups of cells having non-overlapping receptive fields 
synchrony is a product of orientation preference, as well as being sensitive 
to stimulus features such as motion. I t was found that i f the stimulus was 
changed, for example a stationary bar o f light moved, the reaction of the 
groups of neurons producing oscillations changed, indicating that the 
oscillations encoded feature specific information and did not just respond to 
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any kind of stimulation with the same pattern of activity. Also a long single 
bar produced stronger oscillations than two separate bars, (Engel et al, 
1990) . 
There is a great deal of controversy as to the relevance of this kind of 
neurophysiological research. Phase information has been largely ignored on 
the grounds that it is unreliable. Most of the problems can be traced to the 
methodology used to extract the data. The wrong kind of anaesthetic can 
effect the recordings taken, and incorrect analysis can also be a problem, 
(Engel et al, 1990). However the results obtained by this recent body of 
research have overcome these problems. 
Parallel work carried out over a similar period of time by Eckhorn et al 
made further distinctions as to the nature of this oscillatory activity 
(Eckhorn et al, 1988; 1989; 1990; Eckhorn & Schanze, 1991; Eckhorn, 
1991) . They distinguish between two types of oscillatory activity, stimulus 
forced, and stimulus induced. Stimulus forced synchronisations are driven 
by the image itself and are generally coarse representations of the visual 
scene, referred to by Eckhorn et al "crude instantiations" (Eckhorn et al, 
1990). Stimulus induced synchronisations are internally driven and are 
thought to be the mechanisms by which more detailed and complex 
associations are made. The mechanism for synchrony in both cases is 
thought to be by feedback and in the stimulus-induced synchrony through 
mutual coupling of local oscillators, (Eckhorn et al 1990; Eckhorn & 
Schanze, 1991; Eckhorn, 1991). 
The results of these experiments have led to suggestions that synchronous 
oscillatory activity as a riesult o f neurons responding to particular objects 
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can be likened to Gestalt criteria such as proximity, continuity, similarity 
and common fate (Engel et al. 1992; Sompolinsky et al, 1990). In Gray and 
Singers experiments synchrony was evident in non overlapping receptive 
fields only i f the stimulus was a continuos bar. I f two bars moving in 
opposite directions was observed both groups produced synchronous 
oscillations but there was no correlation in the oscillatory activity between 
the groups (see figure 23). 
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Figure 23. Oscillatory activity between groups showing no correlation 
Engel et al suggest this is evidence to support the Gestalt principles for 
grouping such as continuity and similarity. I f the object falls in the same 
receptive filed but with differing orientation preferences synchrony can still 
be achieved through lateral connections. This is interpreted as representing 
criteria such as common fate and proximity. 
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Thus there is a great deal of evidence from these recent findings to support 
the use of synchronous oscillatory activity as a "binding mechanism" for 
early visual processing. Employing such a mechanism allows segments of 
the visual representation to be bound together to form coherent parts of that 
representation. The hundreds of edges bars blob and terminations that 
contribute to a particular line can be linked via synchronous oscillatory 
activity. In relation to the model stimulus forced synchronisation enables 
initial crude representations to be formed. Subsequent stimulus induced 
synchronisation through lateral connections enables more detailed 
associations to be formed. Within V I and V2 in the model, segments that 
share the same receptive fields can be linked by coupled oscillators that 
form strong feedback connections, and do not necessarily rely on sharing 
the same orientation preferences (Sompolinsky et al, 1990). Segments that 
do not share the same receptive fields, but have the same orientation 
preferences, synchronise their oscillations via weak specific connections 
(Sompolinksy et al, 1990). In terms of viability in the conceptual model, 
there is a great deal of simulation work based on the experimental findings 
described so far, that demonstrate the ability to build artificial models 
capable of such behaviours (for example Cotterill & Nielsen, 1991; Denham 
et al, 1991; Denham & Troup, 1992; Dorizzi, & Grammaticos, 1991; 
Eckhorn et al, 1990; Eckhorn & Schanze, 1991; Eckhorn, 1991; Grossberg, 
& Somers, 1991a; 1991b; Kurrer et al. 1991; Kurrer et al, 1992; 
Sompolinsky et al, 1990; Troup, 1992). 
Later experimental and simulation work has suggested that synchronous 
oscillations are also an interhemispheric phenomena suggesting that inter 
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area association or "binding" via synchronous oscillator activity within the 
model is feasible (Engel et al, 1991a). Engel et al also suggest that 
synchrony can be mediated by long range cortico-cortico connections. 
Synchronisation of oscillation between cortical areas has also been reported 
notably between V I and V2 (Eckhorn et al, 1988). Further to this 
synchronous oscillatory responses have also been recorded between V I and 
the posteromedial lateral suprasylvian area (PMLS) mediated by long range 
cortico-cortico connections (Engel et al, 1991b). This provides significant 
evidence to support association between striate and extrastriate areas via 
synchronous oscillatory responses. The PMLS is an association area thought 
to be primarily involved with the analysis of global motion information, 
responding to movement in large scale patterns. The PMLS also has 
significantly large receptive fields compared to V I . As already discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3, V I is responsible for the analysis of localised detail of 
objects rather than global interpretations (Engel et al, 1991b). The existence 
of synchrony provides evidence to suggest that it could be implicated as a 
possible mechanism for binding between cortical areas coding for different 
properties o f the visual image. This would suggest that temporal binding 
through synchronous oscillations is not dependent on the receptive field 
properties o f neurons and therefore can easily bind information that is 
supposedly unrelated. 
In sum the use of synchronous oscillations as a mechanism for binding or 
associating information both within and between modules in the model 
presented in chapter 4 is well supported in neurophysiology. Whether or not 
it is the sole mechanism for binding information in the biological brain is 
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st i l l not conclusive. It does however lend itself well to simulation and 
therefore provides a strong candidate for binding both in the conceptual 
model and in the future development of artificial systems based on that 
model. 
TOP-DOWN INPUT CAUSES OSCILLATORY ACTIVITY. 
Within the model it is proposed that both bottom-up and top-down inputs 
generate synchronous oscillatory activity. Feedforward retinal inputs drive 
bottom-up oscillations allowing the retinal image to be represented across 
the visual cortex in the manner discussed in the previous section. Feedback 
connections provide a mechanism for both the integration of information 
across modules and also for top-down inputs to contribute to perception. A; 
outlined in chapter 4, the visual image is interpreted through comparing it 
to previously stored examples in memory. A match induces oscillations in 
the relevant neurons in IT confirming the identification is correct. This in 
turn, through feedback connections, enhances synchronous oscillatory 
activity throughout the system. Synchrony is also induced in neurons that 
may not have received retinal input. Such neurons are driven by top-down 
input from memory and are known to belong to the visual image from past 
experience but are not explicit in the retinal input due to things like 
occlusion. 
Recent simulation work has shown that it is possible to generate synchrony 
from top-down inputs fed back into the system (Bugmann & Taylor, 1994). 
They claim that in their model synchronisation is a product of visual 
recognition in higher levels of processing rather than causing visual 
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recognition itself. One of the predictions of their model is that 
synchronisation occurs at all 4 levels supporting the notion of inter area and 
interhemispheric integration through synchronous oscillation. The results of 
simulations partially uphold this prediction. An important point that they 
raise in the paper is that models of synchronisation to date all include 
artificial neurons that are capable of self sustainable oscillatory behaviours 
which enables synchronisation to occur. External input alone does not 
induce synchronisation in such models. I f neuronal f i r ing was driven 
entirely by retinal input then synchronisation would not occur. However 
this could be looked upon as a simulation problem in that this may be the 
case in relation to artificial models but does not mean that the biological 
vision system cannot produce oscillatory behaviour i f i t is driven by 
feedforward retinal input alone. The binding of information in V I for 
example relies on stimulus induced oscillations according to the 
neurophysiology outlined in the previous section. 
It is extremely di f f icul t to asses the relevance of these claims in relation to 
understanding human visual perception as their model only attempts to 
explain a small aspect o f visual processing. Also the model is only loosely 
based on functional and structural neurophysiology and is more concerned 
with the intricacies of simulation rather than the biological mechanisms of 
vision. Finally it addresses important issues, such as the binding problem 
without substantiating them in any way. However their model does 
demonstrate that for the purpose of developing artificial vision systems at 
least it is possible to induce synchronous oscillations as a result of top-
down input. Therefore in relation to the model outlined in chapter 4 it is 
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possible to combine the results of this paper with neurophysiological 
knowledge to make certain predictions about visual perception which can 
then be both incorporated into conceptual models as in chapter 4 and 
investigated further both neurophysiologically and psychologically. An 
example being the claim that feedback could be considered as a possible 
mechanism for the integration of visual information processing in parallel 
architectures. 
Further evidence to support the claim that integration in the conceptual 
model is driven by top-down feedback comes from neurophysiology. 
Correlated f i r ing in thalamic relay cells has been found to be driven by 
feedback inputs from V I to the dLGN (Sillito et al, 1994). This they claim 
provides additional support for the role of synchronous oscillatory activity 
in feature integration. They go on to suggest that the role of this 
synchronisation via feedback is to maximise the capability of relay cells in 
driving cortical processing. They expand this by suggesting that the 
correlation of a cortical pattern of activity in V I with thalamic relay cells is 
a mechanism for "testing" that the original pattern in V I is still correct, and 
i f it is, to enhance the relations between its component parts. The dLGN 
contains the most recent representation of the visual image which is 
continually updated reflecting the transient nature of the visual scene. 
The suggestion that the role of the thalamus extends beyond merely relaying 
information on to the cortex is not new. It has been widely implicated in 
models and explanations of visual attention (including: Desimone et al, 
1990; Crick. 1984; La Berge et al, 1992; Taylor & Alavi . 1993). It is also 
central to many models and theories of sensory processing (Harth et al, 
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1987; Mumford. 1991; 1992). In relation to the conceptual model outlined 
in chapter 4 of the thesis Sillito et al's findings provide neurophysiological 
support for oscillatory activity underlying hypothesis testing. The transient 
thalamic representation serves to provide a pattern against which the 
hypothesis that has been generated through cortical processing can be 
tested. I f it is correct then a correlation in the form of synchronous 
oscillatory activity occurs enhancing the pattern of activity representing the 
visual image in V I . It is also possible that new information about the visual 
image has become available, and can now be incorporated into the 
representation, thus the visual image is continually updated with new 
information. This also serves to aid the interpretation of ambiguous 
hypotheses which may have been unlabelled on their first iteration through 
the system. 
INTEGRATION OF POLY SENSORY INPUT VIA TOP-DOWN 
SYNCHRONOUS ACTIVITY. 
There is also evidence to support the proposal of oscillatory activity being 
the underlying mechanisms for integration from other sensory areas. Top-
down synchronisation could be occurring as a result of input from poly 
sensory areas or directly from other sensory areas. Recent evidence suggests 
that in several different species synchronous oscillations occur between 
cortical processing areas notably between the somatosensory cortex and the 
motor cortex (Murthy & Fetz, 1991). Further synchronous oscillatory 
activity has also been found in the association areas which include poly 
sensory areas (Llinas et al, 1991). Llinas et al reported the presence of 
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oscillatory activity in layer 4 of the guinea pig frontal cortex which 
oscillated at the same frequency as previously mentioned cortical 
oscillations. 
The implications of this in relation to the model are that input from other 
sensory processing areas could be associated with resultant visual 
processing through synchronous oscillatory activity. It is also possible that 
inputs from the poly sensory areas could induce oscillatory activity in the 
visual cortex as suggested by Bugmann and Taylor's top-down model of 
synchronisation. However as with much of this work this is purely 
speculative and bears more relation to the development of artificial vision 
systems than it does to explaining human visual perception. 
INTEGRATION OF PAST EXPERIENCES VIA SYNCHRONOUS 
ACTIVITY. 
It is proposed in the model that past experiences or "memory" is used to 
identify and label hypotheses that are constructed via feedforward pathways 
projecting to IT. The model suggests that a given hypothesis is matched or 
rather checked against stored exemplars for recognition purposes. As 
mentioned in chapter 4 it is not the aim of the thesis to provide detailed 
explanations of the module referred to as memory. (A comprehensive 
related account of a possible model of this module can be found in O' 
Shaughnessey, 1995). In relation to developing artificial vision systems it is 
acceptable to check patterns of oscillation in IT with stored exemplars in 
the module of the model referred to as memory. I f a match or close match is 
made then identification can be facilitated. This then leads to induced 
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synchronisation in the related neurons across modules via the feedback 
pathways. 
Relating the conceptual model to the understanding of human visual 
perception it is a little tenuous. There is however evidence to suggest that 
synchronous oscillatory activity is present in brain structures that are 
implicated in memory related activity such as the entorihnal cortex 
(Freeman, 1975). Later research suggests that oscillations in the entorihnal 
cortex occur at around 5-7 Hz corresponding to the theta rhythm associated 
with the hippocampus which is also strongly implicated in memory (Alonso 
& Llinas, 1989; Llinas, 1991). How the theta rhythm associates with the 
cortical rhythms which underlie the oscillatory activity implicated in visual 
binding both in neurophysiology and the conceptual model is not clear. The 
only concrete common factor is that recordings of responses with an 
oscillatory nature have been made. I t is possible to hypothesise that as there 
are cortical cells that oscillate in a wide frequency band between 10-45 Hz 
as well as those oscillating in the narrow 35-50 Hz band (Llinas et al, 1991) 
there are some cortical cells that correspond to the theta rhythm. This could 
enable the permeation of memory via wide band oscillations into cortical 
processing, this however is purely speculative. Engel et al emphasise the 
danger of implying to much from oscillatory activity saying that the 
presence of such activity does not prove the temporal coding hypothesis in 
anyway (Engel et al, 1992). This also applies in attempting to link cortical 
rhythms with theta rhythm in explanations of cortical processing in the 
human brain. 




of mechanisms in relation to artificial visions systems. Concerning th 
of the model to understand human visual perception the evidence is by 
means conclusive. The role of synchronous oscillatory activity in binding 
memory in the form of past experience with sensory input for identificatio: 
purposes is speculative. However by implicating such a mechanism in 
human visual perception should stimulate interest in pursing its existence 
and relevance further. 
CONCLUSIONS. 
This chapter has provided additional support for both the model and the 
theory outlined in chapter 4. The evidence presented is in no way 
conclusive but aims to substantiate some of the claims that were made in 
relation to the theory and model but were not presented previously in the 
thesis. It seems that i t is reasonable to suggest that visual perception is not 
a single process but a combination of both bottom-up and top-down 
processing where the retinal image provides a hypothesis that is labelled 
according to information from memory and poly sensory processing. 
Further, oscillations as an underlying mechanism provide a solution to the 
integration of information across parallel processing modules. 
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C H A P T E R 6 
SUMMARY: 
A DISCUSSION OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF 
THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER WORK. 
A brief summary of the work is outlined followed by a discussion in three 
sections. The first section discusses what has been achieved in the thesis in 
relation to its original aims. The second section discusses the conceptual 
model further in relation to perception. The third section attempts to 
discuss the implications of the thesis. Finally suggestions for future work 
are outlined including suggestions for simulation work, psychophysical and 
neurophysiological experimentation and how the conceptual model may be 
used as a neuropsychological tool. 
INTRODUCTION. 
As stated in chapter 1 the aim of the thesis is to develop both a theory and a 
conceptual model of visual perception, the purpose of such being twofold. 
Firstly to provide a better understanding of visual perception and secondly 
to provide insight into new architectures and mechanisms for artificial 
intelligence. Ultimately the applications of a conceptual model would be its 
eventual implementation as an artificial vision system which could be used 
to perform visual tasks as well as provide insight into biological vision. The 
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development of such a model was to be based on a bottom-up approach, 
through investigating what we understand about the neurophysiology of 
vision, and from a top-down approach, through looking at general theories 
of vision. Through combining both neurophysiological and psychological 
accounts of vision a strong multi-disciplinary framework would be establish 
with which to investigate the nature of visual perception. 
HAS T H E THESIS A C H I E V E D WHAT IT S E T OUT TO 
A C H I E V E ? 
OVERVIEW. 
In comparison to the complex accounts of both architecture and function in 
the visual systems of primates and humans the model evolved is extremely 
simple. This reflects the extremely complicated nature of visual perception 
as a whole. There are both models of artificial vision systems and of human 
visual processing that are both complicated and detailed, significantly more 
so than the model in the thesis. This is true of psychological top-down 
models and neurophysiological bottom-up models. Such models are only 
really detailed in relation to certain specific aspects of visual processing or 
visual perception. The seemingly impossible task that is created by trying to 
move away from localised models to global models means that simplicity is 
the only option. This section aims to address the claims made in chapter 1 
and discuss the model in relation to these claims. 
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A CONCEPTUAL MODEL THAT PROVIDES BETTER UNDERSTANDING 
OF HUMAN PERCEPTION. 
The claim that the development of a conceptual model of human visual 
perception wi l l lead to a greater understanding of that process can be seen 
as an emergent aspect of the thesis. The early chapters enabled an 
assimilation of a broad range of knowledge about the nature of vision that 
would not necessarily been a result of a research path restricted to a more 
"narrow" domain. For example i f the aim of the thesis had been to develop a 
model of feature integration in early visual processing the research would 
have been restricted to investigations into the structure and function of V I 
alone. This may have resulted in the development of an extremely detailed 
model of feature integration, i t may even had lead to the implementation of 
a conceptual model in software, but it would not have showed any real 
understanding of visual perception as a whole process. The question is what 
has the model achieved in helping us understand human visual perception. 
In general terms the conceptual model suggests that its is possible to regard 
visual perception as being a combination of both data driven and concept 
driven processing. The model incorporates a top-down, concept driven 
component with a bottom-up data driven component to explain how visual 
perception occurs. The implication of a top-down component in visual 
perception also suggests that vision as a sensory modality does not 
necessarily occur in isolation. Information from other sensory areas, as well 
as from memory indicates that the traditional view of sensory processing as 
being completely modular is not necessarily the case, although at a local 
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level processing is in fact restricted to purely visual information, more 
specifically the model proposes a possible mechanism for the integration of 
information globally via oscillations driven by top-down diffuse feedback 
connections and also locally via weak connections between populations of 
cells representing stimuli. 
In relation to understanding human perception one question that emerges 
from the development of the conceptual model is how much can be 
explained by developing models of perception? Arguably understanding 
visual perception is best explained by psychological or neurophysiological 
experimentation, through the testing of hypotheses or the gathering of data 
rather than through the construction of conceptual models. This may be true 
to some extent, but what the conceptual model does is provide the 
foundations for conducting experimental work. So many theories o f 
perception have been based on a subset of experimental evidence that bears 
no relation to the visual process as whole. Experimentation that is guided 
by a general idea of how perception works is far more productive than 
experimentation that is carried out in isolation of the global interpretation 
of the system. It is envisaged that it w i l l be possible to extend 
understanding of human perception with the eventual implementation of the 
model in software when some of the predictions of the model can be tested 
against experimental evidence. 
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A CONCEPTUAL MODEL THAT CAN EASILY BE IMPLEMENTED IN 
AN ARTIFICIAL SYSTEM. 
The second main aim of the thesis was to develop a conceptual model that 
could be easily implemented in software and would provide new and 
innovative algorithms for use in artificial vision systems. To a certain 
degree the development of the model has achieved this status. It would be 
possible to build the model in software in the structural and function form 
outlined. As mentioned in chapter 5 there are a number of simulation 
studies to support various structural and functional aspects of the model. 
The role of such a model once i t has been successfully implemented in 
software is not so clear. 
Arguably an implementation of the model as it stands would not provide a 
great deal of benefit to the artificial intelligence community. So far, in 
artificial intelligence research, it has been acknowledged that to build 
systems capable of intelligent behaviour we need to look more closely at 
how the brain functions. The failure of expert systems to realistically 
extend beyond a single domain, caused attention to focus on neural network 
theory providing artificial intelligence (AI) with systems that could "learn". 
However both expert systems and neural networks have been extremely 
successful in the development of artificial vision systems, especially the 
application of standard neural network techniques to pattern recognition 
problems. Both expert system and neural networks are based upon very 
general and very simple characteristics of brain function rather than 
detailed explanations. This does not mean that performance can be greatly 
enhanced by developing an A I model based on detailed structural and 
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functional understanding of the brain. However the progression from expert 
systems which are far removed from the brain to neural networks that are 
more closely linked to the brain has demonstrated an improvement in the 
capabilities of artificial vision systems in that they can now "learn". 
One of the important emergent properties of the model in relation to 
artificial vision systems is that like the brain the model does not separate 
structure from function. Standard neural network approaches to artificial 
vision not only separate structure from function but also apply different 
functions to the same structures (Churchland, 1986; Churchland & 
Sejenowski, 1992). The model reflects the relationship between structure 
and function through maintaining separate pathways for object 
identification and object manipulation. This relationship is further 
maintained in the modular processing of information within the model 
which is based upon the brain. As Churchland points out the structural and 
function relationship in the brain is the key to its ability to make sure that 
information requiring different amounts of time to encode, process and act 
upon information emerges as a coherent whole (Churchland, 1986; 
Churchland & Sejenowski, 1992). For real time artificial vision systems this 
could provide the key to enabling realistic emergent behaviours. 
What the development of the model has done for A I vision systems to some 
extent mirrors its achievements in relation to understanding human visual 
perception. Essentially it provides a general understanding of perception in 
its entirety providing insight into the sorts of structures and functions that 
might be useful to incorporate in an artificial vision system rather than 
providing a rigid detailed account of architecture and function that must be 
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adhered to. This point can be illustrated in the suggested mechanism for the 
integration of information in the model. The model suggests that the 
integration of information can be explained by synchronisation of 
oscillatory activity across and between modules. This is base upon 
biological understanding, but can be extrapolated to artificial systems quite 
successfully. This does not mean that the artificial system has to be 
architecturally isomorphic with the biological system, or that the oscillatory 
neurons have to be exact replicas of the best biological interpretation on 
single neuron behaviour. In fact most artificial single neuron models are 
based on approximations of biological models of the single neuron such as 
the leaky integrator models (Bressloff & Taylor, 1990) based on the 
Hodgkin Huxley equations (Hodgkin & Huxley, 1952). 
It would seem possible that simple object recognition and pattern 
discrimination tasks could be carried out by a software implementation of 
the model. Shape, colour and motion information could be computed and 
possible simple discrimination tasks could also be demonstrated. However 
to produce a successful artificial vision system would most likely mean that 
a large amount of the biological constraints of the system would have to be 
omitted to f u l f i l the software requirements. Arguably the system that would 
emerge would be no more biologically realistic than those neural network 
models already functioning. It is also highly probable that the 
implementation of a biological system would not be as successful as 
existing systems. What the model has provided artificial intelligence with is 
some pathways which could be explored in more detail. 
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A M U L T I - D I S I C P L I N A R Y APPROACH. 
A UNIFICATION OF TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP APPROACHES. 
In chapter 1 i t was suggested that one of the most distinguishing features of 
the model was that it would adopt a multi-disciplinary approach to its 
development. This would include investigations into the neurophysiology of 
vision, predominantly looking at architectures and function and 
investigations into the psychology of vision looking at theories of 
perception, and how perception manifests itself as higher level cognitive 
processing and ultimately in behaviour. Finally by proposing the eventual 
implementation of the model understanding of the computational aspects of 
the model would be necessary. As the implementation of the model was not 
included in the investigation of the thesis the multi-disciplinary nature of 
the conceptual model was restricted to neurophysiology and psychology 
alone. Computational constraints were addressed in terms of the possibility 
of being able to actually build the model in software, especially in relation 
to the proposed underlying mechanisms of the model, but in depth 
understanding was not necessary at this stage in the research. Bearing in 
mind the problems with taking a multi-disciplinary approach as outlined in 
chapter 1, has the thesis been able to provide a truly multi-disciplinary 
model of visual perception? 
Essentially the unification of disciplines was achieved in the sense that the 
conceptual model incorporates a top-down psychological account of 
perception which was applied to a bottom-up neurophysiological account of 
the architectures and function of the visual system. So the top-down 
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component explained what the bottom-up component would do globally, but 
the functionality of the architecture itself was actually based on bottom-up 
neurophysiology. This can also be interpreted as maintaining the 
segregation of disciplines as well as unifying them. The unifying element is 
the model itself and the segregated interpretation comes from the two 
disciplines explaining different aspects of the model, psychology the 
general theory of perception and neurophysiology the foundations for the 
architectures and their underlying functionality. 
HOW UNIFICATION MIGHT HELP UNDERSTAND HUMAN VISUAL 
PROCESSING. 
This unification and segregation within the model can be expressed in 
relation to the proposal that biological vision operates at three levels. In 
chapter 1 it was proposed that visual perception could be explained as three 
levels, local processing, local perception and global perception. Local 
processing correlates with the processing that takes place within each 
module in the model. The processing of form information in V I , V2 V3, and 
V3a, the processing of colour information in V4 and motion information in 
V5. Local processing has its foundations in the structural and functional 
descriptions offered by neurophysiology. Local perception correlates with 
the level in the model where a representation has been formed that relates to 
a more complete description, the level at which information is combined to 
form a hypothesis. The distributed pattern of activity across the modules 
could then be thought of as being a local perception. At this level the visual 
image is restricted to a purely visual description with no top-down input 
181 
from poly sensory information or from memory at all . It is the result of 
labelling and the checking of the hypothesis that equates to the third level 
of global perception. The combination of sensory processing from other 
areas and experiences from memory mean that visual perception is not 
restricted to the traditional approach in psychology and neurophysiology to 
compartmentalise behaviour. At the level of local processing and local 
perception it is possible to modularise, not only limiting vision to the result 
of processing in a particular cortical area, but also to distinct modules 
within that area. 
This existence of levels could also provide a solution to how higher level 
cognitive states as defined by psychology might be reduced to low level 
neuronal behaviours as deflned by neurophysiology. It would be possible to 
infer that high level cognitive states equate to local and global perception 
whereas low level neuronal behaviour equates to local processing. Having 
three levels allows for a gradual transition from low level processing to 
high level processing, with the middle level of local perception comprising 
both a level of description which is based on low level neuronal behaviours 
and yet one which aspires to a higher level of description. The construction 
of a hypothesis begins with low level neuronal behaviours. Within the 
model artificial neurons extract information about the visual image in 
parallel within two hierarchical steams. The actual hypothesis is a result of 
this processing and is represented in IT by cells that correspond to 
particular patterns of activity. I t is at this level that the distributed 
representation becomes unified as a hypothesis. However it is only through 
the comparison to memory and the incorporation of poly sensory processing 
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that local perception becomes a global perception. Therefore the level of 
local perception provides a level at which higher level processing emerges 
from low level processing. It must be noted that throughout the whole 
model, at all levels, low level neuronal behaviour drives high level 
representations. 
HOW T H E C O N C E P T U A L M O D E L IS D I F F E R E N T FROM 
E X I S T I N G MODELS. 
In very general terms the conceptual model developed is different to 
existing models in that it attempts to add more detail both to broad 
psychological theories of perception and to particular aspects of more 
detailed neurophysiological accounts of perception. This has significant 
implications in relation to furthering our understanding of human 
perception and the development of artificial vision systems. By making 
explicit possible functional structures underlying broad psychological 
accounts of vision it is possible to sec how behavioural explanations of 
perception can be linked to neurophysiological descriptions of structure and 
function. Although the addition of a detailed functional description to 
existing neurophysiological accounts of vision is speculative in terms of its 
foundations in experimental neurophysiology, it provides a basis for future 
investigation. Finally by making explicit the architectures and mechanisms 
underlying both neurophysiological and psychological accounts of 
perception it is possible to facilitate the development of artificial computer 
models of visual processing. 
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NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL MODELS. 
The functional structure of the conceptual model was based on parallel 
models of processing within the biological visual system outlined in chapter 
3. In particular the model was developed from Zeki's four stream theory of 
visual processing (Zeki, 1978a; 1980; 1983; 1988; 1992). However the 
model differs from that proposed by Zeki in several ways. 
Primarily the conceptual model extends Zeki's model to incorporate 
psychological accounts of visual processing. Zeki's model is purely an 
anatomical account of vision, he does not attempt to link his model to 
general psychological theories as discussed in chapter 3 such as Gregory's 
(Gregory, 1972, 1973). This means that Zeki's work can tell us a lot about 
structure and function, and can be used to question the nature of specific 
neurophysiological dysfunction, however it does not tell us a great deal 
about perception as a whole process. It relates more to understanding visual 
processing within a limited set of cortical structures. In reverse general 
psychological theories of perception do not provide detailed insight into the 
architectures and mechanisms that underlie vision. They attempt to explain 
and understand the so called higher level thought processes both conscious 
and unconscious that are a consequence of visual processing. 
In particular the conceptual model incorporates the theoretical assumption 
that vision can be explained as both a top down and bottom up process. This 
is embodied in the structural and functional account of perception by the 
addition of a description of how memory and polysensory processing might 
effect visual input, as well as the role of the dLGN in the visual process. 
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This aspect of visual processing is not addressed by other 
neurophysiological accounts of vision such as Zeki's. 
The importance of the role of the dLGN in the conceptual model is one of 
the aspects that enable it to be distinguished from other models. Within the 
model the dLGN is described as playing an active role in the visual process, 
rather than just relaying information between the retina and the cortex. 
Most of the parallel models of visual processing discussed in chapter 3 refer 
to the dLGN mainly to add support to the segregation of function within the 
visual system. The classification of X and Y ganglions upheld in the dLGN, 
as discussed in chapter 2, is interpreted as being evidence for separate 
streams of processing in the cortex. There are other theories which suggest 
that the thalamus, and therefore dLGN, plays an active role in sensory 
processing. 
As discussed briefiy in chapters 2, 4, and 5 Mumford proposes a model that 
suggests that the thalamus acts as a blackboard which holds the most recent 
results of sensory processing which can then act as a reference point for the 
integration of information throughout the cortex (Mumford, 1991; 1992). 
The conceptual model that has been outlined in chapter four makes the role 
of the dLGN more explicit in that rather than just holding a representation 
of the most recent results of visual processing it actively engages in 
association with both the retina and with V l to enable the confirmation of 
labelled hypotheses propagated back throughout the visual system. Sill i to et 
al showed experimentally that thalamic relay cells associated with a given 
stimulus wi l l fire in synchrony as a result of feedback from V I only i f they 
are also depolarised by their retinal input. They interpret the role of this 
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cortical feedback as being a mechanism for testing whether or not the 
cortical representation matches the retinal image. I f a match is made 
through synchronous firing then connectivity is strengthened. They go on to 
say that these findings are consistent with the proposal that binding in the 
visual cortex occurs as a result of synchronous oscillatory activity (Sillito 
et al, 1994). 
Within the model the dLGN behaves in the same way as described above. 
Synchronous oscillatory discharges within the dLGN wi l l result from cells 
being stimulated simultaneously via feedforward input from the retina and 
via feedback input from V I . As a consequence of this the connections 
involved in the relay of this information between V I and the dLGN wi l l 
then be strengthened. The synchronous activity generated in the dLGN 
implies that the LGN is no longer merely relaying information, but carrying 
an evaluation of both top down and bottom up information. 
As mentioned in chapter 3, Zeki's model of visual processing suggests that 
there are four streams of information flowing in a feedforward way from the 
retina to the cortex. Each stream deals with the processing of a particular 
aspect of the visual image such as form, colour, and motion. Zeki suggests 
that information processed in distinct streams is then integrated by the 
diffuse feedback connections between cortical areas. These diffuse feedback 
connections are "non specific", they are not segregated into pathways in the 
same way that the feedforward connections are. Although Zeki proposes a 
functional structure for the integration of information, neuronal mechanisms 
are not made explicit. The conceptual model suggests a possible neuronal 
mechanism for the integration of information that is processed in separate 
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sites, that mechanism being synchronous oscillations. This mechanism is 
speculative, however as discussed in chapters 3 and 5 there is both 
neurophysiological evidence coupled with simulation studies that have 
shown that synchronous oscillations are capable of such behaviours. 
The conceptual model brings together recent neurophysiological evidence 
which enables existing models such as Zeki's to be extended to f i t with a 
general theory of visual perception. Existing neurophysiological accounts of 
vision such as Zeki's are incomplete in relation to the proposed theory of 
perception outlined in chapter 4. In turn existing models of vision based 
upon more detailed analysis of both structure and function are stil l only 
"simplifying brain models". The more detail that is incorporated the smaller 
the scope of the model. Wehmeier et al have developed a detailed model of 
vision, but to enable this to be achieved they are only able to model the 
retina, dLGN and V I (Wehmeier et al, 1989). This means at best they are 
modelling a subset of visual processing rather than attempting to develop a 
model of visual processing. They do not include explanations of the role of 
memory and poly sensory processing, and they do not include recent 
advances in our understanding of the possible role of the dLGN as the 
conceptual model developed here does. 
By incorporating recent neurophysiological research into particular 
structures forming the primary visual pathway it is possible to provide 
structural and functional support for the general theory proposed in chapter 
4. Further to this it has been possible to develop a conceptual model that 
goes beyond the scope of existing models. 
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PSYCHOLOGICAL MODELS. 
As already mentioned in the previous section the main distinction between 
the model proposed here and existing psychological theories and models of 
perception as a complete process, is that the present account provides 
detailed insight into the possible structural and functional mechanisms of 
vision. Through linking a theory based in psychology with 
neurophysiological description, detailed interpretation of perception is 
possible. The conceptual model is based around a general theory of visual 
perception drawn from existing mainstream global theories. As discussed in 
chapter 3 there are essentially two major views in the psychological 
literature regarding global theories of vision. 
Firstly there are those theories that claim that vision is purely data driven, 
the visual image is interpreted with no reference to stored information and 
those that claim vision is concept driven, using stored knowledge about the 
world to interpret the visual image. Neither of these views alone fits with 
evidence from neurophysiology into the nature of vision. For example as 
mentioned in chapter 2 there are as many feedback connections in the brain 
as feedforward. I f vision is purely data driven what is the role of these 
extensive feedback connections from higher level processing areas to lower 
level processing areas? Surely it implies that vision is concept driven as 
well as data driven, relying on stored knowledge to help interpret the visual 
image. Feedback connections allow the results of processing in higher 
levels of the visual system and other relevant further processing areas of the 
brain, to be propagated back through the system to aid interpretation of the 
visual image. 
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The model differs from existing data driven theories such as Marr's (Marr, 
1982) by extending the general view of vision to include a concept driven 
element to account for the massive feedback connections in the brain, 
therefore avoiding one of the major criticisms of Marr's account of object 
recognition that essentially his model is biologically implausible and hence 
sheds no new light on human perception (Werner et al, 1993). Further the 
model is different from Marr's in respect of the relationship between 
architecture and function. Marr's account of vision identifies the 
computational level as being the most important in describing visual 
processing. Architecture and function can be treated as being completely 
separate. Within the conceptual model outlined in chapter 4, architecture 
and function are inextricably linked. 
The theory on which the conceptual model is based attempts to unify 
existing theories such as Marr's with concept driven theories such as that 
proposed by Gregory to fit with neurophysiological data. The conceptual 
model goes beyond merely unifying data driven and concept driven accounts 
of vision, it attempts to make explicit the nature of the concept driven 
input. As discussed in chapter 3, Gregory's theory refers to the concept 
driven element of perception as ''top down knowledge". However, exactly 
what form this knowledge takes in terms of structure and function in the 
brain is not made clear. The conceptual model attempts to clarify this by 
defining "knowledge" as memory, genetically predetermined information 
and polysensory information. Further to this, embodying the unified theory 
of perception in a conceptual model enables specific structures and 
functionality underlying the redefined concept "knowledge" to be made 
189 
explicit. 
S P E C I F I C IMPLICATIONS OF T H E CONCEPTUAL M O D E L 
LIMITATIONS OF OSCILLATIONS FOR BINDING. 
Within the model it is proposed that synchronous oscillations provide a 
possible mechanism for "binding" both within modules and between 
modules. As discussed in chapters 1, 3 and 5 the proposal for binding 
through oscillations is relatively new in terms of neurophysiological 
evidence in their support. A great deal of excitement has been generated by 
their discovery, however very little has been published which discusses the 
f u l l extent of their possible limitations. 
One genera] criticism of synchronous oscillations as a mechanism for 
binding is that what the discovery of 40 HZ oscillations demonstrates is not 
binding but segmentation (Hardcastle, 1994). Hardcastle takes a classic 
view of vision similar to that adopted in the development of the conceptual 
model, and identifies visual perception comprising of three stages. Firstly 
segmentation, secondly binding and finally association. Segmentation 
involves early visual processing, where the visual image is segmented into 
"simple cohesive features". From segmentation higher level visual 
processing "binds" image segments together, incorporating some top down 
knowledge to form an object hypothesis. Finally memories and associations 
enable objects to be correctly identified. Hardcastle argues that the 
experimental work of neurophysiologists such as Gray and Singer relates 
only to the first stage of this description of visual processing. Therefore 
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synchronous oscillation does not explain binding, rather it can be seen as a 
possible mechanism underlying the segmentation of the visual image in 
early visual processing. 
Hardcastle suggests that the work of Gray and Singer demonstrates 
segmentation of the image in relation to very simple single features such as 
orientation. Gray and Singers experiments do not show how cells coding for 
very different information might behave. Cells are segmenting the image in 
terms of one possible constraint, i.e. orientation, but not binding different 
sorts of information such as colour information processed in V4 and form 
information processed in V I . However as mentioned in chapters 3 and 5 and 
acknowledged by Hardcastle, work by Engel et al has showed that it is 
possible to record synchrony between areas of the cortex coding for very 
different information. Engel et al discovered synchrony between area 17 
( V I ) and the PMLS. Area 17 ( V I ) has relatively small receptive fields, 
coding mainly for fine grain spatial resolution and orientation, whereas the 
PMLS has large receptive fields and is thought to code for motion, but is 
severely limited in its capabilities to encode orientation information (Engel 
et al, 1991a; 1991 b; 1992). 
Hardcastle goes on to argue that even as an explanation for segmentation 
the evidence for synchronous oscillations is limited. It is dangerous to 
imply that a very small number of single cell recordings can be used to infer 
a general trend in the behaviour of all the neurons in V I . Further, with the 
current state of neurophysiological research, it is impossible to accurately 
test the proposal that synchronous oscillations underlie binding. 
A second more general criticism of synchronous oscillations as a solution to 
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the binding problem is that most of the experimental work has been 
conducted on the cortex of the cat. There is much discussion about the 
limited evidence for the existence of 40 Hz oscillations in the primate, and 
therefore the relevance of this work in understanding human visual 
perception. Arguably it is as tenuous to extrapolate from primates to the 
human brain as it is any other animal. The foundations for our 
understanding of visual processing and for that matter the structure and 
function of the biological brain as a whole is largely based on, or at least 
originated from animal experimentation. Dismissing the implications of 
oscillations on these grounds hardly seems justifiable, as it could imply that 
perhaps we should question the whole of our understanding of the human 
brain that has originated from such work. Therefore it is important to make 
clear that the existence of oscillations is limited and requires further 
investigation. 
More recently research has been directed at investigating more extensively 
oscillation in monkey cortex, the results being contradictory. There is 
evidence to suggest that there is both oscillatory, and synchronous 
oscillatory activity present in awake and anaesthetised monkey cortex. 
Livingstone recorded both single unit and local field potential oscillations 
in V I of the monkey, and also demonstrated phase locking behaviour with 
two light bars (Livingstone, 1991). Krieter and Singer recorded 40-60 Hz 
oscillations in MT, however the responses were short, less than 300 Ms and 
not always present (Krieter and Singer, 1992). Work carried out by Young 
et al was not so supportive and found that there was little 40 Hz oscillatory 
activity in V I and MT, and in IT only two of fifty recording sites in a 
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monkey performing a face discrimination task oscillated in the 40-60 Hz 
range (Young et al 1992). However as with more positive conclusions drawn 
from cat experiments, the methodology for measuring this kind of activity is 
limited, meaning that more research is required and the results treated 
carefully. 
More specifically it has been argued that synchronous oscillations in respect 
of visual binding are computationally slow. They do not meet the temporal 
constraints necessary for perceptual integration. Psychophysical research 
has show that the time taken to perform perceptual grouping, segmentation 
and figure ground separation requires less that 200 ms. Biederman et al 
demonstrated that it was possible for subjects to determine the "semantic" 
relations between objects in a novel visual scene in less that 150ms 
(Biederman et al, 1982). This would mean that the visual image would have 
to be segmented, bound and associated within this time. Further, 
neurophysiological experimentation has shown that response to visual 
stimuli in recordings from awake monkey is less than 100 ms. In a 
discrimination task in which different views of faces were presented to the 
animals the latency between stimulus onset and a response in cells in STPa 
was as litt le as 70 ms. (Oram and Perrett, 1994). However i t must be noted 
that a response in a cell does not necessarily mean that recognition has 
occurred. 
Contrary to these criticisms evidence suggests that binding by synchronous 
oscillatory activity is capable of meeting these time constraints. Tononi et 
al has achieved figure ground segmentation in simulation in around 100-200 
Ms which fits with psychophysical and neurophysiological data.(Tononi et 
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al. 1992). The original work by Gray and Singer also demonstrated that 
synchrony was present within a few tens of milliseconds. It could be argued 
that i t might be possible to equate oscillation onset times with cell 
recording times, but not so successfully with behavioural response to visual 
stimuli. Certainly simulations have concentrated on replicating responses in 
populations of artificial neurons rather than in the generation of behaviours. 
Edelman*s group argue that they have successfully used oscillatory 
networks to drive a behavioural response to visual stimuli producing similar 
distribution of reaction times over a given set of trials as psychophysical 
studies (Tononi et al, 1992). 
Another more specific criticism of the use of oscillations as a mechanism 
for perceptual integration is that they are computationally more expensive. 
This criticism related more to the development of artificial vision systems 
than the explanation of biological vision. Although oscillations are 
computationally expensive and the physical simulation time is longer than 
in standard neural networks (SNN's) the advantages out weigh this 
disadvantage. The main advantage is the number of representations one can 
sustain on a single network, facilitated by the fact that you can encode more 
that one parameter (Skarda & Freeman, 1987; Grossberg, 1988), phase 
amplitude and frequency, rather than just amplitude in the form of 
excitation level as in SNN*s. Further, Hummel and Biedermann have 
developed a model that is capable of the temporal binding of visual 
relations using 44 cells compared to the 1.985x10*' cells needed for a 
standard enumeration solution (Hummel & Biederman, 1990). 
The fact that oscillatory artificial neurons are computationally expensive is 
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not a realistic problem at this stage in the development of their use in visual 
perception. At this point they should be seen as the basis for proving a 
methodology rather than for buildings systems for the real world. Once the 
methodology has been established it is envisaged that technology in the 
form of computing power wi l l have caught up. To a limited degree, they are 
already feasible with today's computational power, and have been used to 
replicate binding demonstrated by neurophysiological experimentation( for 
example: Eckhorn et al, 1989; Eckhorn et al, 1990; Engel et al. 1990; 
Eckhorn & Schanze, 1991; Eckhorn 1991.) and binding in cognition (Shastri 
& Ajjanagadde, 1993; Tononi et al, 1992). Further, i t is possible to reduce 
the computational power needed to employ oscillatory behaviours in 
networks. Examples of this can be seen in the case Carpenter and 
Grossberg's Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART), where the oscillatory 
behaviour of resonance is represented in a simplified and computationally 
less demanding form (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1987a & 1987b; Carpenter & 
Grossberg, 1988; Grossberg, 1988) and in the work of Baldi et al (Baldi et 
al, 1990), where oscillatory neurons are modelled simply in terms of their 
frequency and phase relationships. 
Grossberg emphasises this point further in a response to Skarda and 
Freeman's suggestion that chaos is a necessity of biological systems to self-
organise (Skarda & Freeman, 1987) Grossberg emphasises the point that 
although biological data suggests that chaos is evident in the stable self-
organisation of sensory recognition codes, notably in olfaction, i t is not 
necessary to build systems that exhibit chaotic activity to achieve the same 
functional property of the biological system. Grossberg sites ART as an 
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example of a self-stabilising system that is not dependent on chaos 
(Grossberg, 1987c). Baldi et al also demonstrate this point, that biological 
isomorphism is not necessary to achieve the same results in simulation 
through his use of coupled oscillators which used frequency and phase 
information to encode information, but do not actually oscillate (Baldi et al, 
1990). In summary you can capture the nature of oscillations without the 
burden of computational expense necessary to simulate oscillatory neurons. 
Further criticism of the use of synchronous oscillations to explain binding 
is the limited number of representations that are available per network. In 
fact, by binding using temporal codes, it is possible to have several 
representations coexisting in a network. Recent research has shown that it is 
possible to represent multiple memories in a single neural network of 
oscillating neurons (Lisman & Idiart, 1995). Lisman and Idiart replicated 
psychophysical results which showed subjects were capable of storing up to 
7 short term memories at any one time. They worked on the principle that 
different memories were stored as different high frequency (40 Hz) 
subcycles of a low frequency oscillation. The number of possible 
representations on any one network is determined by the number of 
subcycles that f i t in any given low frequency cycle. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SYNCHRONY IN NEURAL FIRING 
AND SYNCHRONY IN OSCILLATIONS 
As discussed in chapter 5 synchronous oscillations result from neurons 
discharging simultaneously causing oscillations in the 40-60 Hz range. 
Temporal f i r ing patterns are closely correlated with this oscillatory activity 
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(Gray & Singer. 1987; 1989; Eckhorn et al, 1988; Gray et al, 1989; Eckhorn 
et al, 1989). However, the integration of information solely by synchronous 
f i r ing patterns is not without its problems. Retinal jit ter, and time delays 
especially in the integration of information between cortical areas would 
mean that spike trains are randomised. Information arriving say in IT from 
two parallel streams of information flow would be subject to varying time 
delays, meaning that information relating to the same object would be 
represented by f i r ing patterns that were not temporally synchronised. It is 
possible that oscillatory discharges would enable these problems to be 
overcome, enabling the integration of information between cortical areas. 
Within the visual cortex it is thought that cells code for stimulus specific 
information through a rhythmic f ir ing pattern which correlates closely with 
oscillatory discharges in the 40-60 Hz frequency band (Gray & Singer, 
1989; Eckhorn et al 1989; Engel et al, 1992;). I t has been suggested that 
this oscillatory activity acts as a "carrier signal for a temporal binding 
mechanism," between cortical areas (Engel et al, 1992). 
As discussed in chapter 5 Eckhorn et al acknowledge the relationship 
between rhythmic f i r ing patterns and synchronous oscillations. They 
distinguish between stimulus forced and stimulus induced synchronisation. 
Stimulus forced synchronisation takes the form of averaged visually evoked 
potentials and are generally not oscillatory. They are involved at all levels 
of visual processing. Stimulus induced synchronisation's are oscillatory, 
and facilitate the correlation of irregular discharges. Eckhorn et al go on to 
suggest that stimulus forced synchronisation's enable crude pre-attentive 
representations to be formed, whereas stimulus induced synchronisation's 
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allow for more sophisticated associations to be made involving inter area 
interaction within the visual cortex and with other cortical processing areas 
(Eckhorn et al, 1990). 
EXAMPLES OF THE COMPUTATIONAL ROLES OF SPECIFIC LINKS IN 
THE MODEL. 
In chapter 4 an outline of the nature of the structure and function of the 
conceptual model is presented. Although simulation of the model was not 
undertaken, a simple description of visual processing and a possible 
simplified implementation of the model is outlined (see figures 18 & 19 and 
corresponding text). It is possible to expand on chapter 4 by looking more 
specifically at the computational roles played by specific arrows in the 
model for example the links between the modules representing IT and 
PARIETAL cortex, and dLGN and V I . 
As outlined in chapter 4, processing within the model is carried out in two 
streams. The "WHAT" pathway processes form information, and is 
concerned with object identification. The "HOW" pathway processes 
information which facilitates a response to the visual stimuli. Although 
there is evidence of integration between these two systems as discussed in 
chapter 3 it is beyond the scope of the model to include descriptions of this. 
The model proposed in general, and at this stage in its development is not 
designed to model specific psychophysical phenomena. However interaction 
between the two streams is addressed on a more general level. As discussed 
in chapter 3 interaction in the biological vision system occurs through 
diffuse feedback connections and very weak specific feedforward 
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connections. The basis for interaction within the model is via diffuse 
feedback connections. Such connections occur between all areas, and result 
in synchronisation of oscillatory discharges. This allows information 
processed in separate pathways to be integrated via temporal mechanisms. 
One such point of interaction is made explicit in the model via a reciprocal 
link between IT and PARIETAL cortex. The purpose of this link is 
discussed in chapter 4. 
Computationally the link consists of diffuse feedback connections between 
neurons in IT and the PARIETAL cortex. These feedback connections would 
be not be specific, enabling the integration of information between areas 
with unrelated receptive field properties. The links between IT and the 
PARIETAL cortex are associative links. The idea being that i f one area is 
active the other area is also activated by association. It is envisaged that 
these links would be weak due to the fact they would not share the same 
receptive fields. This would mean that rather than connecting one to one 
they would connect groups of neurons in IT to groups of neurons in the 
PARIETAL cortex. The links would st i l l be strong enough to enable the 
oscillatory discharges of neurons in IT representing the visual image 
processed in the "what" pathway, to synchronise with the oscillatory 
discharges of neurons in the PARIETAL cortex, representing the visual 
image processed in the "how" pathway. The oscillatory discharges in IT 
would represent a object hypothesis, whereas the oscillatory discharges in 
the PARIETAL cortex would represent the spatial layout information 
relating to that given object hypothesis. The effect of this would be that the 
oscillatory responses for "what" information would be synchronised with 
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those for "how" information This link therefore enables object identity to 
be linked to spatial and motion information which can then be passed to the 
motor cortex via the "how" pathway to enable the execution of motor 
responses to the object. 
Engel et al confirm that it is possible to record synchronisation of 
oscillatory responses between different visual processing areas in the cortex 
that have very different receptive field properties via weak diffuse feedback 
connections (Engel et al, I99lb) , notably between area 17 ( V I ) and the 
PMLS. V I has small receptive fields and is mainly concerned with the 
processing of detailed form information. The PMLS on the other hand has 
large receptive fields and is concerned primarily with the analysis of 
direction of movement, and its capability for processing orientation 
information is extremely limited. 
As mentioned previously in this chapter and in chapters 4 and 5 the 
relationship between the dLGN and V I is crucial to the model. Feedforward 
excitatory connections between the dLGN and V I serve to relay the retinal 
image to the cortex for processing. These connections are specific and 
related to the receptive field properties of neurons in the dLGN and V I . 
Segmentation in V I then takes place as described by neurophysiological 
accounts in chapter 5. As discussed more generally in chapters 3, 4 & 5 and 
earlier in this chapter feedback connections between V I and the dLGN 
perform a different role. They enable an association to be made between the 
object hypothesis which is arrived at as a product of feedforward 
processing, and the retinal image. This association enables the labelled 
object hypothesis to be confirmed. 
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The mechanism for this association is similar to the mechanism for the 
integration of information between IT and the PARIETAL region described 
previously. Feedback connections from V I to the dLGN wi l l cause neurons 
in the dLGN to oscillate i f they are receiving feedforward input from the 
RETINA. Neurons in the dLGN which are oscillating wi l l strengthen their 
feedforward connections to V I causing a stronger level of excitation in the 
relevant neurons in V I . This w i l l then be propagated throughout the model 
affecting all levels. Further to this the feedback connections from V I to the 
dLGN wi l l enable the synchronisation of oscillations between the two areas 
to enable hypothesis confirmation. 
G E N E R A L IMPLICATIONS OF T H E CONCEPTUAL M O D E L 
PSYCHOLOGY 
One of the main implications in relation to psychology is the attempt in the 
conceptual model to link neurophysiological accounts of vision with 
psychological ones. As mentioned in previous chapters the rationale for this 
is that through the development of a conceptual model insight into the 
relationship between visual processing and visual perception wi l l become 
clear. This is seen by researchers as being fundamental to advancing our 
understanding of vision: 
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"...we know very little about how visual processing leads to perceptionf A 
plethora of processing models have been proposed^ yet few encompass or 
account adequately for more than a small fraction of the available 
neurobiological data. " 
(Oram & Perrett, 1994). 
In general terms the model represents a theory of perception, which has 
evolved from combining mainstream psychological theories, and which has 
been grounded in neurophysiology. This has enabled one of the aims of the 
thesis, restated in the quotation above to be addressed. A general claim that 
perception is a combination of data driven and concept driven processing 
has been supported from neurophysiological evidence, specifically the role 
of diffuse feedback connections enabling memory and poly sensory 
information to be integrated into data driven visual processing. The 
suggestion of the role of the dLGN as a mechanism for confirming a 
labelled hypothesis of the visual image, again supported by 
neurophysiological experimentation, adds further support. This then enables 
psychological theories such as those of Marr and Gregory to be re-evaluated 
in the light of these suggestions. 
It is possible that refinement of the theory and model through further 
experimentation and simulation may advance understanding of 
neuropsychological deficits and advance our understanding of the brain. 
Through the future development of large scale biologically plausible 
simulations of the visual system it w i l l be possible to investigate the 
functional properties of the visual system. This approach has already had a 
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major impact on our understanding of the brain. By building biologically 
realistic models i t is possible to investigate the dynamical interactions of 
the nervous system. 
More specifically, through making explicit a possible relationship between 
psychological phenomena i.e. binding and integration, and a 
neurophysiological solution i.e. synchronisation of oscillatory discharges, 
the unification of disciplines has been achieved. This unification allows 
understanding from both disciplines to advance a general understanding of 
perception. Arguably psychological theory alone has been incapable of 
providing an adequate solution to the binding problem. 
Other researchers have also used the same neurophysiological mechanisms 
to successfully develop a model capable of dynamic binding in reasoning 
(Shastri & Ajjanagadde, 1993), attempting to link so called higher level 
cognitive functions with low level neurophysiological description. Although 
their work met with much criticism one of the responses to their paper was 
that they were making a brave attempt to unite psychology and 
neurophysiology rather than merely replacing psychological accounts of 
reasoning with neurobiological ones (Ohisson, 1993). The conceptual model 
has also attempted to achieve the same results for vision. 
Although there is much criticism of oscillation as a mechanism for 
integration and specifically binding it seems to be a candidate for serious 
consideration. The emphasis on neurophysiological mechanisms as a 
possible solution to the binding problem has lead to the development of 
research interest that attempts to span several disciplines. One of the 
biggest problems to overcome is the fear of multi-disciplinary research 
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evident in both the psychological and neurophysiological literature. The 
conceptual model has endeavoured to provide a framework which spans 
disciplines, so providing proof that multi-disciplinary research is possible. 
More specifically, through the development of both a theory and conceptual 
model that is firmly grounded in both neurophysiology and psychology, it is 
hoped that the pitfalls of complex computational models such as that 
developed by Marr can be avoided. Marr's theory of vision, which 
dominated psychological accounts of vision for so long relied on 
biologically implausible computational requirements (Werner, 1993). This 
meant that although it provided the foundations for the development of 
successful artificial vision systems it did not provide accurate insight into 
the nature of human visual perception. As mentioned previously in this 
chapter, Marr's theory of vision suggests that architecture and function can 
be seen to exist as separate entities. Through taking into account 
neurophysiological accounts of visual processing it becomes obvious that 
structure and function are inextricably linked. Therefore it is possible, 
through multi-disciplinary research, to advance our understanding of 
perception. 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
The use of oscillations as mechanisms for binding and integration have far 
reaching implications for A l . In general, input from psychology and 
neurophysiology provides design constraints which the A l researcher can 
utilise (Singer & Donoghue, 1988). The design constraints evident from the 
development of the conceptual model can be considered to be: 
204 
• The use of stored information in the analysis of input. 
• Simultaneous feedforward processing of information in separate channels 
• The use of both spatial and temporal information in the encoding of 
information rather than simply using spatial encoding as in SNN's. 
Specifically the third constraint is of significance in the development of 
artificial vision systems. As mentioned in chapter 1 the binding problem is 
a central issue in the development of artificial models of visual processing 
as well as in biological vision. Solutions to the binding problem within A l 
generally involves the enumeration of every possible combination of object, 
and provide a unit or set of units to represent each combination in a SNN 
(Hummel & Biederman,1990). For example in the recognition of simple one 
dimensional coloured objects in the visual scene each possible combination 
of shape, colour and position is calculated and represented by a possible set 
of outputs in a neural network. This means that in the analysis o f complex 
visual scenes the number of possible enumerations is beyond the 
capabilities of most networks. Further, more complete information about 
every possible enumeration has to be built into the network before it is able 
to process data. I f the network is presented with a combination that i t has 
not been previously enumerated then recognition w i l l f a i l . 
Another problem for such a network is highlighted by Hummel and 
Biedermann as what they refer to as the "scrambling problem" (Hummel & 
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Biedermann, 1990). This is where a SNN recognises an incorrect 
combination of features, which fu l f i l s the enumeration criteria but i 
visually incorrect. For example the right combinations of edges are present 
say for a square, but in the wrong combination giving rise to a collection of 
lines that are not identifiable as a square. Hummel and Biederman 
demonstrate that these problems can be overcome using "dynamic bindings" 
in the form of synchrony in networks of oscillating artificial neurons. 
Within a series of linked networks the spatial relations, location and 
viewpoint of a given object can all be represented separately and bound 
together through synchronous oscillations facilitated by "fast enabling 
links" which do not affect excitatory and inhibitory processing within each 
network. Further i t is possible to represent more than one object at a given 
time using this technique. 
Other successful implementations of artificial systems capable of binding 
information using temporal coding have been mentioned previously and 
include Skarda and Freeman's model of olfaction and Shastri and 
Ajjanagadde's model of systematic reasoning. Skarda and Freeman's model 
is essentially a neurophysiological model, and does not involve accounts of 
the cognitive aspects of olfaction. Shastri and Ajjanagadde's model related 
more closely to the approach taken here, concerned with linking higher 
level cognitive processes to lower level neuronal behaviours. 
So far the impact of temporal coding in the form of oscillations has not had 
a major impact on mainstream A l . Implementations have mainly centred 
around the development of biologically realistic models by 
neurophysiologists for the investigation of brain dynamics. However, as 
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mentioned earlier, Edelman*s group have concentrated on the development 
of biologically realistic models of brain function that drive robots (Tononi 
et al, 1992). 
SUGGESTIONS FOR F U T U R E W^ORK. 
OVERVIEW. 
It was not intended that the conceptual model and theory would be in 
anyway a definitive account of visual perception. What was intended by the 
thesis was the investigation of the nature of visual perception in relation to 
its architectures and mechanisms. On refiection it seems that one of the 
main outcomes of this work is that its contribution to understanding visual 
perception is to provide the foundations for future research. One of the main 
motivations behind the thesis was that i t is essential to have an 
understanding of perception as a coherent whole before the construction of 
detailed software models. Bearing this in mind it is also possible to refine 
that representation of perception through the implementation of a general 
model in terms of more specific applications. 
SIMULATE THE MODEL. 
The next stage of the research program would be to attempt a simulation of 
the model as i t stands, the aim being to decide whether i t is possible to 
investigate perception as a complete process or whether it would be more 
productive to concentrate investigation on a particular aspect of visual 
perception such as object recognition or visual attention. Through 
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simulation it is envisaged that possible extensions to the model would 
become apparent. The architectures and function described by the model 
may be insufficient to allow for it to be built in software. This may be the 
case both in relation to alterations that might be necessary due to 
constraints enforced by the available simulation tools, and also constraints 
imposed by the neurophysiological and psychological descriptions 
underlying the conceptual model. This would be the case for the application 
of the simulation to both the development of artificial vision systems and 
understanding human visual perception. 
Simulation can be regarded as a tool to advance our understanding of visual 
perception. Arguably in relation to the general theory forming the 
foundations of the conceptual model, simulation would not provide anymore 
insight than the conceptual model outlined in the thesis. A l l simulation 
would achieve would be a different way of representing what had already 
been stated. It could almost be likened to taking a written description of the 
model and then re writing it in diagrammatic form. 
In attempting to understand more specific aspects of the conceptual model, 
simulation may provide a useful tool. For example investigating whether it 
is possible that synchronous oscillatory activity underlies feature 
integration within modules, or whether diffuse feedback resulting in 
synchronous oscillatory activity could explain the integration of 
information between modules. I f the model was to be used in such a way to 
understand the mechanisms of human visual perception then it would have 
to correspond to experimental research taking place in neurophysiology. For 
example the generalisation of neurophysiological findings about neuronal 
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mechanisms in V I to explain how integration across modules might occur is 
speculation. So a l l the model would achieve is a mechanistic demonstration 
o f a theory o f func t iona l i ty . What the model would do however, is to 
provide direct ion for neurophysiological investigations into the possibi l i ty 
o f this a r t i f i c i a l behaviour existing i n the biological brain. 
It is possible therefore to view the possible simulat ion o f the conceptual 
model as either detailed models o f modules, investigating the mechanisms 
underlying perception, or an extremely s impl i f i ed simulation o f the model 
as a whole. The former would not explain perception, rather visual 
processing, the latter on the other hand could be expected to explain visual 
perception, but the fact that i t was an extremely s impl i f i ed model would 
mean that i t would s t i l l only provide a generalised interpretation o f 
perception. I t is possible that implementation o f either the conceptual model 
as a whole or specific aspects o f the model could be applied to help us 
understand and explain both perceptual defici ts and visual behaviour 
generally. This would obviously be most successful i f carried out in parallel 
w i t h pure experimental research. 
Attempted simulation o f the model has far greater significance i n the 
development o f a r t i f i c i a l v is ion systems. Continued research would demand 
that the model was implemented in software and in i t i a l tests were carried 
out to see i f i t was possible in its simple form to demonstrate its ab i l i ty to 
perform in the way proposed by the conceptual model. A t this point there 
would be a need for a great deal o f work to be conducted into the 
computational constraints o f the model and ul t imately a lot o f the biological 
realism would have to be omitted. A simulat ion for a r t i f i c i a l v is ion systems 
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would be based upon the conceptual model, but the resultant behaviour o f 
the system would have to be more important than its biological realism. 
I n i t i a l l y i t would be necessary to decide what k ind o f system was to be bui l t 
based upon the model. As wi th its application to understanding human 
vision there are two possible options. First ly to try to implement the 
conceptual model as a complete system capable o f human like perception. 
The possible uses o f such a system would include real time robotics. 
Secondly i t is possible to concentrate on a particular aspects o f the model to 
provided solutions for specific v is ion problems. For example the 
development o f the feature l i nk ing mechanisms proposed by the model for 
use in pattern recognition processes. 
The next stage would be to select a possible neuronal model which would 
behave i n the way proposed by the conceptual model. Most neuronal models 
that produce oscil latory behaviour are based upon experimental data f r o m 
single cell recordings, therefore i t would seem that biological realism could 
be applied even to a r t i f i c i a l vis ion systems. However the s impl i f ica t ion o f 
the behaviours o f such models to a l low them to be described mathematically 
means that they can at best be considered approximations o f neuronal 
behaviour. The selection and formula t ion o f the neuronal model is in i t se l f a 
major research program. This then becomes even more complex when 
networks o f neurons are constructed. The connection o f a r t i f i c i a l neurons in 
a network, be i t a b iological ly based architecture or a completely arbitrary 
one does not guarantee behaviours proposed by experimental data or 
conceptual models. I t may be the case that architecture, funct ion and 
mechanisms as proposed by the model may not extrapolate to the 
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development o f a r t i f i c i a l v is ion systems. The conceptual model may providi 
ideas that could then be developed further, but may not rely on the actual 
constraints o f the model. 
In sum then, The conceptual model is in fact a hypothesis for a model, it 
could be argued that simulation at this point would involve a great deal o f 
hard work based on pure speculation. I t would be feasible to attempt 
simulat ion o f certain aspects o f the model, but this would not provide 
support for the theory and conceptual model as a whole. 
POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS TO THE M O D E L . 
The development o f any model is an iterative process. Once a model has 
been proposed i t is possible to adapt and change that model to f i t w i t h new 
data and to extend i t to incorporate a wider range o f behaviours. I t was not 
intended that the conceptual model would account for a l l visual processes. 
I t does not for example include secondary visual pathways, visual attention 
processes and detailed explanations o f connectivity between visual modules. 
Therefore further work on the model must include a more comprehensive 
and more detailed account o f both architecture and func t ion . What is needed 
is to look at particular visual behaviours in relation to the model and to 
extend i t incorporate these behaviours, for example how the model explain 
the recognit ion o f faces, or how action responses are generated f r o m visual 
s t imu l i . To a certain degree extensions to the model w i l l be defined by the 
applications o f the model. I f for example the model is to be use to help 
understand b l ind sight, then secondary visual pathways must be 
incorporated. In the same way investigation into other visual behaviours 
211 
w i l l mean that change to the model w i l l be necessary. 
One o f the key areas for further work is the development of a more detailed 
understanding o f the more speculative aspects o f the model. This would 
include investigations into the way in which top-down memory was 
integrated into the system as an aid to hypothesis label l ing, and the role o f 
the dLGN in hypothesis conf i rmat ion. I t would be expected that s imulat ion, 
especially for the purposes o f modell ing human visual perception would 
demand that extensions such as the incorporation o f secondary visual 
pathways were made. The model claims to provide a global account o f 
visual perception. Arguably wi thout incorporating an explanation o f 
attention processes, and by omit t ing certain known structures relating to 
visual perception this claim is not entirely va l id . However the model 
provides a point f r o m which perception as a whole process can be 
investigated. Importantly the development o f the model so far has shown 
that visual perception does not occur in isolation, i t includes input f rom 
processing across the whole brain. Therefore not including descriptions o f 
certain visual processing functions and particular detailed structures is 
really a minor omission in relation to the rest o f the brain. 
The theory underlying the model is not conclusive. Is therefore envisaged 
that another possible extension to the model would involve conducting both 
psychological and neurophysiological experiments to investigate the theory 
i n more detail . This may result i n changes being made to the model in order 
for i t to be used in attempts at understanding human visual processing. 
However as descriptions o f structure and funct ion can be separated f rom the 
theoretical foundations, explanations o f some o f the more detailed aspects 
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o f visual processing would not be affected by such modif icat ions . Any 
changes that were made as a result o f such experimentation would not 
necessarily affect the model in terms o f its application to the development 
o f a r t i f i c i a l v is ion systems unless such systems claimed to be biological ly 
plausible. 
CONCLUSIONS. 
A mult i -disc ipl inary approach to the investigation o f visual perception has 
been successfully applied and the conceptual model developed has benefited 
f r o m this approach. A better understanding or rather interpretation o f human 
visual perception as wel l as new possibili t ies for a r t i f i c i a l vision systems 
has been achieved. Final ly has been possible to place the conceptual model 
in relation to future research. 
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GT.OSSARY 





The processing of sensory information localised 
to those areas of the brain which process only 
visual information. Essentially theses areas can 
be defined as; V I . V 2 , V 3 . V3a. V4 and V 5 . 
The perception of sensory input localised to a 
given sensory area, namely vision. Any 
"perception" at this level would be restricted to 
visual information only and would not include 
information processed in other sensory 
modalities or memory. 
The perception of sensory input that includes 
the result of local processing and local 
perception in many sensory areas as well as 
input from memory. 
An approach to the study of visual perception 
that begins at the lowest possible level of 
explanation, and results in the formation of a 
theory. More explicitly with regard to the study 
of visual perception, to begin by trying to 
understand vision at the neuronal level and 
using successively higher level descriptions 
eventually to formulate a theory based on these 
investigations which also explains high level 
behavioural accounts of visual perception. 
An approach to the study of visual perception 
that takes the opposite approach to bottom-up 
approaches. Initially the formulation of a 
theory takes place based on a high level 
behavioural account of visual perception, which 
is then supported or refuted by the collection of 
evidence at lower levels of description, ending 
at the neuronal level. 
Data-Driven 
Concept-Driven 
An approach to the explanation of visual 
perception that maintains all the information 
needed for interpreting the visual image is 
already present in the visual scene. No prior or 
stored knowledge is necessary. 
An approach to the explanation of visual 
perception that takes the opposite view of data-
driven approaches. Concept-driven approaches 
to understanding visual perception maintain 
that stored knowledge in the form of memory is 
necessary for the successful interpretation of 
the visual image. 
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